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Constitutionalism in Asia
Asian Views of the American Influence
Edited by

Lawrence Ward Beer

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: ASIAN VIEWS OF
THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE
PREFACE TO THE 1988 EDITION
This volume was inspired by the 1976 Bicentennial of the
Declaration of Independence of the United States of America.
(Regarding the related symposium program, see the Preface to
the 1979 edition, below.) The decade since its publication has
been eventful for constitutionalism in Asia. 1 The book now reappears in bicentennial commemoration of a series of events between 1787 and 1791, from the signing of the Constitution of the
United States in Philadelphia on September 17, 1787 to the ratification of the American Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791.
Here I note a few historic constitutional developments and
problems in Asian countries during the years spanning the two
bicentennial eras. In terms of such principles of constitutionalism as limited, responsive and responsible government, civil liberties, and criminal justice rights, my sense is that more Asian
polities have improved than have regressed since the late 1970s.
The hundreds of cultures of Asia differ in many respects
with each other as with those of other world regions; but all
Asian nation-states now share adoption of a government institution invented by the United States in the eighteenth century, the
single-document constitution setting forth a country's public
principles, its governmental structures, and the relationships between its leaders and governed. All of Asia's current constitutions are of post-World War II origin. Very few nations
anywhere (e.g., Norway, 1814; Colombia, 1886) have constitutions dating from the nineteenth century. Of the 165 single-document national constitutions in force as of January, 1989, well
over 100 have been ratified since 1970.
With the end of world wars and the passing of Western colonial dominance, many Asian countries regained not only their
independence, but also their sense of national political identity.
Ever since, they have been redefining their legal and governmental institutions and practices to fuse perennial indigenous values
1. Both the 1979 edition (University of California Press) and the 1981 Japanese-language version (Gakuyo Shobo Publishing Co., Tokyo; Isao Sato, sup. trans.)
are out of print.
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with transcultural forms, ideologies, and constitutional principles. The latter half of the twentieth century may well be the
most dynamic period in history of worldwide experimentation
with governmental institutions. Moreover, for the first time, educated elites in most if not all major cultural zones and legal traditions mutually comprehend a set of constitutional ideas (e.g.,
parliament, elections, presidency, rights, independent courts),
however much they disagree on priorities. While conflict and
disorder here and there in Asia may draw the bulk of American
media attention, the dawning of an unprecedented age of documentary and substantive constitutionalism is ultimately more exciting. To an increasing degree, scholars and practicioners can
speak to each other across cultural boundaries about constitutional alternatives and imperatives, about the distinctive yet intelligible traits peculiar to each constitutional system, and about
related legal technicalities. Although political and economic ideologies continue to divide countries, parties and scholars
throughout Asia, in 1989 rigidities seem to have softened; ethnic
and religious divisions, smooth leadership transition, individual
rights, and economic problems more insistently call for the attention of leaders than do the theoretical varieties of socialism and
democracy. Promotion of tolerance for diversity of beliefs and
subcultures remains perhaps the most intractable project for constitutional states.
The current constitutions of Asia were ratified in the indicated years: Afghanistan, 1980; Bangladesh, 1972; Brunei, 1984;
Burma, 1974; Republic of China, Taiwan, 1947; People's Republic of China, 1982; India, 1949; Indonesia, 1945 (in force since
1959); Japan, 1946; Kampuchea (Cambodia), 1981; Lao, 1975;
Malaysia, 1963; Mongolia, 1960; Nepal, 1962; Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1972; Republic of Korea, 1987; Pakistan, 1973; Papua-New Guinea, 1975; The Philippines, 1987;
Singapore, 1963; Sri Lanka (Ceylon), 1978; Thailand, 1978; and
Vietnam, 1980.
Three themes seem to stand out in the Asian constitutional
politics of the 1980s: leadership succession problems, the military's role in government, and human rights issues. Leadership
changed hands in many Asian countries, not just in the sense of
one leader succeeding another-after election, assassination, natural death, popular upheaval, coup d'etat, or oligarchic selection-but in the deeper sense of a generation passing away and
established modes of governance beginning to change direction.
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Elsewhere, nepotistic succession occurred, as with Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi in 1984, or was awaited, as with the sons of
North Korea's Kim 11-sung and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew.
By 1989, militarized and military-dominated regimes appeared to be receding in importance, and civilian constitutionalism advancing, except perhaps in Indonesia. Human rights
concerns found fresh emphasis in the diplomacy of President
Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), with the expanding acceptance of
United Nations and regional human rights documents, and with
the growth of human rights studies (e.g., Human Rights Quarterly [Johns Hopkins University Press]). Pol Pot's massacre of
his Kampuchean countrymen after the Vietnam War, the subsequent protracted civil-international war involving Vietnam, and
the great exodus of Indochinese refugees since 1975 raised world
awareness of human rights violations notably through the 1980s.
China frankly disclosed the excesses of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution ( 1966-1976, especially 1966-1969), and popular movements called for individual rights and freedoms in, for
example, South Korea, China, The Philippines, Pakistan, and
Burma.
In 1976 the United Nations' "International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights" and "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" came into effect for ratifying
nations; other human rights instruments further defined specific
issues, such as the 1979 "Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women" and the 1984 "Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment." Constitutional rights issues on such matters
transcend differences of culture, but present different challenges
for different civilizations. The Human Rights Committee of the
nongovernmental Law Association for Asia and the Pacific provided a forum for refining understandings of human rights in
Asia; its multi-national membership has formulated "Basic Principles of Human Rights" as guidelines, and publishes a Human
Rights Bulletin on performance. At the fortieth anniversary of
the United Nations' Declaration of Universal Human Rights on
December 10, 1988, on balance, the increased rhetorical and documentary prominence of individual rights in Asia seemed to be
matched by more serious government and private efforts than in
the past to better institutionalize constitutional rights in law.
A generational change of leadership has been linked in many
cases with shifts in the status of military politics and human
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rights. One symbol of such transitions was the passing on January 7, 1989 of Emperor Hirohito of Japan after over sixty-two
years on the throne. Although postwar Japan has been marked
by stable democracy and constitutional pacifism, Hirohito had
continued to call to mind for some, at home and abroad, the aggressive, repressive and militaristic government ending in September, 1945. Upon becoming powerless, hereditary monarch,
Emperor Akihito and his commoner Empress Michiko, both educated to internationalism, adopted the era name "Achieving
Peace" (Heise1).
Other examples of major transition are the current governments of The Philippines and South Korea. They shared what
has been a crucial constitutional problem for some other Asian
countries: the unwillingness of an incumbent to relinquish power
after a legally set period in office, the absence of clear democratic
constraints on a leader's tenure, and/or the lack of any effectively
routinized system in law and politics for passing from one national leader or group of leaders to the next. Ferdinand Marcos
was the first Filipino President elected for a second term; his subsequent manipulation of law and constitution to perpetuate his
leadership and damage democracy and economy suggests the
wisdom of the 1987 Philippine Constitution in institutionalizing
the earlier constitutional custom of allowing only one term in office. President Corazon Aquino and her successors are allowed
only one six-year term. The Sixth Republic of Korea Constitution (1987) provides for the direct election of a president to only
one five-year term. Some scholars and former Presidents of the
United States have wisely recommended that a constitutional
amendment be adopted to limit the American president to a single term of five or six years, in part to assure that the business of
governance is not overshadowed by reelection politics during a
first term.
Another provision of the Philippine Constitution which recommends itself to other Asian countries with family-based systems of sociopolitics is the anti-nepotism provision of Article 7,
Section 13, which prohibits presidential appointment of relatives
to high public office. It may be that a son or daughter of a national leader has excellent credentials, as in the case of Chiang
Ching-kuo of the Republic of China on Taiwan and, apparently,
Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, the first woman prime minister of a
major Islamic country; or it may be that legitimate doubts exist
about the stature of a leader's offspring, as in the case of Rajeev
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Gandhi of India and Kim Jong 11, son of Kim 11 Sung, North
Korea's leader since 1948. Special problems are created if, as in
Thailand, the monarch is of central constitutional importance
and the heir apparent's qualities excite considerably less respect
than those of the incumbent, King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Restraint of various forms of family power remains a seminal issue
for constitutional debate in Asia.
Since 1948, South Korea has experienced a series of constitutional crises and has lived under six constitutions. In dramatic
prelude to Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Olympics, a widely supported popular movement in 1987 demanded and won constitutional establishment of direct popular election of the president,
increased protection of human rights, and a strict limit (noted
above) on a president's term of office. The current Republic of
Korea Constitution was ratified in the fall of 1987. After defeating a divided opposition majority in December 16, 1987 elections,
President Rob Tae Woo succeeded President Chun Doo H wan
on February 25, 1988. This marked the first peaceful transfer of
power under law since the founding of the Republic in 1948.
Chun was the first incumbent to leave office after one term (seven
years), albeit as part of a transition to a new constitutional order,
and amid charges of family corruption. These events of 1987 and
1988 may augur lasting democracy. Besides Korea's rights protection record in years to come, the main test for constitutionalism may come at the end of President Rob's five-year term: Will
the military allow transition to a civilian president?
Since 1961, South Korea's presidents have been former
generals first chosen by their military colleagues rather than by
popular election. Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) was assassinated
and Chun Doo Hwan (1979-1988) soon took over the Republic
by coup d'etat; Rob Tae Woo is also a retired general. To concerned Koreans, the general question in the background is: Will
the military permit Korea's democratic constitutional system to
operate without interference? Analogous questions face other
Asian countries in transition, such as Burma, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. This is not to deny the noteworthy accomplishments of some of Asia's peacetime militarydominated governments since the 1940s; nor is it to suggest that
one-party civilian governments may not be even more inimical to
constitutionalism than military governments. These points are
clear from the repressive record of Asia's communist states and
from instances of military leaders yielding elsewhere to civilian
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democracy. Nevertheless, a military is an irregular, non-constitutional center of government power. In general, the primacy of
military power in a government is as concrete an indicator of
weak constitutionalism as are the absence of adequate provisions
for democratic leadership succession and defects in the protection of freedom of expression or criminal justice rights.
A new generation of demilitarized governments may be
emerging in the latter 1980s in East, Southeast and South Asia,
but that is yet problematic. Will Pakistan and Bangladesh continue toward less military power in government? General Ne
Win and the Burma Socialist Program Party dominated Burmese
politics for decades. After the 1988 demonstrations and leadership changes, will the military in Burma allow pluralization of
politics and/or demilitarization of government? In Thailand,
General Prem Tinsulanond's eight years as prime minister made
him the longest serving elected leader in the history of Thai democracy. After the July, 1988 elections, he yielded the premiership to Chatichai Choonhaven, the choice of the civilian
coalition. Will Thailand's military permit the evolution of multiparty civilian democracy to continue, or will it revert to government by coup? In the Philippines, will the tradition of military
subordination to civilian government regain strength after the aberrational Marcos period and the strains of governing since the
People's Revolution of 1986?
The Republic of China has moved on from the Chiang era
with peace and prosperity. Taiwan's constitutional situation
presented an unusual mixture of elements in 1989. Like the Philippines and South Korea, Taiwan entered a period of apparent
transition toward constitutional democracy in 1987, but at the
initiative of its popular leader, President Chiang Ching-kuo
(1910-1988), not primarily in response to citizen demands or
strong opposition to the government. The Constitution of the
Republic of China first went into effect during civil war on December 25, 1947. At the first meeting of the National Assembly,
"Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion" (Temporary
Provisions) were passed, and were promulgated on May 10, 1948.
These Temporary Provisions were later amended four times, last
in 1970. In substance, they delayed full implementation of constitutional democracy on Taiwan on grounds of continuing wartime conditions, and martial law was proclaimed. The
Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), founded by Sun Yat-sen
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and long headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975),
has held sway over government, law and politics.
In an historic action on July 14, 1987, party Chairman and
President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law on Taiwan; it had
been in effect a remarkable thirty-eight years. The law of the
constitution could now begin to function more autonomously;
but Taiwan remains in transition. A "National Security Law for
the Period of Rebellion Suppression" was enacted to continue
some restraints on freedom characteristic of the martial law period, when government was quite sensitive to any criticism.
However, law and policy now seem on the way to favoring substantially increased tolerance for political diversity. Among
other signs, five political parties have been allowed to exist and to
engage in vigorous competitive party politics. In early 1988, after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, a Taiwanese technocrat, Lee
Teng-hui, became President to serve out the remainder of Chiang's term till 1990. 2
In the People's Republic of China, an historic leadership
transition continued in 1989 which had begun with the deaths in
the mid-1970s of Mao Zedong and colleagues such as Chou Enlai
who had ruled the Chinese Communist Party for forty years.
The succession process has no precedent in China and will not
end as long as Deng Ziaoping remains on the scene as an authoritative guiding hand; but he and his supporters have been putting
in place a generation of new leaders in the 1980s. Ziao Ziyang
has become General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party,
and Li Peng Premier of the government. The currently operative
"constitution" of China is composed of the 1982 Constitution
and the Party's rules after the Thirteenth National Party Congress (October 25-November 1, 1987). In the absence of any
transition since 1949 from the charismatic founders to a new generation ofleaders under well-tried procedures, post-Deng China's
leadership and course seem unpredictable. Increased international openness to foreign capital and technology has not implied
serious official interest in constitutional democracy, but has
spurred development of the stronger legal system essential to predictable economic relations and more regularized governmentcitizen relations. Much new law has been promulgated in areas
2. For a comprehensive study on the influence of American Constitution on the
Republic of China, see Ray S. Cline and Hungdah Chiu, The U.S. Constitution and
the Development of Constitutionalism in China, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Global
Strategy Council, 1988, pp. 7-69, 135-150.
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subject to capricious change in the past, such as criminal law.
Limited periods of vigorous public discourse and demonstrations
have occurred. However, besides government acceptance of the
supremacy of the constitution and well-drafted laws, criminal
justice rights and constitutionalism in general require a solid infrastructure of institutions (e.g., independent courts) and trained
professionals. Even should China decisively favor adoption of
democratic practices of criminal justice, it would take considerable time and resources to develop the expertise necessary for national implementation of that policy. With their legal institutions
and expertise and with their measure of democratic education,
countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and
Taiwan have great advantages China lacks: they have only to opt
for constitutional democracy and they have the infrastructure to
put it into practice. It is easy to forget, ideological differences
aside, that in ruling over one billion people, the government of
China is engaged in the greatest organizational task in the history
of humankind. 3
The American constitutional experience continues to be one
of the perennial reference points in world discourse about government, law and human rights. The intensification of peaceful
American relations with Asian countries in the past ten years,
and the recent apparent tendency in a number of nations toward
strengthened constitutionalist government make it more important than in the past that we understand the foundations of government and law in Asia on their own terms and in comparison
with American constitutionalism. This book is offered again in
commemoration of the United States bicentennial and in honor
of Asian constitutionalists.
In closing, a word about the current status of the Asian authors. Former President Chowdhury continues to provide diplomatic services for Bangladesh in international meetings.
Professor Ma is now Grand Justice in the Judicial Yuan of the
Republic of China. Professor P.K. Tripathi continues to teach
law at the University of Delhi, while former Chief Justice Seno
Adji has returned to teach law at the University of Indonesia.
Honored by Japan's government for exceptional public service as
a scholar and educator, Professor Ukai passed away in Tokyo
3. For Chinese mainland scholars' views toward U.S. Constitution, see Fengming Liu, "Studying United States Constitutional Law: A Personal Experience of a
Chinese Students," Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 37 (1987), pp. 346-351 and
Cline and Chiu, supra note 2, pp. 70-86, 150-153.
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early in 1987. Lord President Tun Suffian is in active retirement
from Malaysia's highest court. Professor Fernando completed
his tenure as Chief Justice of the Philippines in 1985 and now
practices law. Professor Jayakumar has continued active in the
government of Singapore, as Law Minister and as Home Minister. Finally, sincere thanks to Professor Hungdah Chiu for his
assistance in bringing this book to light of day.
LAWRENCE W. BEER
P.M. Kirby Professor of Civil Rights
Lafayette College
Easton, Pennsylvania
December 31, 1988.
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Preface

The purposes of this symposium are to further knowledge of Asian law
and to advance the comparative study of law and constitutionalism.
This volume presents a wealth of data and expert opinion concerning
law and constitutionalism in Asia which hitherto has been unavailable
to Americans or difficult to obtain except in indigenous sources. It also
sheds light on the degree and manner of the relevance of the Declaration of Independence and the American constitutional experience to the
modern legal and political life of Asian nations which stretch in an
enormous arc from India and Pakistan to Japan. Asian constitutional
and legal realities are here presented, not through the sometimes tinted
glasses of Western legal scholars, but as perceived by eminently qualified indigenous jurists and legal scholars: Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed
Chowdhury, past President of Bangladesh; Professor Herbert H. P.
Ma, College of Law, National Taiwan University, Taipei; Dr. P. K.
Tripathi, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, and past Member, Law
Commission of India; Chief Justice Dr. Oemar Seno Adji of the
Supreme Court of Indonesia; Professor Nobushige Ukai of Senshu
University, Tokyo, and past President, Public Law Association of
Japan; Lord President Tun Mohamed Suffian of the Federal Court of
Malaysia; Senior Associate Justice Enrique Fernando of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines; and Dean S. Jayakumar, Faculty of Law,
University of Singapore. (A biographical sketch on each Asian author
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can be found at the back of this book.) The Committee on Asian Law
thanks the Asian contributors for taking time to honor us with their
views.
A word of explanation on the background of this symposium and
on the Committee on Asian Law is in order. In the spring of 1976, the
Committee on Asian Law of the Association for Asian Studies offered a
month-long Bicentennial program centered on the theme "Asian perspectives on the American constitutional influence in Asia." The Committee on Asian Law is an elected committee of legal scholars specializing in one of the four subregions of Asia, as Asia is divided for
organizational purposes by the Association for Asian Studies (AAS):
Northeast Asia (Japan and Korea); China and Inner Asia; Southeast
Asia; and South Asia. The Association is the principal learned society
for many thousands of scholars in a wide range of academic disciplines
who have a special interest in one or more nations of Asia, from Japan
to Afghanistan.
The Committee on Asian Law is the primary meeting ground for
legal practitioners and academics in the fields of law, political science,
sociology, anthropology, and history who share a professional interest
in Asian law and legal systems. The Committee's goals include the
advancement of research and teaching on Asian law, and the development of reliable information concerning available expertise on Asian
law. See, for example, the Committee's annual publication, Asian Law
Forum, and the Directory of Persons Interested in Asian Law (Chin
Kim, ed.), which is up-dated periodically by the Committee. Of related
interest is a survey of American law schools and Asian Studies programs, "Asian Legal Studies in the United States: A Survey Report,''
Journal of Legal Education 29, no. 4 (1978), a product of Committee
collaboration with the International Legal Center.
The Bicentennial program of the Committee on Asian Law consisted in a series of public panel presentations and seminars in March
and April, 1976, at the annual convention of the Association for Asian
Studies (Toronto), and in Buffalo, New York City, Washington, D.C.,
and San Francisco. In all, some thirty programs were offered as a
group; additional talks and seminars were presented in other cities
during the portions of the itinerary when the Asian jurists were
traveling singly. Earlier versions of many of the contributions to this
volume were presented and candidly discussed on those occasions. The
present writer served as program coordinator and an official escort
throughout.
The Committee on Asian Law was assisted in this project by the
Office of East Asian and Pacific Programs, U.S. Department of State;
the Asia Foundation; the Asia Society in New York and Washington,
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D.C.; and the Visitor Program Service of Meridian House International. In addition, law schools, the American Bar Association, the
Federal Bar Association, Barry Metzger of the Coudert Brothers law
firm, and a number of local bar associations and World Affairs
Councils lent a helping hand. Generous cooperation was also forthcoming from the White House, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger of the
United States Supreme Court, the Committee on the Judiciary of the
U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Justice Department, and both
federal and local courts. To all of these, and to the officers and able
staff of the Association for Asian Studies, the Committee and the
Bicentennial guests wish to express their deep gratitude.
Members and associates of the Committee on Asian Law have
assisted in the preparation of the manuscript for publication, especially
the following: Daniel S. Lev and Ronald G. Brown of Seattle; Marc
Galanter and Robert Hayden of Madison, Wisconsin; James L. Magavern of Buffalo, New York; Hungdah Chiu of Baltimore, Maryland;
and Henry F. Goodnow and Roger K. Paget of Boulder, Colorado.
The views of the Asian authors are their own and are not to
be construed as official statements of the policies of their respective nations or as the opinions of the Committee on Asian Law or
the Association for Asian Studies or the cosponsors of the 1976
Bicentennial program. In some papers, informational footnotes have
been added by the editor and his assistants to clarify the context or to
indicate sources to which the reader may turn for further enlightenment on the subject under discussion in the text. Modification and
adaptation of English-language phraseology has been necessary in a
number of places because English is the second, third, or fourth
language of our Asian contributors; in this editing process we have
scrupulously avoided any modification of the author's intent. The
opinions of the authors of editorial notes before chapters and of the
present writer (expressed herein and in chapter I) do not necessarily
mirror those of the Committee on Asian Law or any agency cosponsoring or supporting the Bicentennial program or chapter authors.
The sequence of chapters was determined solely on the basis of the
alphabetical order of the names of the countries dealt with herein, in
keeping with the system of protocol adopted for the Bicentennial
presentations of 1976. The number of Asian countries represented by
the writings we offer in this symposium is of necessity limited. Our
intent has been, not comprehensive coverage of all the many nations in
that vast area encompassing almost two-thirds of humankind, but
rather the inclusion of a sufficient number and diversity of nations to
provide representation of most Asian legal traditions operative at the
present time. For obvious if regrettable political reasons, we do not
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have the benefit of a contribution by an indigenous scholar of Asian
socialist legalism. Final responsibility for the selection of the Asian
nations represented and the distinguished contributors rests with the
Committee on Asian Law.
Thanks are due, finally, to Ms. Bee Peterson of the Department of
Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, for typing most of
the manuscript; to my parents, Lucile H. Beer of Portland, Oregon, and
the late Norman H. Beer, for teaching me to Jearn from other lands
while critically appreciating our own; and to my wife, Keiko, and our
children for patience with scholarly absenteeism.
The ideas and institutions espoused in the Constitution of the
United States and the Declaration of Independence are among the
finest contributions of the United States to the world in the past two
hundred years. In the years ahead, Americans may well learn to grasp
more deeply the persisting principles of their constitution and legal
system by learning from jurists and scholars of Asia who have first
honored the United States by studying its legal principles and constitutional experience. This symposium is offered as such a learning opportunity, and in the hope it may stimulate further creative exchanges.
LAWRENCE WARD BEER
Committee on Asian Law
Association for Asian Studies
Boulder, Colorado
May 1978

I

Introduction

Constitutionalism in Asia and the United States

Lawrence Ward Beer

The Constitution and the Declaration of Independence of the United
States of America emerged in the particularistic historical context of
British North America; but the constitutional values enunciated and
institutionalized therein were seen from the beginning as having universal relevance for humankind. These documents still speak forcefully,
not only to most citizens of the United States,' but also to many peoples
of different history and heritage around the world. American constitutionalism is one of the major models available two centuries later.
What is striking is not that some elements of the Declaration and
the Constitution are out of tune with the indigenous power structure,
legal perceptions, social values, economic systems, or constitutional
needs of many nations, but that so much of their spirit has become part
of the evolving perennial wisdom of democratically inclined countries
I. The Bicentennial occasioned an outpouring of commentaries on the Declaration
of Independence and the constitutional and moral foundations of American government
in the American mass media. For some recent scholarly analyses, see Paul Eidelberg, On
the Silence of the Declaration of Independence (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1976); Robert H. Horwitz, The Moral Foundations of the American Republic
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976); Walter Berns, The First Amendment
and the Future of American Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1976); and Norman A.
Graebner (ed.), Freedom in America: A 200- Year Perspective (College Station: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976).
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in so many regions of the world. As the distinguished Ceylonese jurist
C. G. Weeramantry has said:
Aversion for colonialism and all it meant and a respect for the antiquity
of Third World tradition must not obscure the fact that one of the
grandest intellectual concepts that has emerged in the long history of
justice-thinking is the concept of the Rights of Man as developed in the
West. The philosophy of natural law, built upon an ancient base by such
philosophers as Locke, Rousseau and Bentham in Europe, and Thomas
Paine and Thomas Jefferson in America, and their flowering in the
American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man-all these are the property, the achievement and the
inheritance of all mankind. Third World cultures did not bring their
formulations of human rights to this degree of explicitness, and it would
be unwisdom indeed to jettison this stream of tradition merely because
it had its greatest development in the West. Indeed, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the other basic international formulations around these themes, on which the world order of the future needs to
be built, draw heavily upon this stream of thought. The very notion of
the economic rights and duties of States, on which much of the future of
the Third World depends, must rest in the ultimate analysis on a bedrock
of natural law.2

The United States Bicentennial era of the mid-1970s was ill timed to
generate enthusiasm, pride, and confidence in the rule-of-law principles
behind the American constitutional endeavor from its inception. The
period preparatory to the Bicentennial observance was coincident with
the early aftermath of the Vietnam War, probably the most excruciatingly divisive conflict since the American Civil War, and attendant
communist victories in Cambodia and Laos. lt'l addition, the balance
and cohesion among the elements of the American constitutional structures have been disrupted in recent years by abuses of power symbolized by the Watergate affair. American citizens differed deeply among
themselves on what this all meant and on whether the republic emerged
strong or weak from the ordeals. The inflation, recession, unemployment, and new concern for energy resources of the mid-1970s provided
almost welcome distraction from the exposed national wounds of war
and corruption for many Americans.
2. C. G. Weeramantry. Equality and Freedom: Some Third World Perspectives
(Colombo: Hansa Publishers, Ltd., 1976), p. 67. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10,
1948. The United Nations Charter, which came into force on October 24, 1945,
affirmed human rights particularly in Articles I and 55. Some of the other major
international documents dealing with human rights are the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted in 1948); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ( 1965); the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (I 966); and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). The United States has chosen not to
participate in some such covenants.
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Some noted that the number of nations abroad adhering to principles, laws, and governmental practices compatible with those of American constitutionalism seemed to be shrinking perceptibly year by year,
and nowhere perhaps more noticeably than in Asia. 3 Moreover, setting
aside for present purposes the merits of the conflicting positions taken
in the American debate over the causes and effects of the Vietnam War,
Asian peoples and leaders seemed to see America as either an enemy
defeated, a disturbingly unskilled great power, an unreliable ally, or in
some other light unflattering to the American ego. The winds were not
favorable for human rights and limited government.
It was a good time for mature reflection on the nation's foundations in light of the experience and knowledge of some of Asia's most
able jurists and legal scholars. President Jimmy Carter had not yet been
nominated, and his controversial and dramatic emphasis on human
rights had not yet become an essential element of American foreign
policy. Given the costs of three American conflicts in Asia since 1941,
and the complexities of wise implementation of the current human
rights policy, legal scholars and policy makers might well bend their
efforts to understand accurately what friend, foe, and neutral in Asia
say and do with respect to law and constitutionalism. Little information, let alone perspective, has been readily available in America on
the law and constitutionalism of many Asian nations.4 Knowledge will
not necessarily bring agreement, but it can lead to a valuable state of
mind that is difficult to achieve-genuine disagreement. Those who
stand in alleged disagreement in Asia and the United States often lack
an accurate understanding of their respective positions. One must
understand what the other party is saying before he can correctly say he
disagrees with that party; this applies with force to dialogue between
those of contrasting legal cultures. This symposium serves the causes of
both understanding and disagreement between the legal systems of the
United States and of some Asian countries. This chapter briefly sketches the colonialist background of constitutionalism in modern Asia,
3. For example, during the early 1970s South Korea. the Philippines, and India
joined the list of Asian nations which systematically increased restrictions on public
liberties. See "Authority, Emergency, and Development: A Symposium," Asian Survey,
April, 1978; Raymond D. Gastil, "Comparative Survey of Freedom," Freedom at Issue
(this periodic survey, the Freedom House Survey of Human Rights, focuses on political
rights, not socioeconomic rights); and the following journals which review progress in this
field: American Bar Association, Human Rights; and International Institute of Human
Rights (Strasbourg), Revue des droits de l'homme; and United Nations, Yearbook on
Human Rights, from 1946.
4. A brief bibliography on Asian law and constitutionalism is at the end of this
book. Concerning the debate on human rights, see, for example, Stanley Hoffman, "The
Hell of Good Intentions," Foreign Policy, no. 29 (Winter, 1977-78), p. 8, and Mumtaz
Soysal, "Refle~tions on Peace and Human Rights," 1977 Nobel Peace Prize Lecture,
Matchbox, Wmter, 1978.
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comments on a few problems attendant on comparative studies of
Asian law and constitutionalism, and identifies views held in common
by a number of the Asian authors regarding Asian and American constitutionalism today.
Colonialism and Constitutionalism in Modern Asia
Obviously there is no such thing as "Asian" constitutionalism and law.
Asia is a vast region with many countries and over 60 percent of the
world's population; each Asian nation-and indeed, each of many
subgroups within some Asian countries-has its own separate history
and distinctive laws, customary law, and constitutional system. Moreover, many Asian nations have shared as little in common with each
other in premodern times as they share now with the United States.
Each of the Asian contributors relates history to the law of his country,
but some brief comments on the modern colonial setting in Asia are in
order here for the reader who is not an Asia specialist.
Elements of cross-national similarity-in traditional governmental
system, legal concepts, religion, and colonial history-do loosely link
some Asian countries, in sentiment if not often in practical politics. For
example, the majority of the world's Muslims live in Asia, as the
primary religious grouping in Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan, and as significant minorities in India, China, the Philippines,
and Singapore; the Islamic legal tradition remains an important force in
most of those nations. Confucian legal concepts and assumptions
continue to affect social, legal, and political life in varying ways in
Japan, Korea, China, Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia. Particularly
in the area of law and constitutional ideas, the British colonial system
has left a common mark on India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka (Ceylon), Burma, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Much earlier,
Hindu notions of kingship spread from India over a period of centuries
into the Southeast Asia region, and either Mahayana or Theravada
Buddhism entered deeply into the life of many East, Southeast, and
South Asian peoples. But kaleidoscopic variety greets the student of
modern Asia more often than clues to commonality.
The United States and its law have had very little in common with
most Asian nations; the context of "revolution'' in late-eighteenthcentury America bears little resemblance to the circumstances of Asian
revolutions and independence movements of the twentieth century. In
most parts of Asia, the very discussion of the principles of democratic
constitutionalism imbedded in the Declaration of Independence, the
United States Constitution, and other Western legal-political documents did not begin until the nineteenth century; independence and
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consideration of these principles as a desirable or possible alternative
approach to law and government usually came much later.
The patterns of colonial history in East Asia differ from those in
Southeast and South Asia. Japan fared best in the confrontation with
the West during the nineteenth century. After its forced opening in 1854
by the United States, Japan achieved by the early 1900s full independence from the unequal treaty system imposed by the Western imperialist nations, rose to a status of significant international power, and
established new legal and constitutional systems based on European
civil law models.s But Japan's laws and constitution went through
fundamental alteration short decades later during the American-dominated Allied Occupation (1945-1952) following World War 11.6
The territory now divided into the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
was an ancient state, unified since A.D. 668, when the "hermit Kingdom" reluctantly opened to intercourse with Japan and the West in the
1870s;7 it was annexed by Japan in 1910, and remained in that status
until the "Liberation" and tragic fissure of 1945, at the hands of the
United States, Russia, and other Allied Powers. North Korea and South
Korea became opposing independent nations in 1948. 8 The communist
North Korean Constitution was changed formally in late 1972, and in
effect it enhances the position of Kim Il-sung, leader of that nation since
1948. 9 South Korea's political history has been turbulent, with constitutional modifications attending changes of national leadership in 1960
5. A good analysis of legal developments in pre-1945 modern Japan is Dan Fenno
Henderson's "Law and Political Modernization in Japan." in R. E. Ward (ed.), Political
Development in Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 387-456.
On the history of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam generally, see John K. Fairbank et
al., East Asia: Tradition and Transformation (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1973).
6. See J. A. A. Stockwin's survey of the Occupation period in Japan: Divided
Politics in a Growth Economy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), pp. 35-61. Among
notable early assessments are Thomas L. Blakemore, "Postwar Developments in
Japanese Law," 1947 Wisconsin Law Review, pp. 632-653; and Washington Law
Review, "Legal Reforms in Japan during the Allied Occupation," special reprint volume,
1977. See also, Theodore McNelly, "American Political Traditions and Japan's Postwar
Constitution," World Affairs (Summer, 1977), pp. 58-66.
7. Pyong-choon Hahm, The Korean Political Tradition and Law (Seoul, Korea:
Hollym Corporation, Publishers, 1967).
8. Takashi Hatada, A History of Korea, trans. W. Smith and B. Hazard (Santa
Barbara: ABC Clio Press, 1969); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).
9. A translation of the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) of September 9, 1948 (as amended October 22, 1962), can be found inS. Kim
and C. Cho, Government and Politics in Korea (Silver Spring, Maryland: Research
Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972), p. 316. The new Constitution of the DPRK
proclaimed on Decem~er 27, 1972, is in Journal of Korean Affairs, 2, no. 3 (January:
1973): 46-57; useful articles o? law and constitution in North Korea by Sung Yoon Cho
and Ilpyong J. K1m appear 111 the same issue of that journal.
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and 1961, IO and solidifying Park Chung-hee's hold on power in the
1970s.
China's law and government had been evolving within a perennial
framework controlled by the Imperial Court and scholar-gentry elites
for thousands of years when the Opium War (1839-1842) wrenched
open China's doors to trade and led to disruptive challenge of Chinese
legal assumptions. 11 After seventy years of encroachments by many
Western nations and Japan, the Republic of China was formally
established in 1912; but China was still wracked by warlordism, imposed upon by foreign powers under unequal treaties, and then torn by
war with an aggressive Japan from 1937 to 1945. 12 All this was followed
soon by a costly civil war in fact suspended, but officially continued on
either side, with the establishment in 1949 of Mao Tse-tung's People's
Republic of China and the migration to Taiwan of the Republic of
China under Chiang K'ai-shek and Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of
the People." The Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and the Constitution
of the Republic of China (1947) on Taiwan, and the Chinese Communist Party and the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
( 1954, 1975, and 1978) on the mainland, continue to direct their
respective peoples along widely separated legal paths. Each regime
disputes the legitimacy of the other's claim to rule all China's land and
people. 13
Thus, the present political order in East Asia took shape between
1946 and 1949 after a century of colonialism and internal constitutional
10. Concerning the constitutional developments of 1959 to 1961, see Sungjoo Han,
The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1974). The "Text of the South Korean Constitution" adopted by
referendum on November 21, 1972, is published in Journal of Korean Affairs, 3, no. I
(April, 1973): 39-53. The previous Constitution of the Republic of Korea ( 1948, as
amended through 1969) can be found in Kim and Cho, op. cit., pp. 294-315.
II. See Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1967).
12. Li Chien-nung, The Polirica/ Hisrory of China, 1840-1928 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1956).
13. Concerning Republican Chinese law and constitution, see Herbert H. P. Ma's
chapter and the works cited therein. An English translation of the Constitution of the
Republic of China (December 25, 1946) can be found in Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The
Governmenr and Polirics of China. 1912-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1970}, pp. 447-461. Also of interest for perspective on earlier legal history is Harold S.
Quigley, "Constitutional and Political Development in China under the Republic," The
Annals of rhe American Academy of Polirical and Social Science, no. 211 (November,
1925}, pp. 8-14. In general, see Jerome A. Cohen (ed.}, Conremporary Chinese Law:
Research Problems and Perspecrives (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). On
law in the People's Republic of China (PRC) of the 1970s, see James L. Seymour, China:
The Polirics of Revolutionary Reinregrarion (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
1976), particularly chap. 3; the 1975 Constitution of the PRC is included as an appendix,
pp. 287-295.
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redefinition. The colonial period there was characterized by shared and
partial control by many foreign powers (Great Britain, the United
States, France, Russia, Italy, Germany), for varying time periods, ofthe
relatively homogeneous peoples of China, Japan, and Korea, and by
the rise of Japan to full participation in colonialist exploitation and
eventual outright control of Taiwan, Korea, and much of Manchuria.
In contrast, the patterns in the colonial history of South Asia and
Southeast Asia show numerous Western nation-states individually
asserting exclusive colonialist rights over different specific regional
segments, most of which are characterized by ethnic, linguistic, and
religious heterogeneity. Great Britain was the paramount power not
only in South Asia but also in Singapore and Malaya, following long
periods there of first Portuguese and then Dutch colonialism. France
dominated the Indochinese area of present-day Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos, and the Netherlands pursued colonialist profit in that great
sprawl of thousands of islands across the southern seas, the Dutch East
Indies. The late-coming United States replaced the Spanish as colonial
masters of the Philippines at about the turn of the century. What is now
the independent state of Papua-New Guinea was under German, British, and finally, until 1975, Australian administration. Much of Southern Asia was also briefly but significantly affected during World War II
by Japan, the Asian colonialist that broke the back of Western exploitation and domination in Asia for both Pan-Asian and self-centered
motives.J4 To this day, many Asians are much more knowledgeable
about their former colonial masters than they are about neighboring
Asian nations.
Under dramatically various circumstances post-colonial independent government has come to South and Southeast Asian countries
only since 1945. Independence, earned sometimes by rebellion and
sometimes through negotiations and cooperation between Asian and
Western men, was achieved at different points in the decades following
World War II. Where a few colonial empires once prevailed in South
and Southeast Asia, today there stand independent (since the year in
parentheses) the Philippines (1946),15 Vietnam(l954),Cambodia(l953),
14. On the South Asian and Southeast Asian contexts, see Keith Buchanan, The
Southeast Asian Wor/d(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1968); Robert N.
Kearney (ed.), Politics and Modernization in South and Southeast Asia (Cambridge:
Schenk man Publishing Company, 1975); and Joel Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast
Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). For recent developments and data on all
Asian nations, see the annual Asia Yearbook published by the Far Eastern Economic
Review (Hong Kong), Asiaweek (Hong Kong), and the monthly Asian Surver (University
of California Press).
·
15. Concerning the modern constitutional and legal development of the Philippines,
and for related comment on other Asian nations, see chapter 8 and works cited therein.
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Laos (1953), Burma (1948), Indonesia (1945),16 Malaysia (1963),17
Singapore (1965), 18 Bangladesh (1972),19 India (1947),20 Sri Lanka
(Ceylon) (1948), 21 Pakistan (1947),22 and Papua-New Guinea (1975).23
Monarchical Thailand, the exception, had retained a significant measure of independence throughout the trying colonial period.2 4 Attainment of independence did not imply political stability; over the past three
decades, major changes of regime and territorial definition in South
and Southeast Asia have obstructed efforts to nurture new legal orders
in these regions.
Although Asian nations can boast of a richness of cultural heritage
equal to that of countries in any world area, all Asian legal systems are,
at least in important part, of relatively recent origin. The legal impact of
the Western world on Asia has been great. Indigenous legal institutions
and ideas have developed alongside of or been deftly integrated or
replaced with newer concepts, forms, and processes derived from the
Western world. 25 One aspect of these Asian legal developments has
been an explosion of innovative, significant, and fascinating constitutional thinking as Asian nations have made, amended, and occasionally remade their constitutions. This phenomenon has been part of a
worldwide pattern. The period since World War II has seen more
constitution-making and legal change than any comparable time span
m world history.
Over two-thirds of the [world's] existing national constitutions were
drafted and promulgated in the last three decades; in the same period
16. Concerning Indonesian constitutionalism, see chapter 5 and works cited therein.
Also, Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1972).
17. On Malaysia, see chapter 7 and works cited therein.
18. Concerning Singapore's law and constitution, see chapter 9 and works cited
therein.
19. Regarding constitutionalism in Bangladesh, see Justice Chowdhury's chapter 2
in this volume.
20. See chapter 4 and writings cited therein.
21. T. Nadaraja, The Legal System of Ceylon in Its Historical Setting (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1972), and Joseph A. L. Cooray, Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri
Lanka (Ceylon) (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Hansa Publishers, Ltd., 1973).
22. Concerning Pakistan and the split with East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, see
Kearney, op. cit. (n. 14 above).
23. On the diverse law of pre-independence Papua and New Guinea and constitutional developments there, see B. J. Brown (ed.), Fashion of Law in New Guinea (Sydney:
Butterworth and Company Ltd., 1969).
24. See David M. Engle, Law and Kingship in Thailand (Ann Arbor: CSSEAS
Publications, 1975); and D. D. Nash and S. Valaisathien, 'Thailand: The Courts and the
Legal Profession," Lawasia, 5 (December 1974), p. 61. Other monarchical nations and
principalities in South and Southeast Asia include Nepal, Brunei, Sikkim, Bhutan, and,
until it was incorporated into China, Tibet.
25. Henry W. Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1976), chap. I.
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constitutions of many old established nations were either partly or totally
revised to fit the new era and its new needs and values. 26

Sudden twists and turns in constitutional politics having profound
impact on legal life continue unabated in the late 1970s, in Asia as in
many areas of the world.
The Comparative Study of
Constitutionalism and Law: Asia
Because of the colonial era and a continuing interest among Asian elites
in Western legal institutions and processes, Asian legal scholars are
commonly familiar with Western legalism and constitutionalism, while
their legal counterparts in the West are generally ignorant of law and
constitutionalism in Asia. Not only are the Asian authors of this book
eminently qualified to comment as scholars on the constitutional
struggles and legal characteristics of their respective countries, they
have also experienced these revolutionary changes personally and
directly. However, as in the rest of the world, so also in Asia and about
Asia, there has been too little cross-national dialogue on constitutional
and legal issues. Detailed studies of specific problems or aspects of
individual nations-or, in some cases, of a specific ethnic subgroup
within a given country-are a necessary basis for the development of
constitutional theory and comparative perspective on legal doctrines;
and too few such studies yet exist. Moreover, even when the scholarly
stage has been carefully set for the exploration of modest binational,
bilegal comparative speculation on a specific issue, it is difficult for the
social scientist or legal scholar to see the terms of the comparison in
accurate perspective and avoid the temptation to attribute meanings to
words, institutions, and sociopolitical contexts that are characteristic of
his own country or peculiar to the experience of only one of the nations
being compared. Presumptuous and hasty data interpretation and
theorizing from a weak basis in knowledge of foreign systems may be
encouraged by an academic climate in the social sciences or the legal
profession which presumes a priori, as some Americans do, sometimes
unwittingly, that the theoretical model necessary for transcultural
qualitative judgments on laws, constitutions, politics, and judicial
behavior already exists in refined form in the Western world. Indeed,
American scholars sometimes assume that their own are precisely the
practical standards against which the legal and constitutional behavior
26. Jvo D. Duchacek, Rights and Liberties in the World Today: Constitutional
Promise and Reality (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio Press, 1973), p. 4. See also, by the same
author, Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio
Press, 1973); and Richard P. Claude (ed.), Comparative Human Rights (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976).
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of other nations may best be judged, without reference to what might be
called the ecology of the specific constitutional issue in a foreign
society-its history, social environment, and legal background, and the
direct effects and probable by-products of alternative solutions to the
problem. A further obstacle to the development of a transcultural
understanding of constitutionalism and law is the contrary assumption
that each cultural system is so unique and separate from the world
community that virtually all apparent similarities unearthed by careful,
country-specific, and comparative legal studies must be regarded as
illusory or insignificant.
Admittedly, the comparative study of legal systems, constitutionalism, and constitutional law is still in its infancy; it will never advance
into childhood until the experience of the Asian two-thirds of humankind, as well as that of Africa, is routinely incorporated into comparative discussions of law and constitution. During their Bicentennial visit,
data and perspectives on Asian constitutionalism were exchanged by
the Asian authors in the process of considering the influence in Asia of
America's constitutional ideas and legal institutions. Although each
participant spoke or wrote primarily of his own country, some similar
concerns and convictions emerged, regarding both Asian and American
law and constitutionalism. The remainder of this chapter will indicate
the nature and limits of the influence of American law and constitutionalism in Asia, and will highlight some of the common views
expressed in the other chapters or in oral dialogue during the Bicentennial program of the Committee on Asian Law in the spring of 1976.
Constitutionalism in Asia
and the United States: Some Comparisons
Americans tend to regard the United States as a young country and
European and Asian nations as ancient and mature civilizations. If one
disregards the antiquity of the foundations of American civilization,
this may be a tenable position; but, as was pointed out by Chief Justice
Seno Adji, in the history of documentary constitutionalism the United
States can more accurately be considered a hoary-headed pioneer of
venerable status.27 The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution
of the United States of America, and other early and basic American
documents antedate most of the world's foundation documents of
constitutional government. The antiquity and relative success of these
documents as guides in American constitutional and legal development
is one basis for the unfeigned respect shown for American constitutionalism by the Asian contributors and many other Asians. For
27. See chapter 5.
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example, former Justice C. G. Weeramantry, mixing praise with criticism, notes:
America, the first country in the modern world wherein the formulations
of human rights and dignity received State recognition without reservation or class distinction, has thus many claims to leadership concerning
human rights. It would be ungracious indeed for the Third World to
discount the importance of this fact, which contributed so signally to the
stream of revolutionary thought which coursed through the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries into the liberation movements of our age. The
links between Thoreau and Gandhi, between the American Constitution
and the Indian and the host of others patterned on it are too real to pass
without due recognition.
It is a pity this debt has tended to be obscured by the fact that such
a country, for generations the apostle of liberty, independence and the
rights of man, has in some of its relationships with the Third World
shielded dictatorial regimes against the claims of the oppressed.2s

But have the Declaration and the Constitution ofthe United States
been relevant to the constitutional and legal needs of contemporary
Asian nation-states? If so, in what manner and degree is this relevance
manifested? Where it is not considered a suitable set of general guidelines or a model for the constitutionalism of a particular Asian country,
what precisely about American constitutionalism, in theory or practice,
is found irrelevant or repugnant in which Asian country covered herein?
What alternative systems have been preferred by Asian constitutional
states? These and similar questions were put to the Asian symposium
participants, not only as they prepared to write their papers, but also in
public and private discussions with American legal scholars, judges,
and lawyers, and with each other.
It is of course impossible to make many salient generalizations
about such a diversity of nations, and those that are hazarded here are
made with reference to some but not all Asian nations considered. First,
let us look at some of the modes of American constitutional influence in
Asia. One form of influence is found in the fact that some constitution
makers consulted as seminal, relevant documents the Declaration, the
U.S. Constitution, and other American documents when they were in
the process of drafting or debating the details and principles of their
own nations' constitutions. This mode of recognition as a forerunner in
documentary constitutionalism is found in the cases of Indonesia,
India, Bangladesh, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Japan.29
The latter two used American models out of the political necessities
attendant upon American occupation and tutelage, but with general
acceptance of most constitutional principles suggested in both cases.
28. Weeramantry, op. cit. (n. 2 above), pp. 67-68.
29. See the chapters on these countries herein, passim.
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Moderate nationalist resentments remain in some circles, but adoption
of American constitutional and legal ideas was a step that smoothed the
way to independence at the time.
A second context for American influence has been the consultation
of American experts on constitutionalism and law during the process of
drawing up, applying, interpreting, or amending a national constitution. Concretely, the views of individual American judges and legal
scholars have been solicited during visits by Asian constitutionalists to
America; American legal literature (including judicial precedents) has
been studied, and one or more Americans have been directly involved in
some Asian constitution-making. As noted in the chapters below on
Bangladesh and Malaysia and elsewhere, British rather than American
influence was of course significant. In the case of Japan, historically a
civil law country, Americans wrote most of the Constitution of Japan
(1947), Japanese judges often study (even if they do not often cite)
precedent of the United States Supreme Court in constitutional cases,
and many influential Japanese legal scholars continue to be well
informed about American laws and judicial decisions touching on
constitutional issues. This or analogous patterns of consultation are
found in a number of other Asian systems. A fascinating example of
indirect American influence on the Constitution of India ( 1950) is in
Article 21 of that constitution, which adopts the wording in Article 31
of the Constitution of Japan in providing: "No person shall be deprived
of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established
by law" (the phrasing adopted is in italics).JO Other instances of
consultation will be found in the chapters concerning India and the
Philippines. As Justice Fernando makes clear, even in those systems of
constitutional law which were not directly affected by the United States
there will be found recognition of principles, such as the concepts of
judicial review and the supremacy of the constitution, deriving their
historical influence in fair part from American constitutionalism. 31
What are some of the other specific issues and constitutional
characteristics in terms of which American influence has been notable
in Asia?J2 All of the Asian jurists stressed the rights, equality, and
30. See chapter 4. See Article 21 at p. 15 in Jagdish Lal, The Constitution of India.
as Amended by Forty-second Amendment [1976] (Delhi, India: Delhi Law House, 1977).
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan: "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor
shall any other criminal penalty be imposed. except according to procedure established by
law" (H. Itoh and L. W. Beer, The Constitutional Case Law of Japan [Seattle, University
of Washington Press, 1978], p. 260.)
31. See, for example, chapter 8.
32. Some of the views herein attributed to the Asian participants are a distillation of
many discussions with or in the presence of the present writer during the month-long
Bicentennial program in the spring of 1976. They do not necessarily represent the views of
this writer. Those of the authors contributing to this symposium who were present are
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religious values enunciated in the Declaration of Independence: "We
hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." This
Declaration is considered by the participants to be one of the few most
important human documents enunciating these values. Although there
are profound differences of religious concept among the Asian nations
represented, all protect freedom of religion; the Islamic states (Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan) and the Christian Philippines
emphasize monotheism, as do prevalent American religious concepts.
In discussing appropriate constitutional relationships between religion
and the State, the visiting Asians agreed that the American constitutional doctrine of strict separation is unreasonable, extremely rigid, and
in effect possibly inimical to religion and the community.JJ They felt
that the central concern should be, not the nonestablishment of a
particular religion or religions, but rather the equal and friendly
treatment of all religions by the State, without discrimination against
any religion. In fact, they found rather strange, even puzzling, the
secularist and implicitly antireligious legal bias of some current American constitutional law, in light of the commitment to religious values in
the Declaration of Independence and the apparent intent of the Constitution. Can, they ask, a "wall of separation" between Church and State
and full exercise of religious freedom coexist? In another context,
Professor Ukai, an influential Christian from non-Christian Japan,
speculated that perhaps the long-term success of democratic constitutionalism in Japan requires a Christian religious foundation. Whatever
the merit of that view, it suggests the broader question: What are the
necessary characteristics of a legal, social, philosophical, or religious
basis for democracy? In the diversity of Asia, how relate democratic
rule-of-law values to Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and
animism?
A second issue on which a number of the contributors agree is the
centrality of equality. Equality was stressed more than freedom, not
because the Asian jurists do not value freedom, but because many
Asian nations suffer from serious poverty, maldistribution of goods,
and a deep gap between a small, privileged elite and most other citizens.
In part, the economic problem is seen as a direct result of colonial
systems that restructured traditional economic life to produce comChief Justice Seno Adji, Professor Ukai, Tun Suffian, and Justice Fernando; in addition,
a paper by Dr. Tripathi (unable to attend owing to a last-minute complication) was read
at " number of public panel presentations.
33. This view is also expressed in this volume; see, for example, chapter 5 and
chapter 7.
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modities in kind and quantity desired by colonialist traders and functionaries. For example, Sri Lanka was forced to cut back on rice
production and to grow tea for export, while Burma became a major
rice exporter under British rule.3 4 The tendency today is to put less
emphasis on individual private property rights than on economic
justice, and more stress on policies leading toward economic prosperity
for the generality of citizens. The Asian jurists were particularly sharp
in their criticisms of America's allegedly excessive emphasis on private
property to the detriment of economic equality. The contention was that
the U.S. Constitution, as it has developed through legislative, administrative, and judicial interpretation, has come to serve special economic
interests much more assiduously than it has pursued the contrary ideals
of equality, life, and the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of
Independence. Interpretations of the Constitution which in effect protect economic "liberty," for example, at the expense of economic
viability and education for all citizens are seen as a possible betrayal of
the spirit of the Declaration by the United States. At the same time, the
"state action theory" of some American Jaw, and also government entry
into the private sector to regulate the use of resources and to correct
discrimination in housing and employment, and into the political arena
to equalize political campaign financing, were seen as doctrines in
keeping with the true spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the
best in the U.S. Constitution.
Third, the necessary linkage seen by many Americans between
economic liberty in a free enterprise system and civil liberties is not
easily accepted by many of the Asian jurists. Political liberties and civil
rights are separable from economic liberty and property rights and are
to be more vigilantly protected; but this socialist leaning does not imply
"pro-communism."
Fourth, a common view expressed is that freedom of speech and
freedom of the press should be protected, but only insofar as they do
not excessively disrupt the development and functioning of the political
or the economic order. Given the fragility and youth of some political
arrangements and economic systems in Asia, as well as patently existing
internal or external sources of possible threat to some regimes, such
views are not necessarily self-serving prevarications. As our Bicentennial guests from Asia found through personal exchanges in the United
States, relatively few American constitutional lawyers and political
observers are likely to refrain from harsh attributions of authoritarianism and political evil whenever they perceive restraints of liberty,
whether it be economic liberty, free speech, freedom of assembly, or
34. Buchanan, op. cit. (n. 14 above}, pp. 24 and 78-86; and Weeramantry, op. cit. (n.
2 above), pp. 38-68.
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freedom of the press. Torture or prolonged incarceration without trial
for peaceable acts of dissent from political policy are of course incompatible with any system of genuine constitutionalism; but interpretations at variance with common American views of rights in areas of
other issues were not rare. America does not face political and economic problems analogous to those of most Asian nations which affect
the status of freedom and law. Moreover, like scholars in some European democracies, most of the Asian jurists took issue with the absolutist tone of some legal interpretations of the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, as being both unpersuasive and unrealistic. On the
other hand, Professor Ukai felt that a near absolutist posture was
needed in Japan in order to encourage citizens to exercise rights and
liberties granted only some thirty years ago, in light of Japan's prior
modern history of governmental and social restrictions.35 The relative
stability of Japan's economic and sociopolitical order adds to the
plausibility of Professor Ukai's position; but other Asian jurists critically contrasted the "social responsibility theory" of freedom with
American "absolutist theory."
Fifth, the status of individual rights and liberties under "martial
law·· regimes and "emergency" declarations was discussed on a number
of occasions and is touched on here and there in this volume. The
suspension of legal or constitutional rights or both has occurred under
many constitutional traditions, legal provisions, and political situations
in Asia since World War II; but reliable generalizations about the
empirical status of rights in such circumstances-the degree and consistency of restraints, popular support or resentment of the same, the
significance of their effects on the system, and the intent of ruling elites
in restricting certain types of activity normally thought lawful in a
country-are not easily arrived at. For example, Lord President Tun
Suffian noted in public session that although the King of Malaysia has
utilized his constitutional power to declare an "emergency" on the
advice of the Prime Minister three times in recent decades, an emergency has not in fact implied a suspension of civil liberties. He added
that this may seem unusual, particularly in a nation where civil liberties
are generally less of a preoccupation than are socioeconomic and
cultural rights. (He might have added that the critical importance of a
semblance of communal harmony among the majority Malays, and the
Chinese and Indians of Malaysia, suggests the rationality of quiet
restraint on speech likely to foment violence, judging from past tragedies.) Tun Suffian also pointed out that Malaysian law concerning
emergencies derives from British legal practice in India prior to Inde35. Relevant to this point is Richard H. Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976).
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pendence, which copied British legal thinking on an earlier Palestinian
situation, which in turn goes back finally to English policy during the
Irish "troubles" of the early twentieth century. Justice Chowdhury in
his paper maintains that the suspension of rights and of Superior Court
jurisdiction to protect them by the emergency proclamation of late 1974
did not abrogate rights, but left them in a temporary state of "animated
suspension." Justice Fernando, while emphasizing the great importance
of the issuance of writs of habeas corpus in the Philippines system of
judicial review, said that recent denials of such writs to political
prisoners under the presidential emergency powers of the present
"Martial Law Constitution" of the Philippines rely on American legal
precedent and constitutional doctrine of both the Civil War period and
the colonialist era in the Philippines. Professor Ma of National Taiwan
University points out that the principles of habeas corpus have been
incorporated into Chinese law and constitution under American influence, but that the interpretation of the relevant provisions requires
intelligent adaptation of foreign legal techniques, both European and
Anglo-American, to the Chinese legal context.J6
The severity of the threats to a system and the rigidity of governmental restraints on individual rights can be balanced only by regard
both for theory and for detailed studies of the ecology of rights and
freedom in each nation. Groping for a fair assessment of some Asian
systems, Michael Brecher has maintained that a clear democratic thrust
exists in the regimes and elites of most ·'middle zone" Asian states,
which sets them off from the less open Asian communist systems:
But in none of these states is authoritarianism total; this is one vital
distinction between communist governments and those of the "middle
zone." Another difference is the commitment in principle to "democracy," though this has lessened in recent years; but even among those
who seek alternative paths to a stable political system, there is acceptance
of the idea of change in the political elite, protection for individual and
minority rights, the notion of choice by the governed as to who shall
be the governors, and other components of "democracy." Because of
these commitments and the possibility of change in the political system,
these authoritarian regimes are potentially closer to the substance of
democracy than to the rigid closed political system of communism.J'

In the contributions to this symposium, one of the American
constitutional institutions most frequently cited as important and relevant is the judicial review of laws and other acts of government in light
of constitutional requirements. Judicial review directly inspired by
American precedent was written into the 1947 Constitution of Japan
36. See chapter 3.
37. Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 48; see also the symposium cited in n. 3 above.
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(Chapter VI, Articles 76 to 82) during the Occupation; but, as in other
Asian nations such as Indonesia, the coexistence of judicial independence and judicial review powers with aspects of civil law tradition
limits in theory, law, or practice or all three the judicial assertion of
review powers.Js Continental German, Swiss, French (e.g., in Japan,
China, Korea) and Dutch (in Indonesia and Sri Lanka) legal thinking
and interpretive approaches have been notable formative factors in
modern Asian law. Dr. Tripathi's chapter explicates the American
influence on incorporation of judicial review into the Constitution of
India and indicates the negative effects on legislative development and
on rights protection itself of subsequent citizen reliance on judicial
review for the solution of an excessive range and number of problems. 39
The Federal Court of Malaysia has and makes moderate use of the
power of judicial review, a constitutional feature adapted from the
Constitution of India. 4o
An American type of federalism has not been characteristic of
constitutionalism in Asian countries; but the U.S. pattern has been
consulted in the process of devising systems of limited local autonomy
in India and Japan. 41 Indonesia's "United States of Indonesia" (January
to August, 1950) experimented briefly with federalism but found it
impossible in a system composed of hundreds of ethnic groups and
over 13,000 islands. 42 Professor Ma of China notes the importance of
American influence on the federalist strain of early republican constitutional thinking, and the movement in the 1920s for "United Autonomous Provinces." 4 3 The Federation of Malaysia, building unity out of
long-existing autonomous sultanates, operates under a distinctive system contrasting clearly with the American federal modes. For example,
federal subjects for judicial review include education and police matters, and Malaysia's king (the Yang Dipertuan Agung) is elected for a
five-year term from among the hereditary sultans of the federal states
by a Conference of Rulers; he is a constitutional monarch, not a
president. 44 All other nations in Asia are unitary in constitutional
structure.
38. See chapter 5. Concerning the differences between law and judicial practice in
civil law and common law countries, see John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). An accurate American assessment of the
status of judicially protected rights, for example, in a civil law country must take into
account the contrasts in judicial function and powers flowing from the two major
Western legal traditions.
39. See chapter 4.
40. Oral comments of Tun Suffian. See also his An Introduction to the Constitution
of Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Kuala Lumpur: Ibrahim Bin Johari, Government Printer, 1976),
pp. 105-110.
41. See chapters 4 and 6.
42. See chapter 5.
43. See chapter 3.
44. See chapter 7, and Tun Suffian, An Introduction (chap. 3).

18

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

The executive systems of governmental Asia owe little to the
American presidency, except in the cases of the Philippines and Indonesia; but with respect to his powers, the President of the Republic of
China resembles the American President. 4 5 The Indonesian President's
position was originally modeled in part on the American system, Chief
Justice Seno Adji points out, but the office is not balanced against
legislative and judicial organs in the American manner. 46 In 1975,
constitutional amendments under Martial Law Regulations by Parliament made the President of Bangladesh more powerful than the
American President, and reduced the considerable powers vested in the
Prime Minister by the 1972 Constitution. 47 Most democratically elected
Asian executives are parliamentary prime ministers in a cabinet system
deriving its forms, at least in part, from the British Parliament. In
addition, a rich tradition of distinctive monarchical systems continues
to live in the constitutions, written and unwritten, of a number of Asian
nations. The unique kingship system of Malaysia has been mentioned.
In Japan, the Emperor Hirohito is the latest of an ancient line of
hereditary monarchs; he is now a symbol of national unity in the
Constitution of Japan, is explicitly denied any governmental powers,
and is technically not a head of state. Except during the period from
1868 until 1945, and then only formally, the Emperor has very rarely
held any significant political power in the past thousand years. 4 s Other
kingship systems are found in Thailand, Laos, Nepal, and the Himalayan principalities. In Thailand, for example, perhaps the most stable
and popular element in constitutionalism, despite changes in government and in constitutional document, is the hereditary kingship system.
Patterns of written constitutional change vary strikingly in Asia,
but American influence on amendment processes has rarely been
significant. Constitutions have been amended often in India and Malaysia, but never in Japan. Indonesia too has been reluctant to employ its
amendment process. 49 The Constitution of India, already the longest
constitution in the world, can be amended by a majority vote with "a
majority of not less than two-thirds of the members" of each house
.. present and voting."so Forty-two amendments have been passed, with
complications analyzed in this volume by Dr. Tripathi.5 1 The amendment process under the Constitution of Malaysia is modeled on that of
India, but establishes different requirements for different categories of
amendment; in all, there had been seventeen amendments in seventeen
45. See chapter 3. 46. See chapter 5.
47. See chapter 2.
48. David A. Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1974).
49. See chapter 5. 50. Article 368, in Constitution of India, p. 173.
51. See chapter 4.
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years by the beginning of 1976.52 On the other hand, the fear that any
amendment will imply wholesale anti-democratic revision of the Consituation has rendered politically impossible any utilization of the
amendment provisions of Japan's Constitution. 53 Replacement of one
constitution with another as a means of change has occurred in the
Philippines ( 1972), Indonesia ( 1966, a returning to the 1945 Constitution), Burma (1974),5 4 and the People's Republic of China (1975 and
1978).
In summary, the American influence in Asian constitutionalism is
manifest in the utilization of American sources, from the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution of the United States to the Gettysburg Address to more recent judicial decisions, and in the direct or
indirect adaptation of American institutions such as legally protected
liberty and judicial review. Federalism and the American system of
separation of powers have not been exported to Asia. In the area of
individual rights and liberties, the Asian contributors have found fault
with American notions of absolute freedom of expression, property
rights, and separation of religion and the State, but much inspiration in
the emphasis on the equality of persons, the right to self-government,
human dignity, and the pursuit of economic justice found in America's
constitutional documents and experience. All express commitment to
the principle of the supremacy of the law of the constitution in their
respective countries.
As the United States picks her way through the next century of
constitutional development, the constitutional strains and wisdom arising from the current era of experimentation in Asia's politico-legal
cultures will deserve the attention of American judges and constitutional lawyers. One measure of the constitutional maturity of the
United States in the twenty-first century may well be the degree of
American openness to the reception of legal and constitutional influences flowing from Asia and other non-Western regions.
52. Oral comments of Tun Suffian, and his Introduction, pp. 337-343.
53. Article 96, Constitution of Japan, in ltoh and Beer, op. cit. (n. 30 above), p. 268.
54. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, adopted
January 3, 1974.

II

Bangladesh

Editorial Note

Prior to August 1947, when India was still part of the British Empire,
one of its large and populous states was known as Bengal. Its capital
and its center of transportation, communication, commerce, industry,
and education was the city of Calcutta. The first university in India of
the English type was established in Calcutta in 1857. Bengal had a
substantial Muslim population whose ancestors had been converted to
that faith in the twelfth century as an afLermath of the Turks' capture of
Delhi in 1191. In August 1947 these Mus lim majority districts of Bengal
became the eastern wing of Pakistan-separated by more than a
thousand miles from the western segment of Pakistan. By 1971-some
twenty-four years later-East Pakistan had demanded its autonomy
and, with the aid of the Indian Army, achieved its independence after
the Pakistan Army surrendered on December 16, 1971. This new nation
was called Bangladesh.
Bangladesh is the most densely populated nation in the world
except for the very small nation of Singapore. Its population in 1978
was estimated at 87 million-an average of about 1,500 persons for
each of its 55,000 square miles (a little larger than England). Its capital
is Dacca, a city with a population of over one million. Bangladesh is
bordered on the west, north, and east by India; to the south lies the Bay
of Bengal; it shares a short border with Burma to the southeast. No
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point in Bangladesh is more than a hundred miles from the border of
India. Most of the country is a flat, alluvial plain-never more than five
hundred feet above sea leveL It is a nation of rivers flowing south into
the Bay of Bengal and adding more silt to the extensive delta.
Bangladesh has a tropical monsoon climate with heavy rainfalL
About 94 percent of the population lives in villages; 80 percent depends
on agriculture for subsistence. It is difficult land on which to build
substantial structures: foundations are soft and floods are frequent.
Calcutta, which once provided extensive services to this area, now lies
across the border in India.
The citizens of East Pakistan (as the area was called from 1947 to
1971) were never satisfied with their treatment by the national government in the west. Although the population of East Pakistan exceeded
that of the western segment, Pakistan's national government never
placed a high priority on the development of its eastern province. The
people of West Pakistan dominated the armed forces, the civil services,
industry, and commerce. The two parts of Pakistan spoke entirely
different languages. Although the eastern province earned most of the
nation's foreign exchange through jute sales, it was the west that
decided how to spend it. In 1978 Bangladesh continued to have an
agricultural economy that relied principally on rice, tea, jute, and
sugarcane. Its annual per capita income was approximately $70 (U.S.).
Only 20 percent of the population was literate.
Bangladesh shares with the rest of the Indian subcontinent a
common governmental heritage. In the eighteenth century the British
East India Company became the principal commercial organization in
India and, after victory in two military engagements, had emerged as
the undisputed ruler of Bengal by 1764. A century later the Company
had been replaced by the British government, and Bengal was governed
in the name of the Crown. A penal code, a code of criminal procedure, a
civil code, an administrative code, and a civil service system were prepared by the British for India. The system and its procedures were
carefully designed to facilitate British control of the subcontinent and
also to give the natives an opportunity to learn self-government. At
times these two objectives seemed inconsistent. The Government of
India Act of 1935 set the pattern for the original constitutions of
independent India, Pakistan, and even Bangladesh.
The immediate events in Pakistan which led to the independence of
Bangladesh may be recounted briefly. Military officers and retired civil
servants had been running Pakistan for most of its brief history. In 1970
Pakistan scheduled its first general election. The results of the voting in
that election showed massive support in East Pakistan for the Awami
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League and its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Surprisingly, the
Awami League also won a majority of the seats in the National
Assembly without winning a single seat in West Pakistan. Thus the
logical head of government would be Mujibur Rahman except for the
fact that he had campaigned on a platform of autonomy for East
Pakistan and was therefore unacceptable to the leaders of West Pakistan.
The new National Assembly never met. No compromise could be
reached; there were strikes and riots in East Pakistan. On March 25,
1971, the Pakistan Army attacked. There was devastation. Mujibur
Rahman was arrested and flown to West Pakistan. An estimated ten
million refugees fled to India, and ultimately the Indian Army entered
East Pakistan and forced the surrender of the Pakistan Army on
December 16, 1971. The following month Mujibur Rahman was released from prison and became Prime Minister of the newly created
nation of Bangladesh; Abu Sayeed Chowdhury became President (see
footnotes 5 and 10). By the end of 1972 a Constitution had been
prepared by a Constituent Assembly consisting of those elected from
East Pakistan in the 1970 elections. In March 1973 elections were held
under the new Constitution, and Mujibur Rahman's Awami League
party won 305 of 313 seats.
President Abu Sayeed Chowdhury resigned in December 1973 and
was succeeded by Professor Mohammadullah. By the end of 1974 the
deteriorating political situation caused the President, at the request of
Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman, to proclaim emergency rule and
suspend the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution of 1972.
The Constitution was also amended to provide for a system of presidential supremacy. On August 15, 1975, Mujibur Rahman was assassinated
and Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed was named President (see footnote
II). In November 1975 he resigned in favor of a former Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, Abusat Mohammad Sayem. A little more than
eighteen months later, on April 21, 1977, President Sayem resigned for
health reasons and nominated Major General Ziaur Rahman, who
continued to hold the posts of Chief of Army Staff and Chief Martial
Law Administrator, to succeed him as President. The new President
immediately ordered the amendment of the Constitution to eliminate a
reference to Bangladesh as a secular state and inserted in its place an
expression of absolute faith in Allah. Other changes made the Constitution amendable by a simple majority vote of the membership of
Parliament and provided a procedure by which Supreme and High
Court judges could be removed by the President.
In a referendum held in May 1977, 85 percent of the electorate
reportedly went to the polls, and almost 99 percent voted in support of
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General Ziaur Rahman as President of Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the
situation remains unstable. In early October 1977 an abortive coup
occurred and was promptly suppressed, but five hundred persons were
said to have been tried as a result, and ninety-two received the death
penalty.

May 16, 1978

HENRY F. GOODNOW

The Bangladesh Constitution
in American Perspective
Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury
Past President of Bangladesh

The American Experience
American celebration of the bicentenary of its independence is in effect
renewal of its determination to pursue a way of life as visualized in the
declaration of its independence and in its Constitution. It reminds the
world of its pledge for democracy founded on the basic principle of
consideration for others. America derived benefit of the experiences
acquired since the discovery of the New World from men and women
from all over the world and built it up by dedicated and collective
efforts for the welfare of the people of America and the peace and
happiness of the peoples of the world.
The way of life cherished in its Constitution is mainly based on its
well-founded and well-recognized principle of the "government of laws
and not of men." Implicit in this American concept is that nothing can
happen without due process of law, and the United States has provided
its judiciary with all facilities to do justice in all circumstances, and the
mechanism is laid on a foundation, solid and stable.
Americans wanted liberty. When that was denied, they were left
with no other course than to demand complete and full independence,
which they achieved by their determination and steadfast adherence to
and firm faith in the cause they were upholding. Liberty, it is well
established, consists in the power of a person to perform an act which
would not infringe on the right of another. The principle of common
good as conceived in a civilized society implies limitation of the power
of an individual in that he is free to act in any manner-so long as he
does not stifle the natural rights of another person. None of his actions
claimed to be in pursuance of his fundamental rights can encroach upon
those of others.
There is an eternal human yearning for an individual to be free to
act, think, and move about with his head erect and conscience clear so
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long as he does not violate other supervening principles established for
the common good of the people. Limitation on such powers can be
discerned in the police power, taxation power, eminent domain, and
such other powers limiting the fundamental rights in the interest of the
State as a whole.
Salient features of the United States Constitution such as the
doctrine of ultra vires, separation of powers, the enumeration of
inalienable human rights, and well-planned checks and balances have
influenced many written constitutions since the adoption of the Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787. Since that year these principles designed
to uphold human liberty have been adopted in varying degrees in
written constitutions adopted in many parts of the world, including
Bangladesh.
It is true that for some time America became indifferent to other
nations of the world. After a period of isolationism America was
brought by force of circumstances to play its destined role in the
development of the modern world; and the Second World War led
America to be a founding member of the United Nations and enshrine
the principles upholding human dignity and honor in its Charter. These
formulations placed man above everything else, and the world body
was entrusted with the solemn and historic duty of upholding the
cherished ideals of civilization and the dignity of man.
The nations that believed in a representative form of government,
whether presidential or parliamentary, gained much from the American
experiences and the fruits of the struggle to make the world "safe for
democracy.'· In fact, President Woodrow Wilson when declaring war
on Germany in 1917 emphasized the philosophy of life which guided the
thoughts and deeds of the great American people. In his ringing voice
he told the Congress that America would enter the war "for the rights
and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such
a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations
and make the world at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives
and fortune." It was in fact a reiteration of cherished goals of mankind
as contemplated in the U.S. Constitution and its various amendments.
The Path to Bangladesh Independence
Bangladesh is a new country with an ancient civilization and culture. As
its mighty rivers flow down one can hear, in their murmurs, the music
that was heard thousands of years ago. The enchanting beauty of its
vast green fields spreading to the distant horizon and its azure blue sky
still reveal the beauty witnessed since the dawn of civilization. The
people inhabiting the land are well known for emotion, a strong sense
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of values, hospitality, friendliness, a capacity to face challenges, endure
sufferings, bear losses calmly, meet the demands of the occasion, and
retain firm faith in God.
The territory now known as Bangladesh was a part of British
India, and on the achievement of independence in 1947, it became a
province of Pakistan and was called East Pakistan. People of this area
took a remarkable part in the quest for independence during British
days and acquired considerable political consciousness.' They became
fully aware of their legitimate rights and privileges.2
The first British step according some recognition to the struggle for
independence was the Government of India Act (1919), which declared
that its aim was to establish "a responsible government as an integral
part of the British Empire." This naturally failed to satisfy the growing
aspirations of the sub-continent. The Act was to be reviewed after a
period of ten years, but the time was shortened and a commission
headed by Sir John Simon was appointed to report about constitutional reforms. There was no one from the sub-continent itsel( on the
commission, and it was claimed that such a task could not be accomplished without someone having intimate and close association with the
thoughts and prevailing ideas in the sub-continent; so the commission
suffered from lack of cooperation. It submitted its report on May 27,
1930. Thanks to the good efforts of Lord Irwin, three successive roundtable conferences could be held to find an acceptable solution; but
unfortunately they failed to work out an agreed framework for the
constitution.
The British Parliament, however, rightly felt that it was high time
to act and, if necessary, to act unilaterally. And so it did, by enacting a
valuable document called the Government of India Act (1935). Elaborate and detailed in its provisions, the Act provided the foundation on
which all constitutional exercises were made in the sub-continent. This
Act introduced a federal form of government to which princely states
were also to accede.
Although the part relating to the federation could not be put into
operation at all, the provincial governments as provided in the Act
came into existence and worked satisfactorily. The federal form provided therein worked as a model to the framers of constitutions in both
India and Pakistan after the achievement of independence in 1947.
I. Leonard Gordon, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement, 1876-1940 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1974).
2. Concerning the modern constitutional development of India, see R. G. Aggarwala, Constitutional History of India and National Movement (Delhi: S. Chand & Co.,
1964); Sankar Ghose, The Western Impact on Indian Politics (1885-1919) (Bombay:
Allied Publishers, 1967); Granville Austen, The Indian Constitution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966), and chapters 4 and 6 of this work.
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When the Second World War was raging, renewed efforts were
made to arrive at a constitutional settlement satisfactory to the subcontinent. With that end in view, a mission led by Sir Stafford Cripps,
an eminent British jurist and statesman, went to India in 1942, but
again no accepted formula could be found. It was felt that Sir Stafford
was very genuine in his efforts, and naturally high hopes were raised,
but as the political parties failed to reach agreement, these hopes were
dashed to the ground.
Soon after cessation of hostilities, the question of framing a
suitable constitution for the sub-continent was again taken up. Lord
Pethick-Lawrence, the then Secretary of State for India, led another
mission for the purpose. It presented a scheme of its own in May 1946.
It recommended that an elected Constituent Assembly should be
entrusted with the work of framing a constitution for the sub-continent.
It also brought into existence an interim government at the centre. But
a constitution could not be framed without settling the demand for
partition between India and Pakistan, which had grown into a gigantic
mass movement. 3
The British government by then became anxious to transfer power
to the sub-continent, for it knew when to leave, and the British
Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act. in 1947. As the
political parties by then had agreed to partition the sub-continent,
Britain handed over its responsibilities to two independent dominions,
India and Pakistan, amidst universal friendliness for Britain, without
bitterness, without rancour. The American attitude at the time of the
severance of its connection with Britain was perhaps not the same.
The two wings of Pakistan were separated by more than twelve
hundred miles. They had, however, many things in common. As was
already noted, the people of East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh,
took full part in the struggle for independence from Britain. Such a
politically conscious people now clamoured for equality of rights and
opportunities as visualized in the United States Constitution, and the
struggle which started soon after achievement of Pakistan in 1947
culminated in the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign and independent republic on December 16, 1971, after twenty-four years of working
together.4
3. Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960); G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan
(London: Longman, 1969, 2nd ed.); and Sir Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems in
Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957).
4. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972); Wayne Wilcox, The Emergence of Bangladesh (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1973); G. W. Choudhury, 1he Last Davs of United
Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974).
·
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Independent Bangladesh then adopted a parliamentary Constitution on the fourth day of November, 1972;5 the first election under this
Constitution was held in the beginning of 1973.6
The 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh
and the Emergency
This Constitution when first adopted in 1972 provided for a parliamentary form of government, although the Prime Minister and not the
Cabinet was made all powerful, deviating from the theory of collective
responsibility. In fact, by virtue of Article 55 (2) of the Constitution, all
executive authority was to be exercised by the Prime Minister.
Suddenly, at the end of 1974, an Emergency was declared; 7 fundamental rights were suspended, and the Superior Courts, which were to
enforce them, were divested of the authority to do so against any
executive action infringing them. Suspension, however, does not mean
abrogation; it means that these rights remain in a state of animated
suspension. The moment the suspension order is removed, they would
be revived. Even before the proclamation of the Emergency, the Prime
Minister in reality possessed all the powers, and as such its need was
widely doubted.
The Prime Minister possessed unlimited powers even otherwise by
reason of a number of Presidential Orders or Ordinances which were
later protected by the Parliament by a saving clause of the Constitution.
A list of these Orders and Ordinances was given in a schedule of the
Constitution as passed by the Parliament prohibiting by a constitutional provision any attack on them; many of their provisions were
violative of the fundamental rights.s
5. The Consrirurion of rhe People's Republic of Bangladesh, passed by the
Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh on Nov. 4, 1972, and authenticated by the Speaker
on Dec. 14, 1972 (Dacca: Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh, 1972). See Rounaq
Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State," Asian Survey, Feb. 1973,
pp. 199-210; M. M. Sankhdher, "Bangladesh Constitution: A Content Analysis," Journal
of African and Asian Srudies, 4, no. I (March-April 1973): 23-34; and Abu! Fazl Huq,
"Constitution-Making in Bangladesh," Pacific Affairs, 46, no. I (Spring 1973): 59-76.
The latter author notes, at p. 60: "Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, a former High Court
Judge and Vice-Chancellor of Dacca University (one of the few intellectuals who had
actively participated in the liberation movement and yet was not aligned with any
political party), became the new president of the Republic. If integrity and impartiality
are considered essential qualities of the head of the state, there could have been no better
choice for the presidency."
6. Concerning the March elections and other 1973 developments, see Rounaq
Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1973: Management of Factional Politics," Asian Survey, Feb.
1974, pp. 125-135.
7. On events of 1974 and the emergency decree of December 28, see Talukder
Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis and Political Polarization," Asian
Survey, Feb. 1975, pp. 117-128, and "Bangladesh," Keesing's Conremporary Archives,
Jan. 20-26, 1975, pp. 26924-26925.
8. Keesing's, p. 26925.
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The Constitution also made it a unitary form of government and it
continues to be so.
The United States Constitution
and the Bangladesh Constitution
Geographically, Bangladesh is a homogeneous territory inhabited by a
people speaking the same language, inheriting the same traditions,
culture, thoughts, and ideas. The question of a federal form of government therefore did not arise, and the framers of the Constitution were
therefore relieved of the many problems which confronted the Convention at Philadelphia.
We may now have a closer look at the Bangladesh Constitution
and the American impact thereon. The U.S. Constitution declares in its
Preamble:
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, secure the blessings of liberty
to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

The Bangladesh Constitution, also in its Preamble, pledges that its
aim is to realize a society free from exploitation and that fundamental
human rights and freedom and equality and justice will be secured for
all citizens. Resemblance between the two is apparent.
The Bangladesh Constitution is an all-embracing document providing for a mechanism of administration practically in all constitutional spheres. 9 It consists of 153 Articles in 11 Parts. Part I deals with
the republic, declares Bengali the State language, provides for citizenship, and other matters. Part II is devoted to fundamental principles of
State for the guidance of the government and the Parliament, but these
are not enforceable by courts. Part III is the most important, relating to
fundamental rights recognized by the Parliament and enforceable by
Superior Courts when there is no suspension order on account of any
proclamation of emergency. Part IV is divided into five chapters and
deals with the executive branch of the government. Part V provides for
Parliament, and for legislative and financial procedures and ordinancemaking powers. Part VI provides for the judiciary, Part VII deals with
elections, Part VIII provides for the Comptroller and Auditor General,
and Part IX deals with the armed services of Bangladesh. The procedure for amendment of the Constitution is to be found in Part X.
Miscellaneous matters have been laid down in Part XI. This outline
should give an idea of the structure of the Constitution itself.
9. See note 5 above.
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As was already noted, the Bangladesh Constitution has enumerated fundamental rights in a chapter. A study of these rights would at
once make it clear that in their formulation Magna Carta ( 1215), the
Petition of Rights ( 1628), the Bill of Rights ( 1689), and the Constitution
of the United States of America, together wjth its amendments, were
kept in mind. It is in this part of the Constitution that the full benefit of
the written Constitution of the United States was taken as a model, and
in fact, in dealing with these provisions the courts in Bangladesh freely
refer to the judicial pronouncements of the Superior Courts of Britain,
America, and the Commonwealth countries. Bangladesh is a sovereign
and independent republic, and these decisions are certainly not binding
on Bangladesh courts, but the views expressed by them are taken into
consideration as and when similar questions arise, just as those courts
also refer to judicial pronouncements of Superior Courts of other
countries.
The chapter on fundamental rights begins by adopting the doctrine
of ultra vires, for it expressly declares that all existing law inconsistent
with those rights as enumerated therein shall be void to the extent of
inconsistency; it incorporates a prohibition to the effect that the State
shall not make any laws inconsistent with those rights, and if so made
they would also be void. It is clear that an order made by the State, if
challenged, has to be referable to some law of the land, and ifthere is no
law supporting the executive order, or even if there is one and that law
is inconsistent with fundamental law, the law must be declared void,
and the executive order set aside.
Perhaps the most important of all rights enumerated therein is
Article 27 of the Bangladesh Constitution, which reads: "All citizens are
equal before law and entitled to equal protection of law." Broadly
speaking, this Article confers the right to equality as visualized in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The principle of equality before the law contemplates that the
courts must treat all citizens as subject to the ordinary law of the land
and they must enjoy equal protection of law. It will therefore be seen
that the obligation imposed on the State is to secure to a person
equality before the law and also to give equal protection thereof. It is
true that in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution the
expression "equality before the law" does not occur; but it must be
remembered that the expression "equal protection of the laws" occurs
therein; and in this context one has to bear in mind that the expression
"due process of law" is so elastic in its ideas that in its application it
does include "equality before the law" as well.
This Article of the Bangladesh Constitution prohibits discrimination in any shape or manner. One cannot arbitrarily pick and choose
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any person or class of persons under the law. In other words, the law
should be equal and equally administered, and the like should be
treated alike. Without going into detailed examination of this principle,
one would say that it is one of the most important of all the rights
conferred on a citizen, for it is an injunction against discrimination in
applying the law. Moreover, Article 28 prohibits discrimination on
grounds of race, colour, sex, or place of birth.
Similarly, Article 29 provides for the equality of opportunity in
public appointment. Article 32 guarantees that no person shall be
deprived of life and personal liberties except in accordance with law.
Article 33 provides that a person who is arrested shall not be detained
unless informed of the grounds of arrest and shall have the right to be
defended by a lawyer of his choice. A person so detained has to be
brought before a court of law within twenty-four hours.
Articles 39, 40, and 41 provide for freedom of thought and
conscience, freedom of profession and occupation, and freedom of
religion. Articles 42 and 43 provide for the rights to property and
protection of home and correspondence. A study of the Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution would show that these cherished principles were
incorporated therein.
In a parliamentary form of government provision is made for a
head of state who represents the State as distinguished from the
government; as such, after election the President belongs to the country
as a whole and not to a party and is looked upon as a symbol of
national unity and national dignity. Bangladesh also provided for a
President to be elected by the Parliament; by virtue of Article 48 (2), as
head of the state "he shall take precedence over all other persons in the
State." It was also provided that all executive actions of the government
were to be expressed as taken in the name of the President. He was by
another Article made Supreme Commander of the armed forces, and
the officers of the government were to hold office during his pleasure.
He is also to appoint constitutional functionaries like the Prime Minister, Ministers, Judges of the Superior Courts, Attorney General, and
Auditor General. He was invested with legislative functions as well
when the Parliament was not in session.
But, by one single Article, namely, Article 48 (3), all these functions were rendered ceremonial inasmuch as the advice of the Prime
Minister was made constitutionally binding on him in the discharge of
all his functions except the appointment of the Prime Minister. This
was a mandatory constitutional provision as distinguished from a
convention in a parliamentary form of government such as is found in
Britain.
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The Constitutional Changes of 1975
But this discussion about the functions of the President in the Constitution that was originally adopted in 1972 is merely academic now.
Without again ascertaining the opinion of the country, which earlier
gave its verdict for a parliamentary form of government, drastic and
sweeping changes were brought about by the Parliament in the beginning of 1975, Jo empowering the President to discharge all his functions
at his own discretion or in his individual judgment, and the Prime
Minister and all other Ministers were made to function subject to the
direction of the President.
A number.of amendments to the Constitution had to be effected
now by Martial Law Regulations in order to make it workable. Briefly
stated, by sweeping amendments made by the Parliament, the President
was vested with much more power than the President of the United
States, without any of the well-thought-out checks and balances obtaining in the U.S. Constitution. As was already stated, the Cabinet was
retained; so also was the office of the Prime Minister, but he had none
of the powers or functions of a Prime Minister in a parliamentary form
of government. Ironically enough, this time it was the Prime Minister's
office which was made a ceremonial one.
Then on August 15, 1975, the Constitution as it existed on that date,
as was indicated above, was kept in force but with necessary amendments made by Martial Law Regulations. 11 It continues in force today,
subject to Martial Law Regulations, which may bring about amendments as and when thought necessary.
The present Constitution provides for a unicameral legislature as
distinguished from a bicameral one. The Parliament consists of three
hundred members; for a period of ten years there shall be fifteen women
members of the Parliament, to be elected by the three hundred members
already elected.
Illustrative of its legislative functions are provisions that no tax can
be levied without parliamentary sanctions, and the budget is to be
10. Mr. Justice Chowdhury, a confidant of Mujibur Rahman, had resigned from
the presidency in December 1973 to devote himself to service in the foreign affairs of
Bangladesh. The constitutional changes were adopted by the Parliament (Jatiya Sangsad)
on January 25, 1975. See "Bangladesh," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, March 3-9,
1975, p. 26997, and Aug. 25-31, 1975, pp. 27296-27297.
II. On August 15, 1975, President Mujibur Rahman, together with his family, was
killed in a coup d'etat by a group of military officers. He was succeeded as President by
Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed. On August 20, 1975, President Moshtaque Ahmed
assumed the power to issue martial law regulations which could not be questioned in any
court. See "Bangladesh." Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Oct. 13-19, 1975, pp. 2738127383; and Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of the Mujib Regime
and Its Aftermath," Asian Survey, Feb. 1976, pp. 119-129.
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passed by the Parliament. As the Parliament stands dissolved now, the
budget can be authenticated and certified by the President.
The Constitution as it now stands provides for a Supreme Court
and a High Court. It is also provided, as in Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, that Chief Justices of the Supreme Court and the High
Court and other judges shall be independent in the exercise of their
judicial functions. The Supreme Court originally had an Appellate
Division and a High Court Division; but recently the Constitution has
been amended, and a High Court has been established with a Chief
Justice with distinct status and functions.
The Supreme Court is empowered to hear appeals from the High
Court. The High Court is entrusted with original powers of issuing
orders directing a functionary to refrain from doing anything which he
is not permitted in law to do, or declaring an act illegal if it is in
contravention of a statute. These are, in fact, powers of issuing writs
analogous to the American writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto, certiorari, or habeas corpus.
Although the power of enforcing fundamental rights has been in
suspension by proclamation of emergency since 1974, the High Court is
empowered to issue directions as contemplated in Article 102 of the
Constitution if the order against which a c~mplaint is brought is in
violation of any statutory provision. Appeals from such orders are
made to the Supreme Court.
A brief reference can now be made to the question of separation of
powers. The principle postulates that the same person or body of
persons should not be entrusted with unrestricted powers. The idea is
that the three different organs of the State, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, should function independently of each other.
Here we may refer to the words of James Madison, who said: "The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary in the
same hands, whether of one, a few or many and whether hereditary,
self-appointed or elected, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny."
The United States Constitution, therefore, in Article I gave legislative power to the Congress, executive power to the President, and
judicial power to the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time establish. Although the U.S. Constitution greatly succeeded, without entering into an elaborate discussion it
may be said that it has also been found that the watertight compartments were neither possible nor desirable.
A study of the Bangladesh Constitution would show that the
Parliament, while acting as the Constituent Assembly, adopted the
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principle of separation of powers but did not make effective provision
for its implementation.
Bangladesh is a new country and as such it has to go through
constitutional experiments with a view to securing peace and happiness
for the people, who are looking forward to enjoyment of the fruits of
independence. It has been aptly said that a constitution is best which
works best. A nation vibrating with enthusiasm and continuously
looking for prosperity and a higher standard of living has to adopt a
mechanism suitable to the changing circumstances and needs of society.
This is particularly true of a country like Bangladesh, which is still in
the process of constitutional experimentation, in order to secure for its
people peace, happiness, and prosperity.'2
12. "Bangladesh," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Jan. 16, 1976, pp. 2752127522; Oct. 15, 1976, pp. 27989-27992; March 4, 1977, p. 28223; and July 29, 1977, p.
28480. See also Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975," and by the same author,
"Bangladesh in 1976: Struggle for Survival as an Independent State," Asian Survey, Feb.
1977, pp. 191-200; M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Military
Rulers," Asian Survey, Feb. 1978, pp. 126-134.

III

Republic of China

Editorial Note

Geography: The Republic of China (ROC), located in East Asia,
exercises control over the island of Taiwan (Formosa), the Penghu
(Pescadores) islands, the Quemoy and Matsu islands. It also controls
Pratas and some of the Nan-sha (Spratly) Islands, such as Tai-p'ing
(ltu Aba) Island, in the South China Sea. Although the ROC continues
to claim legal sovereignty over other parts of China under the Communist rule, it has since 1958 renounced the use of force to achieve
that goal.
Taiwan Island lies 80 to 125 miles off the southeastern coast ofthe
China mainland. It is about 245 miles long and from 60 to 90 miles
wide. A north-south mountain range forms the backbone of the island,
with the highest peak, Yii Shan, rising to 13,110 feet above sea level.
The eastern slope of this range is exceedingly steep and craggy, but the
western half of the island is generally flat, fertile, and well cultivated.
Population and education: The ROC has a population of 17
million, including about 120,000 on the Penghu islands and 75,000 on
other islands (excluding the military). Population density is about 1,200
per square mile, which is almost five times higher than that of mainland
China and is the second highest in the world, only after Bangladesh. In
1977, the population growth rate was about 2 percent.
Over 27 percent of the population (about 4.4 million) are in school.
Since 1968 a nine-year free education system has been in effect. There
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are about 300,000 undergraduate (including junior college) and graduate students. The literacy rate in the ROC is over 95 percent.
History: China is one of the oldest of the world's civilizations. The
earliest Chinese dynasty began in about 2205 B.C., and under successive
dynasties Chinese culture prospered and advanced to a point where
achievements in literature, philosophy, art, and craftsmanship were
among the highest attained by man. But China was weak in science, and
there was no industrial revolution similar to what happened in the
West. As a result, China was falling behind the West in technology,
especially with respect to weapons, in the nineteenth century.
The foreign Ch'ing (Manchu) rulers adopted an isolation policy to
prevent foreign penetration into China. However, after its defeat in the
Opium War (1839-1842) by Great Britain, China was forced to open to
the Western powers. Continued encroachment on China by Western
nations and Japan led to other unequal treaties which included foreigners' extraterritoriality, foreign control of tariff and customs administration, and other matters which the Chinese considered humiliating.
Some unequal treaties continued into the 1940s.
After decades of painful experiences and frustration, the Chinese
people began to take a keen interest in the revolutionary movement led
by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which finally overthrew the Ch'ing Dynasty ( 16441911) and established the Republic of China in 1912. The new republic
was soon beset with warlordism, foreign intervention, and domestic
social disorder.
In the 1920s a new leader arose, Chiang Kai-shek, a follower of Dr.
Sun Yat-sen. Chiang reorganized the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)
and established a party army. In 1929, Chiang almost unified China. At
that time, the Communist movement began to spread in southeast
China, and Chiang moved to eliminate the Communists. He succeeded
in destroying most of their party organization and virtually paralyzed
their ranks throughout China. The remnants of Communist forces of
several thousand fled to Shenshi Province in the northwest in 1936. In
1937, Japan invaded China, and a provisional truce was made between
the ROC government under Chiang and the Communists led by Mao
Tse-tung.
During the Sino-Japanese War, when the Chiang government was
preoccupied with resisting the Japanese aggression, the Communists
took the opportunity to expand their military forces from roughly
thirty thousand in 1937 to a million in 1945. After the defeat of Japan,
civil war broke out and finally culminated in the Communist defeat of
the ROC forces in 1949. On October I, 1949, the Communists established the People's Republic of China on the mainland. Chiang Kaishek moved his government and the remnant of his forces and his
supporters to Taiwan in late 1949.
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Economy: During the past three decades, Taiwan has changed
dramatically from an agricultural to an industrial economy. The gross
national product (GNP) in 1977 was about $19 billion and per capita
income was about $1,000 (U.S.). The economic growth rate since 1970
has been about 8 percent annually. Foreign trade, both ways, in 1977
was about $18 billion, with a favorable balance (surplus) of $850
million. Trade between the United States and the ROC in 1977 was
about $6 billion.
The economic system is a mixture of socialism and free enterprise.
The government controls electricity, petroleum, railways, highways,
steel, shipyards, salt, tobacco, wine, postal service, and a few other
major enterprises. All others are open to private enterprises.
The economic policy is also directed toward a more equitable
distribution of income among the population. In 1976, the 20 percent of
families with the highest income received 37.3 percent of the total
personal income, while the 20 percent of families with the lowest
income received 8.9 percent of the total personal income. The ratio
between the highest income group and that of the lowest was 4.2. Such
discrepancy in income distribution between the two groups is one of the
lowest in the world.
Constitutional development and government structure: Modern
constitutionalism was unknown in traditional 'China. The emperor
possessed all legislative, executive, and judicial powers. However, his
rule was not absolute, and there were some limitations on his authority
in practice, usage, and the teachings of ancient sages. Beyond that, the
censorial institution formed another check on the Chinese emperor.
The censors had the duty to watch and criticize any member of the
entire official system, including the emperor. Therefore, China did have
in its tradition something similar to modern constitutional limitation on
the government.
Modern Western constitutional concepts were introduced to China
in the late nineteenth century. After decades of effort, the Constitution
of the ROC was adopted on December 25, 1946, by the constitutional
National Assembly. This Constitution is still in effect in Taiwan.
A popularly elected National Assembly is the supreme organ. The
Assembly elects the President and Vice-President, who serve six-year
terms. The main legislative body is the Li-fa-yuan (Legislative Yuan),
composed of popularly elected members. The cabinet-the Executive
Yuan, appointed by the President with the consent of the Li-fa-yuanis responsible to the latter. Under the central government, there are
the Taiwan Provincial Government, Taipei Special Municipality, and
Fukien Provincial Government (in charge of Quemoy and Matsu
islands). A provincial assembly, city councils, and mayors are all
popularly elected.
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Legal system: Under the traditional Chinese legal system, the
written law was predominantly penal, and the traditional society was
not legally oriented. There were no independent judiciary, no professional lawyers, no formal legal education in the modern sense. One of
the results of Western intervention in China has been the modernization
of its legal system on the Western model. A legal reform movement
started in the late Ch'ing Dynasty at the turn of the century. However, it
was not until the Kuomintang assumed nation-wide power in the
1930s that a complete set of modern laws was enacted and promulgated
by the ROC government and has become known as the Six Codes
(Organic and Administrative Law, Commerical Law, Civil Code, Criminal Code, Code of Civil Procedure, and Code of Criminal Procedure).
These codes are essentially modeled upon continental Europe's civil law
systems, but they also retain some of the traditional Chinese legal rules
or principles.
The ROC government under the Kuomintang also began to
establish modern court systems throughout China. Under the 1946
Constitution, the highest judicial organ is the Judicial Yuan, composed
of the Council of Grand Justices-primarily responsible for interpretation of the Constitution-the Supreme Court, the Administrative
Court, and the Commission on the Discipline of Public Functionaries.
Below that there is a high court (court of appeal) in each province or
special municipality and a district court at the county or city level.
Modern law schools are established to train lawyers and judges. The
constitution also guarantees the independence of the judiciary. Since
late 1949, the Six Codes and the judicial system have operated only in
Taiwan and other islands under ROC control.
HUNGDAH CHIU

American Influence on the Formation
of the Constitution and Constitutional Law
of the Republic of China:
Past History and Future Prospects
Herbert H. P. Ma
Professor of Law, National Taiwan University

I

China's first attempt to emulate Western political and legal institutions
dates back to the last years of the last dynasty, the Manchu reign, in the
1800s. However, serious efforts to make a permanent constitution
began only after the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. As a
result, a number of drafts were introduced leading to the May 5th Draft
Constitution of 1936, which in turn formed the basis of the present
Constitution of 1947.
Both the May 5th Draft Constitution and the present Constitution
are founded on the unique political theory ofthe Three Principles ofthe
People and the doctrine of separation of five powers as taught by Dr.
Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic. However, Western
influence has always been present.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to try to show what
influence the United States Constitution and constitutional law had on
the Republic of China during the formation of her constitution; second,
to try to see in a modest way what prospects there are for developing the
constitutional law of the Republic of China in light of American
experience. It is convenient to begin with what is historically relevant.
II

When Japan first defeated China in 1894 and then Russia in 1905, the
Manchu rulers of the Ch'ing dynasty were convinced by loyal political
reformers that a constitutional government was the only way to be
strong again. A concrete step was taken in 1908 when the Emperor
Kuang-shti declared the 23-article General Plan of the Constitution
aiming at transforming the body politic into a constitutional monarchy
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patterned after the Meiji Restoration in Japan. However, it was a time
when the revolutionaries led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen had determined to
bring down the dynasty as a prerequisite to the successful reconstruction of China. As a last attempt to survive, the Manchu imperial house
further promulgated in 1911 the Nineteen Constitutional Principles to
take effect immediately as a temporary constitution. These Principles
were obviously meant to copy the British cabinet system, with the
Emperor as a mere figurehead. But it was too late to turn the tide. The
next year saw the fall of the last dynasty in China's long monarchical
history, and the first Chinese republic came into being. 1
It is interesting to note that supporters of the Chinese revolution in
their attempts to establish a republic often referred to the experiences of
the United States of America in her constitution-making. In late 1911,
when the governors of Kiang-su and Chekiang provinces called upon all
other provinces which had declared independence to send delegates to a
meeting in Shanghai to form a provisional government, they had this to
say in a joint proposal:
A Republican form of government is now recognized by national opinion. However, success will not be easily had unless there is a model
to be followed. The system of the United States of America should be
the future pattern of our country. At the beginning of the founding of
the United States, the country was rife with crises of internal disruptions
although declaring herself a union. That she managed to achieve final
victory after eight years of bitter struggle was primarily because the
thirteen colonies formed a Congress which ably conducted business and
enforced order unitedly. The first and the second Congress of the American colonies meant to assist the legislatures of the respective colonies .
. . . It was not until the third Congress that a national Congress was
established for permanent order and lasting peace. This is also a necessary course of history. It is appropriate for us urgently to emulate the
method of the first Congress of the American colonies and set up a provisional congressional organization in Shanghai to discuss proper measures for internal and external affairs in order to preserve the unification of our land and to regain peace.2

Delegates from ten and later seventeen provinces did meet in
Shanghai and elsewhere, and the result was the 24-article General Plan
for Organization of the Provisional Government. Though quickly
drawn up and short-lived, these articles are nevertheless fruits of the
first attempt at constitution-making of the first Chinese Republic.
These articles bore some striking similarities to the original United
I. For a general history of the formation of the Chinese Constitution ( 1908-1934),
see W. Y. Tsao, The Constitutional Structure of Modern China (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 1947), chap. I, pp. 1-22.
2. See Hsieh Cheng-min, ed., The History of Legislation of the Republic of
China (in Chinese) (Shanghai: Cheng-chung Book Company, 1948), pp. 45-46.
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States Constitution. Among other things, they made the provisional
President the real chief executive, and there was no mention of the
people's basic rights and duties.
It was most unfortunate that the Chinese Republic had to face in
her infancy successive crises of internal disruptions, to repeat the words
of the above-quoted joint proposal used to describe the United States
of America in her initial stage. The fact was, shortly after the installation of the provisional government, there arose warlordism, which kept
the country divided and irresolute. It started with Yuan Shih-kai, the
most influential figure during China's transition from a monarchy to a
republic. When Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary leader, was made the
provisional President, no one feared he would abuse that powerful
position. But the members of the Senate did have grave concern over
the ambitious incoming President, Yuan Shih-kai-so much so that the
Senate strongly proposed a Provisional Constitution of fifty-six articles,l which replaced the General Plan for Organization of the Provisional Government and changed the American type of presidential
system to the cabinet system based on the French model. However, the
official explanation was best given by one of the senators as follows:
When the provinces were first united, the situation was very much
likened to the Union of the thirteen colonies of America. Because
the circumstances made it natural for us to have a federal state, the
American presidential system was adopted. Since, after the establishment of the provisional government, the unification of the south and the
north was felt so necessary, it is appropriate for us to have a unitary
state such as the centralized government of France. So we should adopt
the French cabinet system. 4

When an elected Congress worked out a draft for a permanent
constitution in 1913, it adhered to the cabinet system, which requires all
the President's acts to be countersigned by a member of the governmer.<. This greatly angered Yuan Shih-kai, who had by then become
dissatisfied with his already dictatorial presidential power.
What is significant here is the fact that, primarily in fear of a single
person, the early constitution-makers of China forsook the American
presidential system, which, as later developments attested, never was
considered by the subsequent Chinese constitution-makers with the
same force.
After disbanding the Congress by force, Yuan Shih-kai sought to
put himself on the throne. In this he failed. But great damage was done
to the cause of republicanism in China, because, although the Congress
3. In this Provisional Constitution, the rights and duties of the people were for the
first time itemized, but the rights of the people are subject to legislative restrictions. See
Hsieh Cheng-min, History of Legislation, p. 362.
4. These words were Ku Chung-Hsiu's; see Hsieh Chung-min, p. 49.
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was soon reassembled and the constitution-making efforts were made
to continue in the following ten years, warlords began to vie with one
another for control of the central government in Peking. Since they
were not genuinely willing to see China embrace constitutionalism,
which would threaten their own positions, the constitutional drafts
drawn up in 1919, 1923, and 1924, respectively, were either abortive or
never enforced. These drafts all adopted the French cabinet system, but
each time in a more elaborate form.
However, two things that came up during this agonizing period of
constitution-making had obvious American influence. First a bicameral
Congress comprised of a Senate and a House of Representatives based
on the American model was adopted by the constitutional draft of 1913
and followed by the subsequent drafts mentioned above.s Second, when
the governors of Kiang-su and Chekiang sent out a joint proposal
calling for a meeting of the provincial representatives to discuss the
formation of some kind of national government, they explicitly indicated that "the system of the United States of America should be the
future pattern of our country." This pronouncement had no small
impact on the later movement for "united autonomous provinces" that
began to gain groun9 during 1920-21. Frustrated by political and
military strife, many provinces advocated a kind of federalism by the
making of provincial constitutions, on the one hand, and a constitution of united provinces, on the other. At one time, it was openly
proclaimed that all provinces should first enact their own constitutions
and then, following the American example, seek to create a constitution for the Republic of China. 6 But the movement did not go very far,
because it soon met with strong opposition from many sources.
At the time when the warlords battled against each other in the
north, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic, rallied the
revolutionary forces of his Nationalist Party in South China to oppose
them. He was not to see China unified before he died in 1925. The
unification of China was left for his devoted disciple, Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, to complete when in 1926 he successfully carried
through the northern expedition which wiped out the major warlords.
The capital was moved to Nanking, and a new epoch began in China's
efforts to make a permanent constitution, this time on the basis of the
theory of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and the
doctrine of separation of five powers. 7
5. Ibid., pp. 364-365.
6. Ibid., p. 176.
7. This was also the time when basic Chinese laws were codified, following in
general the European continental system. For an introduction to prevailing Chinese laws
and legal system in English, see Herbert H. P. Ma, "General Features of the Law and
Legal System of the Republic of C,hina," in Trade and lnveslment in Taiwan: The Legal
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III
Often translated as the Principle of Nationalism, the Principle of
Democracy, and the Principle of People's Livelihood, these three
principles provide the theoretical bases for the cause of revolution and
national construction. Since so much has been written about them, it is
sufficient for our purpose to say that they aim at national unity and
independence, a government of popular sovereignty and the general
welfare of the people. s The separation of five powers as a direct
guideline for constitution-making is meant to implement the three
principles. While this theory and doctrine are unique in many senses,
they are not cut off from the main currents of political thought
underlying any democratic form of government. Indeed, it has been
asserted that Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People were in
the main of American origin. The immediate inspiration of the three
principles was said to be Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, particularly his
"government of the people, by the people and for the people." 9 However, since Dr. Sun Yat-sen in elaborating his three principles obviously
resorted to many sources, Eastern as well as Western, European as well
as American, the above assertion is only true to the extent that
Lincoln's words probably gave a powerful impetus to Dr. Sun's forming
the idea of three principles of the people.
On the other hand, the separation of five powers as a foundation of
China's constitutional structure is not a departure from, but an improvement on, Montesquieu's doctrine of separation of powers. The
ingenuity of separating the powers of examination and impeachment,
traditionally highly developed in China, from the executive and legislative powers and according them independent status marks the uniqueness of the doctrine. In this way, a government of qualified persons
chosen by means of competitive civil service examinations may be
ensured. On the other hand, the power of impeachment may no longer
be used to achieve partisan purposes in parliament, but may be
exercised independently to help bring about a clean and efficient
government. Dr. Sun Yat-sen believed, however, that a five-power
and Economic Environment in the Republic of China, edited by Richard Cosway,
Herbert H. P. Ma, and Warren Shattuck (Taipei: Mei-ya Publishing Company, 1973),
chap. I, pp. 1-50; Herbert H. P. Ma, "The Legal System of the Republic of China,"
Lawasia, 5 (December 1974): 96-127; Herbert Han-Pao Ma, "Legal System of the
Republic of China," in Rabies Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht, 37. Jahrgang 1973, Heft I Paul Siebeck, Tubingen, pp. 101-110.
8. For an authoritative interpretation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings, see Ts'ui
Shu-chin, New Commentaries on the Three Principles of the People (in Chinese), 4th ed.
(Taipei, 1959).
9. See Arthur N. Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution: A Phase in the Regeneration of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), pp. 134-135.
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government plan would not be able to substantiate popular sovereignty
as advocated by him unless the demarcation of political powers and
administrative (government) powers were realized. In short, Dr. Sun
Yat-sen would push the idea of direct democracy to the extent pos~ble
by installing a popularly elected National Assembly armed with the
political powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum, so that
the five-power government would function according to the will of the
people.1o On the basis of these doctrines, the Organic Law of the
National Government was formulated in 1928 to create the first fivepower national government under the leadership of the Nationalist
Party (Kuomintang).
In the subsequent years constitution-making efforts continued
steadily. In 1931 a Provisional Constitution was adopted, consisting of
eighty-nine articles to be divided into eight chapters. This document
recognized the supremacy of the Kuomintang during the period of
political tutelage in that "the National Congress of the Kuomintang
delegates shall exercise the powers on behalf of the National Assembly." But this period of party rule was supposed to be of short
duration. Hence, after 1932, drafts of the permanent constitution began
to be proposed and released to the public for comment and criticism. It
was only after six revisions that the draft became final on May 5 in
1936. Hence the popular name, "May 5th Draft Constitution. " 11
Unfortunately, the constitution-making task was interrupted, first
by the Sino-Japanese war, which broke out the next year and lasted for
eight years, then by the political crises started by the Chinese Communists who, taking advantage of the war, had been made so strong as
to threaten the existing government and its determination to introduce
a permanent constitution. To keep the country united the government
agreed to a Political Consultation Conference to settle the differences of
all major political parties with regard to constitution-making. Although
certain agreements were reached, the Communists and leftist parties
still refused to participate. The National Assembly finally met to pass a
revised version of the May 5th Draft Constitution as guided by the
agreements, on December 25, 1946.
Since the present Constitution differs from the May 5th Draft
Constitution in both form and substance, it is pertinent to point out the
highlights of that draft before dealing with the present Constitution in
more detail. The May 5th Draft Constitution is by and large in
conformity with the guidelines bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. As far
10. For a general explanation in English of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's five-power theory of
government, see Hsieh K wan-sheng, A Brief Survey of the Chinese Constitution (Taipei,
1954), pp. 1-17.
II. An account of this laborious procedure is found in W. Y. Tsao, Constitutional
Structure of Modern China (n. I above), pp. 17-19.
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as government structure is concerned, it entrusted the four political
powers with a popularly elected National Assembly, which elects and
recalls, among other officials, the President and Vice-President of the
Republic. The President of the Republic, on the other hand, possesses
actual power, and the office resembles to a large extent that of the
President of the United States of America. He appoints all the top
officials of the executive department of the central government, who are
individually responsible to him. Though his acts must be countersigned
by the president of the Executive Yuan, the fact that the President of
the Republic chairs the meetings of the Executive Yuan Council gives
him every opportunity to exert his influence. 12
IV

The Constitution in its present form consists of 175 articles divided into
14 chapters.IJ It was meant to cover all the major points of Dr. Sun Yatsen's constitutional theories and the principles agreed upon at the
Political Consultation Conference participated in by leaders of the then
existing political parties. For this reason, some deviations from the
May 5th Draft Constitution were unavoidable. Consequently, there has
been much argument as to whether as a result the present constitution is
not less conformative to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings than the May 5th
Draft Constitution. However, the following introduction to the present
Constitution of the Republic of China will be done only in terms of
whatever relationship its provisions may have with the United States
Constitution and constitutional law.
First of all, the Chinese Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, has
a preamble setting forth the theoretical bases and the major aims of the
fundamental law of the land. And nothing in the Chinese Constitution
shows more affiliation with the United States of America than its
Article I, which declares that "The Republic of China, founded on the
Three Principles of the People, shall be a democratic republic of the
people, to be governed by the people and for the people." While the
origin of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People may have
derived from Lincoln's famous words, there has been criticism against
the advisability of equating the two and qualifying national polity with
those obvious "foreign slogans."I4
12. For a detailed analysis of the May 5th Draft Constitution, see W. Y. Tsao,
Constitutional Structure.
13. It should be noted that to meet the unexpected needs of the period of war with
the Communists a few Provisional Clauses were added to the Constitution by the
National Assembly from 1945-1966. An official English translation of the Chinese
Constitution and the Provisional Clauses may be found in the appendix of the China
Year Book. For a general introduction to the present Constitution in English, see Hsieh
Kwan-sheng, op. cit.
14. Se~ ~sieh Ying-chow, The Constitution of the Republic of China (in Chinese),
6th ed: (Taipei, 1954), pp. 26-27.
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Under the chapter on Rights and Duties of the People there are
articles corresponding to the Bill of Rights in the United States
Constitution. For example, the people are guaranteed (l) freedom of
speech, lecturing, writing, and publication (Article II, first amendment), (2) freedom of religious faith (Article 13, first amendment), (3)
freedom of assembly and of association (Article 14, first amendment),
(4) freedom of person (Article 8, fourth amendment), (5) right to
present petitions, to file complaints, and to institute legal proceedings
(Article 16, first amendment). Article 22 ofthe Chinese Constitution is
strikingly similar to the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
That Article provides that "all other freedoms and rights of the people
that are not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be
guaranteed under the Constitution."
However, while the Chinese Constitution, like its American counterpart, guarantees individual freedoms and rights without qualification, restriction of them is allowable under conditions set forth in
Article 23, namely: (I) to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of
other persons, (2) to avert an imminent crisis, (3) to maintain social
order, (4) to advance public welfare.
The governmental structure as found in the present Constitution is
based in general on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's demarcation of political and
administrative powers and the separation of five administrative powers.
There are a National Assembly, a President, and five Yuan: the
Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan. Compared with the National Assembly as defined in the May 5th Draft Constitution, the present
National Assembly is so limited in its powers that in practice it only
elects the President and Vice-President of the Republic. For this reason,
it has been derogatively likened to the American presidential electoral
college.' 5
Of particular relevance to our purpose is the frequent question
whether the central government structure adopted by the Chinese
Constitution is modeled on the American presidential system or on the
British cabinet system. This question can best be answered in light of
the triangular relationship between the President, the Executive Yuan,
and the Legislative Yuan. Article 57 reads:
!.The Executive Yuan has the duty to present to the Legislative
Yuan a statement of its administrative policies and a report on its
15. The present Constitution provides for initiative and referendum only for
constitutional amendments, not for ordinary legislation, and limits election and recall to
the offices of President and Vice-President of the Republic (Article 27). However, in 1966
the National Assembly, on the basis of the Provisional Clauses to the Constitution,
enacted a set of rules in accordance with which the National Assembly may initiate
principles and practice referendum for central government legislation. These powers and
the power to recall are seldom practiced.
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administration. While the Legislative Yuan is in session, Members of the
Legislative Yuan shall have the right to question the President and the
Ministers and Chairmen of Commissions of the Executive Yuan.
2. If the Legislative Yuan does not concur in any important policy
of the Executive Yuan, it may, by resolution, request the Executive Yuan to alter such a policy. With respect to such resolution, the Executive Yuan may, with the approval of the President
of the Republic, request the Legislative Yuan for reconsideration. If,
after reconsideration, two-thirds of the Members of the Legislative Yuan
present at the meeting uphold the original resolution, the President of the
Executive Yuan shall either abide by the same or resign from office.
3. If the Executive Yuan deems a resolution on a statutory, budgetary, or treaty bill passed by the Legislative Yuan difficult of execution, it may, with the approval of the President of the Republic and
within ten days after its transmission to the Executive Yuan, request
the Legislative Yuan to reconsider the said resolution. If, after reconsideration, two-thirds of the Members of the Legislative Yuan present
at the meeting uphold the original resolution, the President of the Executive Yuan shall either abide by the same or resign from office.

If the above provision gives one the initial impression that the
system contained therein appears to be both cabinet and presidential, a
closer look indicates that it is neither the one nor the other. While the
President of the Executive Yuan (the Prime Minister) is made responsible to the Legislative Yuan, Article 57 expressly prohibits members of
the Legislative Yuan from holding government posts concurrently, and
the President of the Executive Yuan is not given the power to dissolve
the legislature. On the other hand, while the President of the Republic,
subject to the consent of the legislature, does nominate and appoint the
President of the Executive Yuan,l6 his power of appointment ceases
there and does not reach down to the Vice-President of the Executive
Yuan and the various heads of the ministries and commissions.17 And
unlike the American system, where the President is the ultimate decision maker, the Executive Yuan meeting, which the President of the
Yuan himself chairs, makes the decisions on all important matters of
the State. 18 Article 57 does adopt the veto power, the prerogative of the
American President, but it is exercised by the President of the Executive Yuan. The President of the Republic only reserves the power of
approval. So analyzed, the Chinese government system is of a unique
type taking after both the British cabinet system and the American
presidential system.
One may next ask whether the American judicial review system,
which has been adopted by many countries, obtains in the Chinese Constitution. If by judicial review is meant the power vested in the judiciary
to interpret the Constitution and to repudiate the applicability of laws
16. Constitution, Article 55.

17. Article 56.

18. Article 58.
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inconsistent with the Constitution, it has its counterpart in the Chinese
Constitution.
According to the provisions of Articles 78, 79, 171, and 173 of the
Constitution, the Council of Grand Justices, a component part of the
Judicial Yuan, is vested with the exclusive power of judicial review and
the power of interpreting the Constitution and unifying the interpretations of laws and ordinances.t9 Among other things, the Council alone
is to determine whether a law or an ordinance is in conflict with the
Constitution. However, interpretation can be given only upon request by governmental organs or the people and not of the Council's
own initiative.2o
On the other hand, the ordinary courts, unlike their American
counterparts, have no power of judicial review as to whether a law is in
conflict with the Constitution. Only if a judgment is deemed to be in
conflict with the Constitution does the litigant concerned have the right
to state this in the reasons for his appeal to a higher court while the
proceedings for the case are still in progress.2 1 It is not made clear
whether a higher court must necessarily accept this as a fact, nor what
the higher court can do if it affirms the allegation in the appeal.
Finally, a few words about the Control Yuan may be in order.
Although based on the traditional Chinese censorial system, the Control Yuan as found in the present Constitution is to a certain extent in its
organization modeled on the United States Senate. 22 For example, members of the Control Yuan are basically elected by provincial and municipal councils, the number being five from each province and two from
each municipality. They are prohibited from occupying any other public
office during the time for which they are elected. 23 One of the majorfunctions of the Control Yuan is to exercise the power of consent in the appointment of the President, Vice-President, and Grand Justices of the
Judicial Yuan, and the President, Vice-President, and Members of the
Examination Yuan.24 In fact, it was on the basis of its similarity to the
upper house of a Western parliament or congress, such as the United
States Senate, that the Control Yuan, the National Assembly, and the
19. Article 78 provides: "The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and
shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders." Article 79 provides:
"The Judicial Yuan shall have a certain number of Grand Justices to take charge of
matters specified in Article 78 of this Constitution." Article 171 provides: "Laws that are
in conflict with the Constitution shall be null and void." Article 173 provides: "The
Constitution shall be interpreted by the Judicial Yuan."
20. Law governing the Council of the Grand Justices, Articles 2, 3, and 4.
21. Interpretation of Council of Grand Justices, Shih Tzu No. 9, 1952.
22. For an introduction to the Chinese Control Yuan, see Herbert Han-Pao Ma,
"The Chinese Control Yuan: An Independent Supervisory Organ of the State," Washington University Law Quarterly, no. 4 (December 1963), pp. 401-426.
23. Constitution, Articles 93 and 103.
24. Articles 79 and 84.
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Legislative Yuan jointly were regarded by the Council of Grand Justices
as being equivalent to a "parliament" of a Western democracy. 25

v
In the above paragraphs, instances of American influence exerted and
felt during the extended period of Chinese constitution-making were
given. These instances, large or small, mostly refer to the formation of
the Constitution as a document-whether it be the language used,
institutions adopted, or theories preferred.
Once the Constitution is framed, the next task is to work out a
technique of interpretation and application of the Constitution in order
that a law of the Constitution may be developed. This is based on the
assumption that a constitution, like any code, could not provide a
solution for all controversies that might arise, no matter how carefully
it was drawn up. In other words, a written constitution is not the whole
of constitutional law, and many questions can only be answered by
means of judicial decision or interpretation aided by doctrinal exposition. In this way the constitution is put on a working basis, and a law of
the constitution may be developed. It is with this understanding that
attempts will be made in the following to see whether and how the
American experiences may be resorted to in the development of the
constitutional law of the Republic of China.
First, a mention of some historical facts is pertinent in this
connection. Two years after the promulgation of the Constitution of
1947, the Chinese Communists overran the country and the Nationalist
government retreated from the mainland to the island province of
Taiwan. It brought with it the Constitution, the laws, and the legal
system intact, and they have since been in force within the present
territories of the Republic of China. In other words, there is a continuation in the Constitution proper since it was framed in 1947, but the
interpretation and application of the Constitution are limited to the
experiences after the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan in
1949.26
25. Interpretation of Council of Grand Justices, Shih Tzu No. 76, 1957.
26. Because the Chinese Communists across the Taiwan Strait have continued to
threaten to take the island province of Taiwan by force, the Republic of China has been
continually kept under martial law. However, the economic growth and the prevailing
peace and stability enjoyed by the society as a whole have made it unnecessary to apply
such measures as are authorized by martial law, except in a few special cases. In other
words, to conform to the actual situation of the country, a set of rules has been enacted to
limit the jurisdiction of military courts to certain specific categories of serious crimes
leaving most other cases to ordinary courts. It is now a well-known fact that th~
government has not stopped making efforts to relax existing restrictions. Under these
circumstances, ~eveloping the law of the Constitution, even in the area of guaranteed
freedoms and nghts of the people, is not absolutely impossible, as this paper will show
later.
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It should first be remembered that the Chinese Constitution, while
based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's unique political theories, has incorporated
provisions taken from both continental European and Anglo-American
constitutional systems together with their respective legal techniques. It
should also be emphasized that there is great diversity in training of the
people who participated in the framing of the Chinese Constitution and
people who have interpreted and applied it. These people were trained
in Germany, in France, in England, in America, in Japan, or in China
by teachers with a like diversity of training. When they come to
interpret and apply the Constitution, they are likely to do so from
different standpoints and with different techniques. This will inevitably
lead to an unsystematic interpretation and application of the Constitution, which is detrimental to the development of constitutional law in
the Republic of China. Therefore, there has been felt an imperative
need for a unified interpretation and application of the Constitution,
which can be brought about by intelligent use of the doctrinal and
judicial development of European and Anglo-American constitutions
which have contributed to the framing of the Chinese Constitution. By
intelligent use is meant an adaptation of these foreign experiences,
theoretical and technical, to the basic ideas and techniques of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen and the general constitutional and legal framework developed
on the basis of them. 27
On this assumption, any provision in the Chinese Constitution
which is of American origin should therefore be interpreted and applied
in light of an adaptation of the American doctrinal and technical
development concerned to the basic Chinese teachings and constitutional and legal framework. This is often easier said than done. But as
a general guideline to be borne in mind in the development of Chinese
constitutional law, the approach is sound and workable. An example
would serve to show the direction. However, the adoption of a more
basic approach in the U.S. Constitution should perhaps first be considered.
As is well known, the United States Constitution is both a legal
and a political document. But in America the Constitution is more a
legal than a political document. It is enforced and applied in the courts
as the "supreme law of the land," binding legally not only all private
27. For this basic assumption the present writer is indebted to Dean Roscoe Pound,
who served as Advisor to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of China in Nanking
between 1946 and 1948. During these two years he commented often on the Chinese law and
legal system and suggested how to better apply them. His comments have been published
in different places, for example, Some Problems of the Administration ofJustice in China
(Nanking: National Chengchi University, 1948); The Law in China as Seen by Roscoe
Pound, edited by Tsao Wen-yen (Taipei: China Culture Publishing Foundation, 1953). In
particular, his opinions on how to develop a true constitutional law on the basis of the
then newly framed Chinese Constitution are full of insight and foresight. The subsequent
discussion in this paper is mainly enlightened by them.
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persons but all officials and government agencies. Like the U.S. Constitution, the Chinese Constitution is also both a legal and a political
document in the sense that it is not only a frame of government, a
declaration of national policies, but also a body of the supreme law of
the land. Article 8, which guarantees personal freedom by the privilege
of habeas corpus, and Article 24, under which wrongful exercise of
authority may create a liability enforceable in the courts, attest to this.
What is significant in making this comparison is that there is the
need of a body of principles derived from the Chinese Constitution by a
legal technique to deal with controversies arising under it. For instance,
disputes over the jurisdictional lines between the several Yuan are likely
to rise as the operation of the Constitution increases. How is legislation
in contravention of the Constitution to be made void by Article 171?
How are administrative ordinances in conflict with the Constitution
invalidated by Article 172? And how may guaranteed rights and
freedoms of individuals be infringed? These and other matters are
questions of law and should be solved by judges and jurists with legal
methods rather than by politicians over conference tables. In other
words, so far as constitutional law can be made a body of interdependent principles and rules, it is important to make it such. And in this
respect American experience as a whole is invaluable.

VI
From here it is convenient to go back to the above assumption that the
interpretation and application of any provision in the Chinese Constitution which is based on the American model should be done in light of
an adaptation of the relevant American doctrinal and technical development to the basic Chinese constitutional and legal environment.
Article 8 of the Chinese Constitution is a good example. In definite
terms it provides:
Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. Except in case
of flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or
detained otherwise than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or punishment which is
not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be resisted.
When a person is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed a crime, the organ making the arrest or detention shall in writing
inform the said person, and his designated relative or friend of the
grounds for his arrest or detention, and shall, within 24 hours, t~rn him
over to a coml?~tent court for trial. The said person or any other
person may petition the competent court that a writ be served within
24 hours on the organ making the arrest for the surrender of the said
person for trial.
The court shall not reject the petition mentioned in the preceding
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paragraph, nor shall it order the organ concerned to make an investigation and report first. The organ concerned shall not refuse to execute,
or delay in executing, the writ of the court for the surrender of the said
person for trial.
When a person is unlawfully arrested or detained by any organ, he
or any other person may petition the court for an investigation. The
court shall not reject such a petition, and shall, within 24 hours, investigate the action of the organ concerned and deal with the matter in accordance with law.

That this Article adopted the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
as found in Article I, Section 9, of the U.S. Constitution is beyond
doubt. In fact there had been in force before the introduction of the
present Constitution a law entitled the Habeas Corpus Act, which now
serves to strengthen the provision in the Constitution.2s
What calls for discussion is this expression in the above Article:
"No person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law." It was argued that,
from the standpoint of the Anglo-American legal system in which the
writ of habeas corpus originated and long operated, this sounds very
good. But to the Chinese, who are more accustomed to the French
regime of police handling of petty police offences informally, interpretation and application of this portion of Article 8 to the letter will lead
to awkward results. A preferable way is to change "a law court" to "a
judicial authority" and to prescribe by legislation the procedure in case
of minor infractions of police regulations, thus bringing the customary
practice within the Constitution. The dissatisfaction and inconvenience
in the American system of traffic courts for petty cases in large cities
have also been advanced as reasons for rephrasing this portion of
Article 8 of the Chinese Constitution.29 However, the actual development in the past two decades seems to uphold the system as defined in
the Chinese Constitution, which is in conformity with its Anglo-American archetype. As a matter of fact, years ago the constitutionality of the
Law for the Punishment of Police Offences, which has been in force
since 1943, was formally challenged, and the case eventually ended up
in the Council of Grand Justices awaiting an interpretation. This is a
strong indication that the court rather than the police station is thought
to be the place where better protection for personal freedom is afforded.
28. Enacted in 1935 and enforced since 1946, this Act has ten articles specifying the
procedural details of the privilege of habeas corpus.
29. These arguments were advanced by a person no other than Roscoe Pound
himself. (See The Law in China as Seen by Roscoe Pound, p. 2.) To promote a rule of law
in the Western sense, he would have advised more use of the court in China. That he
should have argued otherwise than this in this example might be reputed partly to his
concern that unsuccessful molding of established customs by legislation would render the
legislation concerned ineffectual. This is also consistent with the basic tenet of his
sociological jurisprudence.
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It is also interesting to note that, contrary to the American experience

alleged above, traffic divisions have been established in the district
courts in major cities of this country to govern the rapidly increasing
traffic cases, which were formerly exclusively handled by the police. In
a country to which constitutionalism and a rule of law in the Western
sense are historically unknown and traditionally strange, these tendencies in the development of her constitutional law are healthy and
encouraging.
VII
Another example of American influence on the development of the
interpretation and application of the Chinese Constitution may be
given. Article 24 of the Chinese Constitution provides:
Any public functionary who, in violation of law, infringes upon the
freedom or right of any person shall, in addition to being subject to
disciplinary measures in accordance with law, be held responsible under
criminal and civil laws. The injured person may, in accordance with law,
claim compensation from the State for damage sustained.

This Article, like Article 8, secures the protection of the freedoms
and rights of the people and may be directly enforced by the courts.
Borrowing from both the European continental system and the AngloAmerican system, it has to do, first, with the civil and criminal liability
of public functionaries for injuries caused by their acts to individuals in
the operations of government, and second, with the liability of the
government to answer for damages sustained by the injured individuals.
More specifically, the purpose of this Article is mainly to provide
compensation for the injured person. As far as this aspect of the Article
is concerned, the injured person may either hold the public functionary
causing the wrong to be answerable or call upon the government itself
for compensation.
The idea of holding the government responsible for the acts of its
officers is, in American law, based on the common law principle of
respondeat superior, that is, let the principal or master be answerable
for the acts of his agent or servant.JO This principle, as a matter of fact,
is not completely unknown to Chinese law. Article 187 of the Chinese
Civil Code explicitly provides: "The employer is jointly liable to make
compensation for any damage which the employee wrongfully causes to
the rights of another person in the performance of his duty."
In the case of exacting compensation from the wrong-doing public
functionary, the injured person may resort to civil law proceedings, as
the first part of Article 24 implies. When the government itself is the
30. See 2 American Jurisprudence 270, Broom's Legal Maxims 843.
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target, the purpose of Article 24 can be achieved only with the help of
special legislation, as is obvious from the latter portion of its provisions.
This was also modeled on the experiences of both European continental
law and American law.JI
As for the Chinese legislation relevant to Article 24 of the Constitution, it is the Law Governing Compensation for Wrongful Convictions of 1959. As the title indicates, this Law only governs criminal
cases in which the innocent has been convicted. The significant thing
about this legislation is that it adopted the principle of liability without
fault, again following the example of many countries, including the
United States of America. Specifically, it includes injuries to individuals
in the course of government, which are not due to the wrong-doing of
public functionaries or which are not the result of violation of law by
public functionaries. This is based on the conviction that the necessary
ground for compensation should be whether there has been a wrong or
an injury sustained, not whether there is violation of law on the part of
public functionaries.J2 Only in this way are the freedoms and rights of
the people sustained.
What is of particular interest here is that the remedies provided by
Article 24 of the Constitution are available only in cases in which the
public functionary concerned has infringed the freedom or right of an
individual in violation of law. In other words, Article 24, based on the
traditional principle of no fault-no liability, is narrower in scope in
providing for compensation for the injured. As a result, the question
was raised as to the constitutionality of the Law Governing Wrongful
Convictions. However, it is heartening to see that most law teachers and
doctrinal writers of importance have in recent years come to support
the Law.JJ Outstanding among the opinions expressed is the argument
that the Law not only conforms to the general trend of modern
legislation but also serves to realize the ultimate purpose of Chapter
Two of the Chinese Constitution, namely: the protection of the freedoms and rights of the people.J 4 One may even go so far as to say that
this piece of legislation also serves to implement the fundamental
Principle of People's Livelihood, which in essence is to help bring about
a service state for the general good of the people.
31. For instance, special legislation or provisions obtained in Switzerland, Germany,
Austria, the states of New York, California, Wisconsin, and North Dakota.
32. See Ho Tso-chih, A Treatise on the Chinese Law Governing Wrongful Convictions
(in Chinese) (Taipei, 1959), p. 102.
33. Notably, Lin Chi-tung, Commentaries of the Constitution of the Republic of
China (in Chinese) (Taipei, 1960), p. 164; Ho Tso-chih, op. cit., pp. 102-103, 159-161.
34. See Ho Tso-chih, p. 103.
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VIII
In conclusion, it seems clear that the usefulness of comparative constitutional law was not exhausted in the framing of the Constitution. It
does and will enter into the interpretation and application of many
constitutional provisions. However, it should be remembered that the
major Jaws of the Republic of China were codified on the basis of
continental European models, especially German and Swiss codes.
Hence, as far as basic concepts, principles, and techniques are concerned, modern Chinese law and the modern Chinese legal system are
similar to other legal systems influenced by the reception of Roman
law.
As this paper has modestly shown, in the formation of the Chinese
Constitution American influence was apparently present though in
different degrees. For this reason, in the development of Chinese constitutional Jaw, American influence will have to continue so that borrowings of American origin may be properly adapted to a codification on
continental European lines. What is more important, the Chinese
Constitution is founded on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's unique political doctrines. Any adaptation of Western institutions, European or AngloAmerican, will have to fit into the basic constitutional framework as
defined by those doctrines. This calls for a well-developed juristic
technique, which Chinese legal scholars and judges must work out for
themselves. Inasmuch as such a technique must be developed mainly by
judicial decision and interpretation, American experience will prove to
be invaluable.

IV

India

Editorial Note

India has a population of approximately 600 million, of whom about 85
percent live in the country's half-million villages. Most are poor: per
capita gross national product in 1974 was $98. While most of the Indian
people are Hindus, II percent are Muslims and another 5 percent are
Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and followers of tribal religions.
The population is also extremely diverse in language and culture: the
Constitution of India confers the status of official languages on fourteen of the country's languages.
Agriculture is the base of India's economy. Self-sufficiency in
agricultural production has been attained in some years in the late
1960s and 1970s, but the uncertainties of the monsoons and the sharp
rise in the price of artificial fertilizers have left agricultural production
unpredictable each year. Since Independence, a number of industries
have also been developed. India now makes some of its own steel,
vehicles, farm machines, and other heavy goods and exports industrial
products to other countries in Asia and to Africa. It must still import
some industrial goods, however, and is dependent on other countries
for petroleum and artificial fertilizers.
India attained independence from Great Britain in August 1947.
After two and a half years as a dominion in the British Empire, India
became a republic with the coming into force of the Constitution in
January 1950. The government created by this Constitution is patterned
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largely after the British parliamentary system. Parliament is composed
of two houses. Of these, the upper house (Rajya Sabha, or House of the
States), like the British House of Lords, has little legislative power. The
lower house (Lok Sabha, or House of the People) is the principal
legislative body. The executive powers rest with the Prime Minister,
who is a member of the Lok Sabha. The President of India, though
titular head of state, has very limited powers.
India is a federation. Each of the twenty-three states has its own
government, each on a parliamentary model similar to that of the
Central government. However, the Constitution envisions a strong
central government. It is possible for the President of India to dissolve a
state government and rule the state directly from New Delhi, and this
step has been taken on a number of occasions.
From Independence until 1977 the dominant party in national
politics was the Congress Party, which led the movement for independence from Britain. All national governments until 1977 were Congress
governments, under three different prime ministers. There were a
number of opposition parties throughout this time, however, and some
of them were strong enough to control intermittently several of the state
governments. In 1969 the Congress Party split, but in the national
elections in 1971 Indira Gandhi, who had been Prime Minister since
1967, and her segment of the Congress Party won a heavy majority in
Parliament.
In 1974 there were massive political agitations in several states
against Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party. In early 1975 a High Court
judge found Mrs. Gandhi guilty of corrupt practices in the 1971 election
campaign for her Lok Sabha seat. This increased the agitation and
brought demands that Mrs. Gandhi resign. Instead, citing the civil
disturbances caused by the agitations against her, the President of India
at Mrs. Gandhi's request declared a State of Emergency, in accordance
with Article 352 of the Constitution. Civil liberties were sharply curtailed, and the press was put under heavy censorship. Most opposition
political leaders were quickly arrested and held for months without
being charged. It was such a detention that was challenged in the
Shivkant Shukla case, mentioned by Dr. Tripathi.
The overwhelming parliamentary majority attained by Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party in the 1971 elections made it possible for the
government to amend the Constitution without much difficulty: the
Forty-second Amendment was passed at this time. In early 1976 the
Parliament, whose term would have expired that year, extended its own
term for one year, as it was entitled to do under Article 83 (2) of the
Constitution. The elections were finally called in early 1977; most of the
opposition politicians were released from jail to campaign, and the
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newspapers, which had been subjected to strict censorship throughout
the Emergency, were permitted some freedom in covering the elections.
Mrs. Gandhi's party was badly beaten in the March 1977 elections and
the Emergency was immediately ended by the President. The new
government has promised to amend the Constitution again to nullify
most of the amendments passed by the Congress Parliament during the
Emergency.
At the time of the Bicentennial symposium (1976: see the Preface)
the Emergency was firmly established; Parliament had just extended its
own term, and it looked as though the Emergency would last indefinitely. At the last minute Dr. Tripathi was not permitted to leave India
to attend the Committee on Asian Law sessions in North America. Dr.
Tripathi's contribution to this volume was written after the change in
government in the spring of 1977.
May 22, 1978

ROBERT HAYDEN
MARC GALANTER

Perspectives on the
American Constitutional Influence
on the Constitution of India
P. K. Tripathi
Professor of Law, University of Delhi

Introduction

Irrespective of whether recourse to the doctrine of judicial review was
intended or "invited" by the framers of the United States Constitution or
was plainly a usurpation of power by Chief Justice Marshall and his
Court, the doctrine has come to be recogp.ized as an outstanding
American contribution to world culture. Based on the seminal English
principle of rule of law-or being, in fact, a maturer paradigm of it-the
doctrine has realized the utmost potentialities of that great principle. In
England, the principle of rule of law ensured that executive action would
comply with established standards of legality and propriety, but it
stopped short of enforcing those standards against parliamentary legislation. The credit for overcoming that inhibition and subjecting the
legislature also to judicial scrutiny for compliance with those standards
goes to the United States.
The claim to share with the United States allegiance to the doctrine
of judicial review is a cachet of cultural attainment which many nations
should be eager to own. Several countries have, in fact, incorporated
the doctrine in their written constitutions. But in this respect, constitutional text is not enough, and actual conduct is of the essence.
Even in the United States, the doctrine and its application have not
been free from practical and even theoretical difficulties. Crises like the
Civil War and the confrontation between President Roosevelt and his
Supreme Court have been attributed, at least in part, to the unimaginative application of the doctrine. The anti-majoritarian principle inherent in the exercise of the doctrine has been recognized ever since its very
inception. 1 More recently, towards the beginning of the century, James
Bradley Thayer warned that exercise of the power of judicial review "is
I. Jefferson's opposition to it is well known.
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always attended with a serious evil," namely, that of depriving people of
"the political experience and the moral education and stimulus that
comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors" and with the tendency "to dwarf the political
capacity of the people and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility."2
These should have been serious deterrents to any newly liberated
underdeveloped Asian nation inclined to adopt the doctrine of judicial
review. Yet, India has not only incorporated the doctrine in her Constitution, but has also lived with it all these years since January 26, 1950,
when the operation of the Constitution commenced. During this period
thousands of controversies have been presented before and disposed of
by the Supreme Court at the Centre and the High Courts in the states,
and hundreds of laws whose expression has been defined to include,
besides Acts of the Parliament or of the state legislatures, "any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage
having in the territory the force of law"J have been declared unconstitutional and void.
It is not as if such a large-scale application of the doctrine
presented no problems in India. By and large, it engendered a sense of
security and a respect for the law and for the law courts throughout the
country, so vital to a good beginning for a young democracy. But, in the
first place, it all began to be unwieldy. Although the numerical strength
of judges in the High Courts was doubled or, in some cases, even
trebled, often at the cost of quality on the bench and depletion of talent
at the bar, arrears continued to mount. High Courts issued writs in
several matters in which the courts in the United States or in England
(when validity of parliamentary legislation is not involved) would
probably not be persuaded to grant relief. Thus, for instance, students
who did not complete the required attendance in schools or colleges
could often get ex parte stay orders enabling them to take an examination, subject, of course, to the final outcome of the litigation in which
they sought relief on the basis of such allegations as that they had no
notice of the rules, or they were not warned about the condition of their
attendance, or, occasionally, that the rules of attendance were not made
by the proper authority or in accordance with the proper procedure and
so forth. Investigation of tax matters was stayed, and the relevant
papers were sealed, and sometimes the ordinary procedure for mandamus or injunction was permitted to be utilized for enforcing simple
contracts against the state, completely bypassing the regular procedure
through a civil suit.
2. J. B. Thayer, John Marshall (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1902), pp. 57-84.
3. Constitution of India, Article 13 (3) (a). Ed. note: see Jagdish Lal, ed., The
Constitution of India (as amended by Forty-Second Amendment) (Delhi: Delhi Law
House, 1977), p. 7.
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There were more serious problems, too. Chief among them was
perhaps the running battle of wits between the Supreme Court and the
legislatures on the matter of compensation for property acquired for
public purposes. This was characterized by a series of constitutional
amendments seeking to attenuate and limit the scope of judicial review
for the enforcement of the fundamental right to property, and an
equally sustained succession of resourceful judicial opinions frustrating
each amendment and reasserting the original norm under which the
State must pay not less than the market value of the property acquired. 4
This culminated in the year 1967 in an opinion of the Supreme Court
which sought to limit the power of constitutional amendment itself in
the same way as ordinary legislation when it attempted to abridge a
fundamental right.S This opinion was overruled in 1973, but is understood to have been replaced by another which enlarges the power of
judicial review by adopting what may be called the doctrine of "basic
structure and framework."6 This doctrine enables the Court to strike
down any amendment which, in its judgment, abrogates or damages
any provision or principle of the Constitution-not necessarily a funda4. The Patna High Court, in 1951, struck down the "Bihar Land Reforms Act,
1950" on the ground that it violated the "equal protection" guarantee in Article 14,
inasmuch as it provided for a higher rate of compensation to the smaller landowners (up
to twenty times the annual rental) and a lower (discriminatory) rate to the bigger
landowners (three times the annual rental); A.I.R. 1851 Pat. 91. This Jed to the
Constitution, First Amendment Act of 1951, which placed certain Acts in the so-called
"Ninth Schedule" of the Constitution and immunized them from judicial review on the
basis of Articles 14 (equality), 19 (right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property), and 31
(compensation). Then, in 1954, in State of West Benga/v. Bela Banerjee (A.I.R. 1954 S.C.
170), the Supreme Court pronounced that "compensation" guaranteed in Article 31 (2) of
the Constitution must mean "just equivalent" and could not be less than the market value
of the property (here a housing site in Calcutta) at about the date of acquisition. This was
met by the Fourth Amendment, in 1955. The amendment resulted in an express statement
being appended to the right in Article 31 (2) to the effect that "no such law shall be called
in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by the law is not
adequate." This worked for some time; but, in 1970, in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India
(A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564) the Supreme Court held that the "market price" rule will continue
to apply in adjudging the constitutionality of "the "compensation" offered or paid for
property acquired by the State. This led to the Twenty-fifth Amendment in 1971, which
substituted for the word "compensation" the word "amount." This was done in the hope
that the difficulties created by the use of the expression "compensation" would thereby
disappear. However, in the meantime, a new question cropped up, namely, whether
Parliament has the power to amend the fundamental rights in the Constitution. For a full
and critical discussion, see P. K. Tripathi, Some Insights Into Fundamental Rights
(Bombay: University of Bombay, N. M. Tripathi, 1972), chapters 5 and 6.
5. I. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643. For a critique, see
P. K. Tripathi, Some Insights.
6. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. The present
writer has analyzed the opinions in the case and taken the view that there is no majority
support in the case for the doctrine that "the basic structure and framework" of the
Constitution is immune from the power of constitutional amendment laid down in Article
368. See P. K. Tripathi, "Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala: Who Wins?" 1
Supreme Court Cases, Journal 3 (1974).
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mental right-which the Court may regard as part of the "basic
structure or framework of the Constitution."
This exchange, which one may or may not like to describe as a
confrontation between the Parliament and the judiciary, continues to
this day. The latest shot has been recently fired by Parliament in
enacting the Forty-second Amendment to the Constitution which, inter
alia, reasserts with retrospective effect the power of Parliament to
amend each and every provision of the Constitution, and declares that
no such amendment "shall be called in question before any court."7
Is it any wonder that the operation of the doctrine was attended
with difficulties in India? Indeed, it would reflect upon the credibility of
the enterprise if no problems arose. What is truly significant is that
India has lived with the doctrine for more than a quarter century; and,
although recently there has been some effort to contain its operation
within certain limits whose reasonability itself is being avidly debated in
the country, 8 it can be confidently asserted that the doctrine has been
assimilated as a part of India's cultural fabric.
Judicial Review: British Statutes
and the U.S. Constitution
The doctrine of judicial review came to be received in India through two
distinct channels. Ironically enough, it came to India, in the first
instance, through a British statute, namely, the Government of India
Act, 1935, which was, in a sense, the precursor of the Constitution of
India. Much earlier, the British Parliament had reconciled to the
doctrine to a limited extent by enacting federal constitutions for the
Dominions of Canada9 and Australia.JO Once a detailed scheme of
distribution of powers between the central and regional governments on
the United States pattern was adopted for each Dominion, judicial
umpiring became almost a logical necessity. For these Dominions the
British Parliament occupied the position simulative of a constituent
assembly, keeping itself beyond the reach of judicial review, but permitting the doctrine to operate upon what the English jurists euphemistically called subordinate legislation by the federal as well as the regional
governments functioning under the written constitutions.
These constitutions provided the models for the Government of
India Act, 1935. The Act provided for three legislative lists. Two of
7. The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, s. 55.
8. The Forty-second Amendment debars the High Courts from questioning the
validity of a "Central law," i.e., a law passed by the Parliament or any regulation, rule, bylaw, etc., passed by the Union Government. But the Supreme Court remains available for
the purpose.
9. The British North America Act, 1867.
10. The Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900.
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these were based on the Canadian pattern and enumerated the matters
on which the federal government and the regional governments, respectively, had the exclusive power to legislate. But, like the Australian
Constitution, the Government of India Act of 1935 also provided a
concurrent list comprising matters over which both governments could
legislate; and, as in Australia, in case of "repugnancy" between their
laws on the same subject, the federal law was to prevail. The Constitution of India substantially adopted this scheme of distribution of
powers between the Union and the states, although there were important
modifications aiming at a strong centre.
Thus, even before the Constitution, India was familiar with the
operation of the American doctrine in the limited field of judicial
umpiring between the central and the regional governments with a view
to confining each within the constraints of a written constitution.
Important decisions were given by the High Courts, the Federal Court,
and the Privy Council on the validity of legislation by the federal and
the provincial governments under the Government of India Act of 1935.
Many of them are still regarded as authority and are followed in settling
disputes under the Constitution.
This is not to say that the framers of the Constitution did not
directly consult or benefit from the United States Constitution in the
matter of distribution of powers between the central and the regional
governments. The Constituent Assembly, which began its deliberations
on December 9, 1946, in New Delhi, was not quite unrestrained,
initially, in its choice on vital issues like the powers of central government under the new Constitution. The Cabinet Mission Plan of May 16,
1946, which set the process of constitution-making in motion, had
envisaged that the Union of India "should deal with the following
subjects: 'Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communications; and should
have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above
subjects,' and that 'all subjects other than the Union subjects and all
residuary powers should vest in the Provinces."'" True, these were only
··recommendations" from the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy of
India; the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, had expressly stated on
March 15, "just before the despatch of the Cabinet Mission to India,"
that the British government's intention was "of using their utmost
endeavour to help her [India] attain her freedom as speedily and fully as
possible" and that "what form of government is to replace the present
regime is for India to decide." 12 Yet, in view of the fact that no
agreement had been possible between the Congress Party and the
II. B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's Constitution, Select Documents (New
Delhi: The Indian Institute of Public Administration), vol. I, p. 209.
12. Ibid.

64

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Muslim League, the two popular organizations without the imprimatur
of whose assent the Constitution could have no social acceptance, these
recommendations constituted real constraints on the Assembly. The
effort of the Congress Party in the Assembly, therefore, was to bloat
and expand the powers under the four rubrics of Foreign Affairs,
Defense, Communications, and Finance, to cover as many subheads or
"items" as possible. In that effort, Sir B. N. Rau, the Constitutional
Adviser to the Constituent Assembly, and Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy
Ayyar, one of the ablest and most respected lawyer members of the
various committees set up by the Assembly, frequently relied on the
Constitution of the United States.
In one of the notes prepared for the use of the members of the
Assembly, Rau referred to Article I, Section 8, of the United States
Constitution to emphasize that "external matters, whether described as
foreign or external affairs or not" included in its embrace commerce
with foreign nations, naturalization, regulation of foreign exchange,
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, offenses against the
law of nations, declaring war, and making "all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."13 In his second note, Rau referred to the ambiguity in the Cabinet
Mission Plan's statement as to the Union power "to raise" the finances
required for the allotted subjects, pointing out that "whether these
powers should be powers of direct taxation in the right of the Union or
merely powers to levy contributions from the Provinces is a question of
great importance on which the statement is silent." 14 He advocated
direct taxation and referred, in support of his recommendations, to the
experience of the "loose confederacy" under the Articles of Confederation. He quoted an appropriate passage from Farrand's The Framing of
the Constitution, to explain the difficulties experienced by the confederacy in obtaining from each state the share of its contribution, and
concluded:
It was to rectify these and other defects that the Philadelphia Convention was called. Under the Constitution framed by that Conventionwhich is substantially the present Constitution of the United States of
America-Congress has been given power "to levy and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States; to borrow money on the
credit of the United States; to coin money, regulate the value thereof and
of foreign coin." Thus the right of direct taxation was substituted for the
right of levying contributions.I5

13. Shiva Rao, op. cit., vol. II, p. 691.

14. Ibid., p. 701.

15. Ibid., p. 703.
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Ayyar, in his note submitted to the "Union Powers Committee" of
the Assembly,'6 referred at length to the "necessary and proper" clause
in Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution and quoted the
words of Chief Justice John Marshall from McCulloch v. Maryland,l1
and the legal tender cases's in support of the doctrine of incidental
powers. He then pointed out:
In the judgments of the Supreme Court, apart from the expression "implied powers," there is also authority for inferring inherent and resulting
powers. The expression "inherent powers" has been used with respect to
a matter of national interest such as no particular State is competent to
deal with. There have been doubts expressed as to this aspect of the
Union power but a resulting power is one implied from a group of
enumerated powers instead of from a single express power. Instances of
this are found on p. 221 of Wills' Constitutional Law. On the question
of inherent, implied and resulting powers, see Willoughby, Vol. I, 993-94:
"Legal Tender cases, eminent domain, expelling aliens, acquisition and
cessation of territory."l9

In conclusion, he recommended that "the most prudent course will
be to draft a clause on the lines of recent American decisions." 20 This
recommendation was considered, along with several others, by a joint
meeting of the Union Powers and Union Constitution committees of
the Assembly in its meeting on July 2, 1947, and "it was agreed
... to consider the necessity of having a provision on the lines of Article
I, Section 8, Clause (18) of the U.S.A. Constitution."21
Actually, however, neither the "necessary and proper" clause nor
any variant of it ever found a place in the Constitution, because the
entire situation changed in early June 1947, when the Congress Party
agreed to the partition of the country into the two Dominions of India
and Pakistan and the British Government announced its decision to
effect the partition. The Constituent Assembly at New Delhi was now
absolutely free to allot to the Centre or to the states any powers it
Iiked.22 Accordingly, the Committee on Union Powers, with the con16. Ibid., p. 714. 17. 4 Wheaton, 316.
18. Latham v. United States and Deming v. United States, 12 Wallace, 529.
19. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. II, p. 717.
20. Ibid., p. 718. 21. Ibid., p. 772.
22. Accordingly, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, Chairman of the Union Powers
Committee, forwarding the report of his committee to the President of the Constituent
Assembly, wrote: "Now that the partition is a settled fact, we are unanimously of the view
that it would be injurious to the interests of the country to provide for a weak central
authority which would be incapable of ensuring peace, or coordinating vital matters of
common concern and of speaking effectively for the whole country in the international
sphere .... We have accordingly come to the conclusion-a conclusion which was also
reached by the Union Constitution Committee-that the soundest framework for our
Constitution is a Federation, with a strong Centre" (ibid., p. 777).
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currence of the Union Constitution Committee, presented a modified
report to the Constituent Assembly based on the premise that "the
soundest framework of our Constitution was a Federation with a strong
Centre." The federal ideal was still practically indispensable for luring
the princely states, which, now liberated from the leash of "British
paramountcy," were, in theory at least, free not to join any Dominion
or to join either of them.23
The Concept of a Strong Centre
By October 1947 Rau had prepared a constitution draft to serve as the
basic working document for the Drafting Committee set up by the
Assembly under the chairmanship of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.24 This draft
was mainly based on the reports of the various committees appointed
by the Assembly at one of its earliest meetings and the decisions taken
by the Assembly itself on those reports.25 It was a thoroughgoing
document comprising two hundred and forty clauses and twelve schedules. It was thoughtfully prepared, with marginal references indicating
corresponding provisions in the other constitutions of the world.
Except for the clauses concerning civil liberties or "fundamental rights;·
with which we shall deal separately, very few of these marginal notes
refer to provisions of the United States Constitution. The obvious
reason for this was that the need to take the Muslim League along had
disappeared, and there was great freedom of choice in the matter of
distribution of authority between the Centre and the states. The idea of
a strong Centre was answered fairly well by the scheme of distribution
available in the Government of India Act of 1935, which could be
further improved by making suitable alterations. Therefore, the task was
thereafter viewed by all concerned as one of adapting the existing
framework to the new aspirations rather than one of writing on a clean
slate.
23. In the Constituent Assembly, this report was ··not discussed in full, and the
Assembly considered only the first 37 items of the Federal List. Further consideration of
the report was held over and, in fact, was never taken up again" (ibid., p. 776).
24. The Drafting Committee was appointed by the Constituent Assembly on
August 29, 1947, under the Chairmanship of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (a graduate of
Columbia University, from where he obtained his doctoral degree, and the most
important leader of the backward communities, including the "untouchables"). Before the
appointment of this Committee, the Assembly had already received and considered the
reports of its various committees earlier appointed, among which was the Advisory
Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities, appointed on January 24, 1947, on a
motion by Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant.
25. This draft is also called the first draft of the Constitution. But the "Draft
Constitution" was a different document, prepared by the Drafting Committee under
Ambedkar's chairmanship and submitted by Ambedkar to the President of the Constituent Assembly in February 1948. The Assembly began consideration of the Draft
Constitution on November 4, 1948. The Constitution was finally passed in its present
form on November 26, 1949.
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Even so, at least one important, though thus far little used,
provision of the Constitution of India in the sphere of distribution of
powers between the Union and the states has been the product of direct
contemporary United States inspiration. It is the provision in Article
249 of the Constitution which enables the Parliament of the Union to
legislate on any matter which is placed in the exclusive state list; only
the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament) must have earlier passed
a resolution supported by "not less than two-thirds of the members
present and voting" declaring that "it is necessary or expedient in the
national interest" that Parliament should make laws with respect to that
matter. Incidentally, it is on the basis of one of those provisions that it
may be said that the Constitution of India is not federal in character. 26
The inspiration came during Rau's visit to the United States
between October 26 and December 2, 1947, immediately after completing his draft Constitution for the Assembly. In his report to the
President of the Constituent Assembly, Rau noted that as a result of the
discussions during the visit abroad he had already proposed two
important amendments to the draft, one of which was
designed to secure that when the national interest requires that a certain
matter, ordinarily falling in the exclusively provincial sphere, should be
dealt with on a national basis, the Centre should have power to legislate
on it on that basis.27

Those with whom he had discussions in Washington included "the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, ex-Chief Justice Hughes and
Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Murphy." 28 At another place, Rau
observes:
On November 20 and 21, I saw Dr. Jessup [Professor of International
Law], Professor Mirkine [Constitutional Consultant to the United Nations], Dr. Hamburger [Secretary General, United Nations Year Book
on Human Rights], and Professor Dowling [Professor of Constitutional
Law, Columbia University]. I had detailed discussions with each of them.
Both Dr. Jessup and Prof. Dowling regard as very important the amendment giving power to the Centre to legislate on a subject which is
normally provincial if it has come to be of national importance.29
26. The present writer considers the Constitution of India to be a "non-federal"
Constitution. SeeP. K. Tripathi, "Federalism: Reality and the Myth," Journal of the Bar
Council of India, 3, no. 3 {August 1974): 251-277. Thus far no other writer has agreed.
27. Shiva Rao, op. cit. {n. II above), vol. Ill, p. 218.
28. Ibid., p. 217.
29. Ibid., pp. 221-222. Rau was so greatly impressed with the need for vesting this
power in the Centre envisaged in the draft he had prepared that on November II, 1947,
while he was still busy in consultations with American politicians, judges, and academicians in Washington, he despatched an air letter to New Delhi recommending a few
amendments to accommodate this and other ideas. Explaining the object of the amendment on this point, he wrote: "The essence of the matter is that where legislation is called
for on a national basis, the Central legislature should have power to enact it without
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Apart from the distribution of legislative powers, there were a
couple of other important matters on which Rau found the discussions
with eminent Americans very instructive. Emulating the Irish Constitution, Rau's draft had provided for "Directive Principles of State
Policy."3o These were not to be judicially enforceable. In his air letter
from Washington on November ll, 1947,31 Rau suggested that the
Constitution should expressly provide that no law made in discharge of
the Directive Principles of State Policy should be considered void
merely on the ground that it contravenes a fundamental right. Explaining his purpose he said:
As a result of the discussions in Washington and Ottawa, I propose the
following amendments: The object of these [two] amendments is to make
it clear that in a conflict between the rights conferred by Chapter 2,
which are, for the most part, rights of the individual, and the principles
of policy set forth in Chapter 3, which are intended for the welfare of
the State as a whole, the general welfare should prevail over the individual right. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to say, as Clause 10
does say, that these principles of policy are fundamental and that it is
the duty of the State to give effect to them in its laws. In the Constitution of the United States of America, there are no express Directive
Principles of State Policy, but the courts have developed what is equivalent thereof, namely, the doctrine of "Police Powers" which has been
defined as the power "to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, and the good order of the people, and to legislate so as
to increase the industry of the State, develop its resources, and add to
its wealth and prosperity." In the exercise of this power, the State
may make laws for the general welfare which would otherwise be inconsistent with the American Bill of Rights. The courts in India might have
been able to develop a similar doctrine but for the language of Clause 9
of the draft Constitution. Hence the amendments proposed. 32

From no less persons than Justice Frankfurter and Judge Learned
Hand a willing Rau received his baptism of skepticism for the doctrine
amending the Constitution. Such legislation may be needed not only in such spheres as
education, cooperative farming, or public health, but also in a matter which is coming to
be regarded as one of the national and, indeed, almost international importance, namely,
safeguarding the civil rights of all citizens: e.g., removing the social disabilities of
Harijans.
. The report of the President's Committee just published in the U.S.A.
recommends that the National Government of the United States must take the lead in
safeguarding the civil rights of all Americans and that Congress must enact the necessary
legislation" (ibid., p. 227).
30. These were recommended by the Advisory Committee, in its report to the
Constituent Assembly, and were already approved by the Assembly along with the rest of
its recommendations. Rau's draft, as was already noted, was based on this groundwork
already accomplished.
31. See n. 29 above.
32. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. III, p. 226. What are referred to as
Chapters 2 and 3 are, in the Constitution, Parts III and IV, respectively; Clause 10 in the
letter corresponds to Article 37 of the Constitution, and Clause 9 corresponds to
Article 13.
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of judicial review. In his report to the President of the Assembly, he
said:
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter considered that the power of judicia! review
implied in the due process clause, of which there is a qualified versio_n
in Clause 16 of our draft Constitution, was not only undemocratiC
(because it gave a few judges a power of vetoing legislation enacted by
the representatives of the nation) but also threw an unfair burden on
the judiciary; and Justice Learned Hand considered that it will be better
to have all fundamental rights as moral precepts than as legal fetters
in the Constitution. 33
Rau's meeting with President Harry Truman was also very interesting. The President commended to him the United States provision
for an indissoluble Senate one-third of whose members retire every two
years. Rau was able to reply, "We had, in fact, copied this provision in
the Indian Constitution." Further on, Rau's report says:
I then mentioned that we had specially noted the step taken by him in
December 1946, in appointing a committee on civil rights-particularly
the civil rights of the underprivileged classes. The committee's report
had just been published and has proved how valuable was a periodic
investigation of this kind and accordingly we had inserted in the Indian
Constitution an express provision empowering the President to appoint,
from time to time, a commission to investigate the position of the backward classes. I added that we had gone further and had actually anticipated one of the recommendations of the President's Committee. The
committee had recommended that there should be a special section in
the Department of Justice, both at the Centre and in the States, to
protect the civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. We have provided
in the Indian Constitution for the appointment of Special Officers for
minorities, both at the Centre and in the provinces forasimilarpurpose.J4
The provision in Rau's draft regarding the appointment of a
commission to investigate the position of the backward classes finds
expression in Article 340 of the Constitution of India. This article
authorizes the President of India to appoint a commission "to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes
within the territory of India and the difficulties under which they labour
and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by
the Union or any State to remove such difficulties and to improve their
condition." The provision in his draft regarding the appointment of
"Special Officers for minorities both at the Centre and in the provinces"
for the protection of civil rights guaranteed in the Constitution was also
33. Ibid., p. 218. Clause 16 of his draft, referred to in the passage quoted, was to this
effect: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law within the territories of the
Federation."
34. Ibid., p. 221.
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slightly modified in the course of subsequent debates at the various
stages. Finally, the Constitution provided for the appointment of such
Special Officer only by the Centre and not by the states. The Special
Officer under the Constitution is only meant for the Scheduled Castes,
the Scheduled Tribes, the backward classes, and the Anglo-Indian
community, and not for all "minorities." It is his duty "to investigate all
matters relating to the safeguards provided for" those groups "under
this Constitution and report to the President upon the working of those
safeguards at such intervals as the President may direct." The President
must place all such reports before each house of Parliament.
The ·•strong Centre" concept had become a part of the unquestionable credo of the Drafting Committee headed by Ambedkar. But even
for this, support if not inspiration was found from no other than the
United States Constitution. In his historic speech in the Constituent
Assembly on November 4, 1948, while moving the Draft Cbnstitution
for the consideration of the Assembly, Ambedkar alluded to the
criticism that the Centre envisaged by the draft was "too strong," and
observed:
However much you may deny powers to the Centre, it is difficult to
prevent the Centre from becoming too strong. Conditions in the modern
world are such that centralization of powers is inevitable. One has only
to consider the growth of the Federal Government in the U.S.A. which,
notwithstanding the very limited powers given to it by the Constitution,
has outgrown its former self and has over-shadowed and eclipsed the
State Governments. The same conditions are sure to operate on the
Government of India and nothing that one can do will help to prevent it
from becoming strong.35

In fact, if the attention given to the United States Constitution in
this important speech is any measure of its influence on the Draft, and
ultimately on the Constitution of India, that influence has been truly
immense. A major portion of this speech-occupying eighteen pages in
Shiva Rao's monumental work36-deals with detailed and comparative
references to the provisions in the Draft and the corresponding provision under the United States Constitution. After stating the preliminaries, Ambedkar comes straight to the question of the form of government envisaged by the Draft. He explains that although the head of the
Union is called the President, the presidential form of government in
the United States has not been adopted. He then states elaborately the
differences that exist between the two forms in regard to the nature of
the executive and its relations with the legislature. He explains briefly
why the American form of government was not adopted and the British
form was preferred. From this he moves on to the next theme-the
35. Ibid., vol. IV, p. 433.

36. Ibid., pp. 419-436.
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choice of the federal form of constitution-with its concomitant of
double polity adopted in the Draft, and says:
This dual polity under the proposed Constitution will consist of the
Union at the Centre and the States at the periphery, each endowed with
sovereign powers to be exercised in the field assigned to them respectively in the Constitution. This dual polity resembles the. American Constitution. The American polity is also a dual polity, one
of it is known as the Federal Government and the other States
which correspond respectively to the Union Government and the State
Governments of the Draft Constitution. Under the American Constitution the Federal Government is not a mere league of the States nor are
the States administrative units or agencies of the Federal Government.
In the same way, the Indian Constitution proposed in the Draft Constitution is not a league of States nor are the States administrative units
or agencies of the Union Government. Here, however, the similarities
between the Indian and the American Constitutions come to an end.
The differences that distinguish them are more fundamental and glaring
than the similarities between the twoY

Ambedkar then explained some of the important features in the
proposed Indian Constitution-the strong Centre-oriented featureswhich made it different from the United States. These included features
like the absence of double citizenship and of separate state constitutions in India.
"So far I have drawn attention to the differences between the
American Federation and the proposed Indian Federation," he said,
after making these comparisons. "But there are some other special
features of the proposed Indian Federation which mark it off not only
from the American Federation but from all other federations." In this
connection, he mentioned the provision for the declaration of emergency which enables the Union to exercise unrestrained legislative and
executive authority overriding the authority of the states. "Such a
power of converting itself into a unitary State no federation possesses.
This is one point of difference between the Federation proposed in the
Draft Constitution and all other federations we know of."JS He then
went on to explain some other distinguishing features of the Draft
Constitution which freed it from "rigidity" and "legalism"-the "two
weaknesses from which federation is alleged to suffer. "39
Thus it will be seen that even in seeking to avoid the presidential
form of government and strict federalism, the two very important
features of the United States Constitution, the framers of the Constitution of India have been very largely influenced and guided by the
constitutional experience of the United States. Naturally, however, the
influence and guidance are most pronounced and direct in yet another
37. lbid., p. 422.

38. lbid., p. 424.

39. lbid., p. 424.
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area, namely, that of civil liberties, or "fundamental rights," as the
Indian document calls them.
Fundamental Rights: Direct and Massive Borrowing
Although, in his speech moving the Draft Constitution in the Assembly,
Ambedkar emphasized the departure from the United States Constitution in regard to federalism, he had just the opposite to say in regard to
civil liberties. This "most criticized part of the Draft Constitution" was
assailed during the period from February to October 1948-when it was
circulated widely throughout the country to elicit criticism and opinion
from the general public-mostly on the ground that the rights were
"riddled with so many exceptions that the exceptions have eaten up the
rights altogether." The critics generally referred to the Bill of Rights in
the United States Constitution and complained that while "the fundamental rights in the American Bill of Rights are real because they are
not subject to limitations or exceptions," those in the Draft proposed by
Ambedkar are "a kind of deception." To dispel this misconception, he
said,
. . it is wrong to say that fundamental rights in America are absolute.
The difference between the position under the American Constitution
and the Draft Constitution is one of form and not of substance. That
the fundamental rights in America are not absolute rights is beyond
dispute. In support of every exception to the fundamental rights set out
in the Draft Constitution, one can refer to at least one judgment of the
United States Supreme Court. It would be sufficient to quote one such
judgment of the Supreme Court in justification of the limitations on the
rights of free speech contained in Article 13 of the Draft Constitution.
In Gitlow v. New York, in which the issue was the constitutionality
of the New York "criminal anarchy" law which purported to punish
utterances calculated to bring about violent change, the Supreme Court
said: It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of
speech and of the press, which is secured by the Constitution, does not
confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility,
whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom.

It is, therefore, wrong to say that the fundamental rights in America are
absolute while those in the Draft Constitution are not.40
The right to freedom of speech, mentioned by Ambedkar to
illustrate his point, was stated in Article 13 of the Draft in these terms: 41
(I) Subject to the other provisions of this Article, all citizens shall
have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression . . . .
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) of this article shall affect
40. Ibid., p. 431.
41. The corresponding article in the Constitution is Article 19.
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the operat-ion of any existing law, or prevent the State from making
any law, relating to libel, slander, defamation, sedition or any other
matter which offends against decency or morality or undermines the
authority or foundation of the State. 4 2

In the final version of the Constitution, there was some reorganization of the subjects on which laws restricting free speech were to be
constitutionally permissive. They read, "libel, slander, defamation,
contempt of court or any other matter which offends against decency or
morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow,
the State." The significant change was that "sedition" had been deleted,
and undermining the "authority" of the State was also dropped.
"Undermining the security of the State" or "tendency to overthrow the
State" were the new tests substituted. Dennis v. United States43 had not
then been decided; but, Ambedkar's phrase "tendency to overthrow the
State" came perhaps fairly close to anticipating the majority view of the
United States Supreme Court in that case. The available United States
precedents on this aspect of free speech, of course, included Gitlow v.
New York,44 and the text of Ambedkar's draft is reminiscent of the
following sentence from the judgment of Mr. Justice Sandford in that
case: "And, for yet more imperative reasons, a State may punish
utterances endangering the foundations qf organized governments and
threatening its overthrow by unlawful means" (emphasis supplied).45
There can be no doubt that Ambedkar had in his mind decisions like
Bridges v. Ca/ifornia, 46 Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court of California,47 the Pennekamp Case, 48 and Craig v. Henry49 when he included
"contempt of court" as one of the matters concerning which laws
restrictive of free speech were to be permitted. On libel, slander, and
defamation, he must have had cases like Near v. Minnesotaso before
him. The Kingsley Pictures Case 51 had, of course, not been decided by
then, but the Minnesota Session Law involved in Near v. Minnesota did
prohibit and punish "obscene, lewd and lascivious" publications. Thus,
as far as the free speech provision in his draft was concerned, Ambedkar was probably justified in making the claim that, in support of every
exception to the right, one can refer to at least one judgment of the
United States Supreme Court. Ambedkar further observed:
42. This article, as will be seen later, was the subject of a very heated and
enlightened debate in the Assembly resulting in several changes in the text, the most
important of which was the introduction of the justiciable element represented by the
word "reasonable" qualifying all permissive legislative restrictions.
43. 341 u.s. 494 (1951). 44. 268 u.s. 652 (1925).
45. Ibid. 46. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
47. Ibid. 48. Pennekemp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
49. 331 u.s. 367 (1947). 50. 283 u.s. 697 (1931).
51. Kingsley International Pictures Corporation v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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What the Draft Constitution has done is that instead of formulating
fundamental rights in absolute terms and depending upon our Supreme
Court to come to the rescue of Parliament by inventing the doctrine of
police power, it permits the State directly to impose limitations upon
the fundamental rights. There is really no difference in the result. What
one does directly the other does indirectly. In both cases, the fundamental
rights are not absolute.s2

What Ambedkar did not seem to have realized, however, was that
by enumerating the interests for the protection of which restrictive
legislation is permissible he imported a rigidity from which the judicially developed doctrine of police powers did not suffer. Furthermore,
his draft did not indicate how far a law will be permitted to go in
restraining free speech in protecting the countervailing public interest,
say, in security of the State. These shortcomings, coupled with the
rather rigid or literalistic view of the text adopted by the courts, made
an early amendment of this clause unavoidable. The amendment,sJ
however, did not discard the enumeration of the protected public
interests, and the rigidity has, therefore, persisted to this day. But that is
a differ~nt matter. 54
Ambedkar was by no means the only person to lean heavily on the
United States Constitution for drafting the fundamental rights. In the
earlier stages, before the appointment of the Drafting Committee under
Ambedkar's chairmanship, others, and particularly Ayyar and Munshi,
played very important roles.
The commitment of the Indian leadership to justiciable fundamental rights went as far back, at least, as the year 1924 when the
National Convention presided over by Sir Tej Behadur Sapru prepared
the Commonwealth of India Bill. 55 This Bill was actually introduced in
the British House of Commons by Mr. George Lansbury, a leading
member of the Labour Party, and had its first reading in the House in
December 1925, but could not be pursued owing to the defeat of the
Labour Government. It contained a "declaration of rights." The rights
were enumerated under seven heads, and included the right freely to
profess and practice religion, the right to free expression, and the right
to equality. It was not expressly stated that these were to be justiciable.
But the Supreme Court was to be the final interpreter of the Constitution, and it was unlikely that the United States precedents would not be

52. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. IV, p. 432.
53. The First Amendment, 1951.
54. On the circumstances compelling this amendment, and on its limitations, see P.
K. Tripathi, Spotlights on Constitutional Interpretation (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi Pvt.
Ltd., 1972), chap. 13 (titled "India's Experiment in Freedom of Speech, etc."), p. 255.
55. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. I, pp. 43-50 (Document No. II).
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emulated. The next milestone in constitution-making was the report of
the Motilal Nehru Committee set up by the All Parties Conference held
in February 1928.56 The report, known as the Nehru report, had wide
acceptance and support in the country and was hailed as a proof of the
ability of Indians to sink their differences and to rule themselves under
their own constitution. The Nehru Report provided for a separate
section dedicated to "fundamental rights." Here again, there was no
express mention of judicial review of legislation for the enforcement of
the rights; but it is obvious that most of them were intended to be
justiciable.
The Government of India Act of 1935 provided for non-discrimination57 and for compensation for property compulsorily acquired for
public purpose.ss The non-discrimination provision was practically
nullified by an exception saving discriminatory action sanctioned by the
Governor in a province or by the Governor-General at the Centre.
Naturally, therefore, it never presented any occasion for judicial review
of discriminatory legislation or even executive action. The right to
compensation was understood not to extend to situations where legislation modified and diminished the rights of landowners for the benefit of
their tenants.59 In other words, the right was merely to be availabk
when there was a direct transfer of ownership of property from the
proprietor to the government, and not in a variety of other situations
understood in the United States to involve the "taking" of property
without direct acquisition.
The Cabinet Mission Plan announced by the Viceroy of India on
May 16, 1946, which set into motion the processes leading to the setting
up of the Constituent Assembly, had in a special paragraph "recommended" the setting up of an "Advisory Committee on the rights of
citizens, minorities and tribal and excluded areas," to report to the
Union Constituent Assembly "upon the list of Fundamental Rights"
and upon certain other matters concerning the protection of minorities
and administration of tribal areas. Accordingly, the Advisory Committee was set up on January 24, 1947. At its first meeting, held on
February 27, 1947, the Committee, presided over by Sardar Patel,
elected five sub-committees, including one on "Fundamental Rights"
and another on "Minorities." The provisions concerning fundamental
rights in the Draft Constitution presented to the Assembly in February
1948, were mainly the product of the fundamental rights sub-committee approved by the Advisory Committee. It was this sub-committee on
fundamental rights which borrowed heavily from the experience of the
United States.
56. Ibid., p. 58 (Document No. 16). 57. Section 298. 58. Section 299.
59. See Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces, A.I.R. 1943 F.C. 29.
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Constitutional guarantee of justiciable fundamental rights had by
that time become a matter of national aspiration, to which the partition
of India made really no difference. It was not only a question of
protecting the rights of minorities; there were several other vital interests and values to be secured, for example, the right to travel, reside,
and settle in any part of the country, or the right-even of the majority
community-to practice religion or to be treated with fairness and
without arbitrary discrimination. The setting up of separate sub-committees for fundamental rights and minorities will itself bear testimony
that the fundamental rights were viewed in a broader perspective than
mere guarantees for the interests of the minorities.
Hardly any foreign experience other than that of the United States
was available in the realm of fundamental rights. The Australian
Constitution had a single fundamental right which could not be taken
away or abridged by legislation, namely, the right to free exercise of
religion.6o That right was itself drafted on the model of its counterpart
in the United States Constitution, and the Australian case law on the
subject added hardly anything fresh or important. The Canadian
Constitution had no such rights. The Irish Constitution, which was
relied upon for the incorporation of some non-justiciable duties of the
State-the Directive Principles of State Policy-had also little guidance
to offer in regard to justiciable fundamental rights inasmuch as the
rights guaranteed therein were all subject to law. The remaining constitutions in the world either had no guaranteed rights, or had rights which
were not justiciable, or had hardly any length of tradition or experience
to encourage emulation. No wonder, therefore, that in the sub-committee on fundamental rights three leading members, Munshi, Ambedkar, and Ayyar, each a lawyer of high standing, leaned very heavily on
the United States Constitution for preparing the draft of the fundamental rights.
The preliminary question whether to plump for fundamental rights
enforceable by the judiciary, or to opt for rights which might be subject
to the overriding power of the legislature, was disposed of without
much difficulty. The minutes of the very first meeting of the subcommittee record that, after a short discussion, "it was agreed that
before the bill of rights was drawn up, the sub-committee should have a
clear idea about the points to be concentrated upon." The chairman
then invited the members to express their opinions, and Ayyar was the
first to speak. The minute reads:
Alluding to the Charter of fundamental rights and guarantees embodied
in the Irish and American Constitutions, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar
60. Section 116 of the Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900.
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pointed out that citizens' rights to be embodied in a Constitution should
consist of guarantees enforceable in courts of law, and it was no use
laying down precepts which remained unenforceable or ineffective. The
Supreme Court of the United States, whenever its power is invoked
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, prevents a State
from depriving any person of life, liberty or property otherwise than by
due process of law. Sir Alladi advised the sub-committee to take the
United States as model for the protection of the basic rights of the
citizens.61

Munshi, agreeing with Ayyar, said that the justiciable rights must
be worked out first, and later some non-justiciable rights may also be
considered. He emphasized, in regard to the justiciable rights, that the
constitution must provide for writs to be issued by the courts. 62
Ambedkar agreed with Munshi. He also "informed the sub-committee that he had prepared a long list of fundamental rights which he
proposed to lay before the sub-committee."63
Ambedkar's promised memorandum was submitted to the subcommittee on March 24, 1947. The influence of the United States
Constitution was writ large on the face of this memorandum. The
preamble to the memorandum began with the words "We the people"
and referred to the Indian Union as the "United States of India."64
Article II, Section I, of the "memorandum and draft" said, "The
Constitution of the United States of India shall recognize the following
fundamental rights of citizenship,"65 and then follows a list of rights
which include, inter alia, the following:
I. All persons born or naturalized within its territories are citizens
of the United States of India and of the State wherein they reside. Any
privilege or disability arising out of rank, birth, person, family, religion
or religious usage and custom is abolished.
2. No State shall make or enforce any law or custom which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty and property without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of
law.
10. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
12. No law shall be made abridging the freedom of speech, of the press,
of association and of assembly except for consideration of public order
and morality.
13. No Bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.
14. The State shall guarantee to every Indian citizen liberty of con61. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. II, p. 115.
63. Ibid. 64. Ibid., p. 84. 65. Ibid., pp. 85-86.

62. Ibid.
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science and the free exercise of his religion, including the right to profess,
to preach and to convert within limits compatible with public order and
morality.
16. No person shall incur any penalties of any kind whatsoever by
reason of his caste, creed or religion nor shall any person be permitted
to refuse to fulfill any obligation of citizenship on the ground of caste,
creed or religion. 66

Nor did Ambedkar confine his borrowing to the text of the United
States Constitution. He was aware of the difficulty felt in the United
States in enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the ground that
Congress could not legislate in the field of civil rights, and so long as a
state abstained from taking positive action supporting segregation the
courts could not intervene to prevent social discrimination by private
action. He, therefore, provided in his draft for specific fundamental
rights dealing with the problem:
4. Whoever denies to any person, except for reasons by law applicable to persons of all classes and regardless of their social status, the full
enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or inns, educational institutions, roads, paths, streets, tanks, wells
and other watering places, public conveyances on land, air or water,
theatres or other places of public amusement, resort or convenience
where they are dedicated to or maintained or licensed for the use of the
public, shall be guilty of an offense.
5. All citizens shall have equal access to all institutions, conveniences and amenities maintained by or for the public.
6. No citizen shall be disqualified to hold any public office or
exercise any trade or calling by reason of his or her religion, caste,
creed, sex or social status.67

Being himself a member and leader of the discriminated classes he
wanted to take no chances in regard to this matter. In Section II of the
same Article, under "remedies against invasion of fundamental rights,"
he sought to provide a second string to the bow by providing:
That the authority of the Legislature and the Executive ofthe Union
as well as of every State throughout India shall be subject to the following limitations:
It shall not be competent for any Legislature or Executive in India
to pass a law or issue an order, rule or regulation so as to violate the
following rights of the subjects of the State:
(I) To make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property;
(2) to be eligible for entry into the civil and military employ and
to all educational institutions except for such conditions and limitations
as may be necessary to provide for the due and adequate representation
of all classes of the subjects of the State;
66. Ibid., p. 86 et seq.

67. Ibid.
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(3) to be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, educational institutions, privileges of inns,
rivers, streams, wells, tanks, roads, paths, streets, public conveyances
on land, air and water, theatres and other places of public resort or
amusement except for such conditions and limitations applicable alike to
all subjects of every race, class, caste, colour or creed. 68

In the "explanatory notes'' appended to the memorandum he
acknowledges that the "provisions of Clause 2 are borrowed from the
Civil Rights Protection Acts, I 866, and of March I, I 875, passed by the
Congress of the United States of America to protect the Negroes
against unequal treatment. "69
In the section relating to remedies, Ambedkar's draft suggests, on
the United States pattern, that the "United States of India shall provide
(I) that the judicial powers of India shall be vested in a Supreme
Court,'' and that the "right to apply for a writ shall not be abridged or
suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it."7° He also borrowed from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments to provide that the "Union Legislature shall
make laws to give effect to such provisions as require legislation for that
purpose and to prescribe punishments for those acts which are declared
to be offenses." 71
Among the other members who submitted separate drafts for the
consideration of the sub-committee was Munshi, whose draft was
finally accepted by the sub-committee, on March 24, 1947, as the basis
for discussion "in conjunction with other drafts."72 Munshi, on the
whole, took the substance of the provisions in the United States
Constitution and, unlike Ambedkar, avoided the literal text. Yet, even
in Munshi's draft, the text of the United States Constitution could be
easily recognized. Here is a sampling:
Article III, Section ( 10):
No person shall be denied equal protection of the laws within the
territories of the Union.
Article V, Section (4):
No person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
Article VII, Section (3):
Every form of slavery or traffic in human beings or compulsory
labour other than public service equally incumbent upon all or as part of
the punishment pronounced by a court of law is abolished and if such
form of traffic or labour is enforced it shall be punishable by the law of
the Union.
68. Ibid., pp. 88-89. 69. Ibid., p. 98.
70. Ibid., p. 88. Article II, Section II, Clause I, sub-clauses (I) and (4).
71. Ibid., p. 88. Article II, Section I (21 ). 72. Ibid., p. 116.

80

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Article X, Section (3):
No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the owner and in time of war except in a manner
prescribed by law.
Article X, Section (4):
Expropriation for public reasons shall only be permitted upon conditions determined by law and in return for just and adequate consideration determined according to principles previously laid down by it.
Article XII, Section (2):
No person shall be tried for the same offense more than once and he
shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor shall the burden of proving his innocence be thrown on him.
Article XII, Section (3):
No person shall be subjected to prolonged detention preceding trial,
to excessive bail, or unreasonable refusal thereof or to inhuman and
cruel punishment or be denied adequate safeguards and procedure.
Article XII, Section (6):
Full faith and credit shall be given throughout the territories of the
Union to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union
and every unit thereof, and the manner in which such acts, records and
proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof determined shall be
prescribed by the law. of the U nion.73

Besides these provisions, which bore obvious textual resemblances
to the corresponding provisions in the United States Constitution, there
were many others in the drafts presented to the sub-committee by
Munshi, Ambedkar, and others which corresponded to the substance of
one provision or another in the United States Bill of Rights. In fact,
almost every important fundamental right which was included in these
drafts and which finally became a part of the Constitution of India has
its counterpart in the United States Bill of Rights. In most cases the text
is deliberately altered because the true import of the guarantee as it now
obtains in the United States after about one hundred and sixty years of
judicial application will be-or so it was thought-more truly captured
by an altered text. The case of the guarantee of free speech is one in
point. As Ambedkar explained in the Constituent Assembly, an absolute statement of guarantee of free speech in the Constitution of India
would have created more uncertainty than a statement qualified by
those exceptions which have been judicially recognized in the United
States over the long years.
In some cases, the text was also altered because Indian experience,
aspirations, and policies were just different. The provision for freedom
of religion illustrates this genre. India, with her memories of Sati and
her awareness of a host of anachronistic social customs sheltered
behind religion could not afford to leave all .. practice" of religion
73. Ibid., pp. 75-79.
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immune from legislative reform. Nor could she afford to forget the
history of communal riots engineered by the obscurantist and antisocial
elements by indulging, in the name of religion, in practices offending
the sentiments of other communities. The Indian Constitution, therefore, guaranteed the freedom "to profess, practice and propagate religion," but, unlike in the United States, expressly subjected it to laws of
health, morality, and public order; and expressly provided that the
regulatory and restrictive power of the law will reach all "economic,
financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated
with religious practice," and the law may bring about "social welfare
and reform" or throw open "Hindu religious institutions of a public
character to all classes and sections of Hindus." 74
In yet another category of cases, the texts are different because the
social format of the problem as it obtained in the United States in the
late eighteenth century was different from that in India in the middle of
the present century, although the essential nature of the problem as well
as the basic human issues involved are nearly the same. The Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provided against slavery
and involuntary servitude and empowered Congress to enforce the
injunction by legislation. In India the problem took the form of
"untouchability," and the Indian Constitution appropriately provides
that "untouchability is abolished, and its practice in any form is
forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 'untouchability' shall be an offense punishable in accordance with law." 7 5 Another
article deals with the problem of involuntary labour: 'Traffic in human
beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offense
punishable in accordance with law." 76 Indeed, Munshi's draft, as we
have already seen, spoke of abolishing "every form of slavery," and
Professor K. T. Shah's draft also said, "Slavery of any kind is forbidden. No rights which would amount to property of any kind in human
beings, or enslavement of one individual by another, or by groups or
corporations, shall be recognized." 77 Consequently, in Clause 15 (l) of
the report of the subcommittee on fundamental rights, "slavery" was
one of the four social evils prohibited. However, when this Clause came
up for discussion in the Advisory Committee, Mr. Rajagopalachari
promptly protested:
May I suggest that we need not adopt the laws of America as enacted
at the time of slavery. What is intended is that forced labour and any
74. Co~stitution of India, Article 25. 75. Ibid., Article 17. 76. Article 23.
77. Sh1va Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. II, p. 53 (fundamental right, 39).
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form of involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime whereof
party shall have been duly convicted are prohibited, etc. 78

And with this the "slavery" provision was dropped without ado.
It is neither necessary nor practicable to trace the development of
every provision, or even several provisions, in Munshi's or Ambedkar's
draft through the various stages of discussion in the sub-committee, in
the Advisory Committee, and then in the Constituent Assembly itself
through the last stage when it does or does not find a place in the
Constitution. However, a review of the progress of the due process
clause through the various stages of this journey will be not only
illustrative but also, it is hoped, interesting and even rewarding.
Due Process: Resisted and Abandoned
In Munshi's draft, which was picked up by the sub-committee on
fundamental rights as the principal or working draft, two provisions
were significant from the point of the "due process" guarantee. These
were to be found in sub-sections (l) and (4) of Article V, the Article
itself being titled "Rights to Freedom."79
The "Rights to Freedom" enumerated in sub-clause (I) included
the rights of free expression, free association, free assembly, and such
other rights. In their progress from Munshi's draft to the Draft Constitution on which the Constituent Assembly commenced debate on
November 4, 1948, these rights to freedom underwent great changes in
style and content. But their essence remained the same. In the Draft
Constitution, these rights found a place in Article 13. The rights were
stated in bare terms in sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause (l) of the Article,
and in clauses (2) to (6) of the same Article provisos were incorporated
permitting the State to impose restrictions on each of the rights for the
protection of specified social objects like security of the State, public
order, or safeguarding the interests of aboriginal tribes or of the general
public. The Article did not say that these restrictions must be "reasonable" or "proper~' or "due"; and this omission, as we shall see, was
severely objected to during the debate in the Assembly. But for the
present we return to the deliberations on Munshi's draft in the subcommittee on fundamental rights.
The other provision referred to above was in sub-clause (4) of
Article V of Munshi's draft to the effect: "No person shall be deprived
of his life, liberty or property without due process of law." It was thisthe due process clause-which was subjected to very keen discussion
and tough resistance at practically every stage of its journey to the
Draft Constitution, before the Constituent Assembly.
It may perhaps be surmised at this stage that Munshi, in all
78. Ibid., p. 255.

79. Ibid., p. 75.
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probability, took his "due process" clause from the Fifth and not from
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is
already indicated by the fact that he did not regard "liberty" in the
clause to comprehend the right of free speech, association, and the like,
which he separately mentioned in sub-section (I) of his Article V. The
surmise is further strengthened by the separate provision elsewhere in
his draft (in his Article X) for "just and adequate consideration" for
private property expropriated for ··public reasons." The epithet "just"
seems to be obviously borrowed from the Fifth Amendment, because
there is no provision at all for compensation in the Fourteenth; and
even in Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, whose
influence is equally manifest in Munshi's Article X, mention is made
only of "compensation" for the property acquired, and not of "just and
adequate consideration."
Be that as it may, in the sub-committee itself Munshi's "due
process" guarantee for "life, liberty and property" was subjected to the
criticism that it will defeat the ineluctable tenancy reforms contemplated in several states. It had to be put to a vote in the sub-committee,
but survived by five votes to two. so Yet another effort was made, at the
sub-committee stage only, to dislodge or qualify heavily the "due
process" guarantee in Munshi's draft. In a note circulated by him "on
the effect of some of the proposed clauses," Rau pointed out that the
"due process" clause has spawned a great deal of litigation in the United
States; it had led to a great deal of uncertainty regarding the standards
of constitutional behaviour and would, if adopted in India, pose a
threat to the validity of social welfare legislation concerning tenancy
reform, price control, regulation of wages, and the working conditions
of labour. His note then referred to the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,SI in
which the Court declared unconstitutional a congressional law scaling
down mortgage debts with a view to protecting the interests of the
farmers, and went on to say:
It should be noted that the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.A. Constitu-

tion contains the "due process" clause and also another clause which
provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. Our draft contains both these clauses (see Clauses II
and 27). It must be admitted that the clauses are a safeguard against
predatory legislation; but they may also stand in the way of beneficent
social legislation. s2

Rau recommended to the sub-committee that a new clause should
be added to its report mitigating the effect of the "due process" and the
80. Ibid., p. 122.
81. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
82. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. II, p. 151.
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"just compensation" clauses by empowering the State "to limit by law
the rights guaranteed" by these clauses "wherever the exigencies of the
common good may require." But the sub-committee rejected this
suggestion also by a majority vote.sJ
In the Advisory Committee, however, B. N. Rau's skepticism was
shared by three very important men, each of whom had rich administrative experience. They were Mr. Goving Ballabh Pant, Chief Minister of
Uttar Pradesh, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, former Chief Minister of
Madras, and Mr. K. M. Panikkar, Dewan (Chief Minister) of the
princely state of Travancore. During deliberations in the Committee,
Pant wanted to know whether the "due process" clause would render it
unconstitutional for persons to be detained, for short periods, without
trial, or for landlords to be disabled from ejecting or evicting their
tenants from urban houses and rural lands. And when he was informed
that there was a possibility of the clause having such consequences, he
expressed his strong opposition to it. He said:
It comes to this. The future of this country is to be determined not by

the collective wisdom of the representatives of the people, but by the
fiats of those elevated to the judiciary. If this is the case, then I strongly
oppose it. The words "due process of Jaw" should be altered. The language should be fool-proof so that every judge may be expected to give
the same sort of ruling. We should not put in words which give rise to
controversies. 84

Finally, the Committee accepted the suggestion made by Panikkar
that "property" be taken out of the phrase "life, liberty and property" in
the "due process" clause suggested by Munshi. 85 Munshi wisely yielded,
saying, "I agree with this formula. We shall deal with property separately." The clause was, therefore, adopted in the truncated form,
extending the "due process" guarantee only to "life and liberty." But
Pant was not satisfied, because "liberty" could, in the first place,
frustrate detention without trial, and, secondly, it could even defeat
social legislation like tenancy reform, price-control, or legislation for
the welfare of the poor, such as debt relief or amelioration of the
working conditions of labour. He wanted the phrase "due process" to
be out. He only said: "I do not agree, but I keep quiet. "86
The matter, of course, did not rest there. Rau, who shared Pant's
apprehensions about the protean concept of "liberty," continued to
work at it. He persuaded the Drafting Committee to agree to qualify
"liberty" by the word "personaJ."8 7 It was thought that so qualified,
"liberty" could not be construed broadly to comprehend things like
freedom of contract or even the right to free speech. Such of these rights
83. Ibid., p. 166.
86. Ibid., p. 247.

84. Ibid., p. 243.
85. Ibid., p. 245.
87. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 199 and 328.
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as were considered worthy of constitutional protection had already
been secured separately. It was believed, perhaps, that ··personal liberty" would mean no more than freedom from incarceration, and "due
process" protection to "liberty" in this limited and qualified sense would
only mean fair trial.
It was at this stage that Rau made his visit to the United States and
learned from Justices Frankfurter and Learned Hand that the "power
of judicial review implied in the 'due process' clause of which there was
a qualified version in Clause 16 of our Draft Constitution was not only
undemocratic .. but also threw an unfair burden on the judiciary."
The upshot of it was that he persuaded the Drafting Committee to
remove the expression "due process" altogether from the draft to be
placed before the Constituent Assembly. Article 15 of that draft was
simply without the expression "due process." It read: "No person shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by Jaw." A footnote explained that the expression "except
according to procedure established by Jaw," substituting the words
"without due process of Jaw" was more specific and was taken from
Article XXXI of the Japanese Constitution. 8B
Thus the attempt to incorporate the "due process" clause from the
United States Constitution seemed to· have completely failed even
before the Constituent Assembly began considering the Draft Constitution prepared by its Drafting Committee, and the expression "due
process" found no mention anywhere in the Draft Constitution.
Due Process: Strong but Disguised Comeback
It was noted earlier that Article 13 of the Draft Constitution incorporated the seven freedoms, beginning with the freedom of speech, in
clause (1), and the restrictions permitted to be placed on each of these
freedoms for various purposes, such as the security of the State, public
order, and the like, were stated in clauses (2) to (6) of the same article.s9
88. Ibid., p. 523.
89. Clause (I}, enumerating the seven freedoms, was in these terms: (I) Subject to
the other provisions of this article, all citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech
and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or
unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any
part of the territory of India: (f) to acquire, hold, and dispose of property; and (g) to
practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
A sampling of the qualifying clauses from (2) to (6) may be given: "(2) Nothing in
sub-clause (a) of Clause (I) of this article shall affect the operation of any existing law of
prevent the State from making any law, relating to libel, slander, defamation, sedition or
any other matter which offends against decency or morality or undermines the authority
or foundation of the State .... (4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect
the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law, imposing, in
the interests of the general public, restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the
said sub-clause (ibid., p. 522)."
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In the United States these freedoms have been judicially "incorporated"
in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the "due process" clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the provision of Article 13 of the
Draft Constitution fell short of the "due process" standards primarily
for the reason that no standard of judicial review was prescribed for the
restrictions to be imposed by the State on these freedoms. This was
noticed by a large number of members in the Constituent Assembly,
and a spate of amendments was moved to rectify the error. Explaining
the deficiency, Sardar Hukum Singh observed:
Now who is to judge whether any measure adopted or legislation enacted
is "in the interest of the general public" or in the interest of public
order, or whether it relates to "any matter which undermines the authority or foundation of the State?" The sphere of the Supreme Court will
be very limited. The only question before it would be whether the
legislation concerned is "in the interest of public order." Only the bona
fides of the legislation will be the main point for decision by the Court
and when once it is found by the Court that the Government honestly
believed that the legislation was needed "in the interest of the public
order," there would be nothing more left for its interference.9o
Hukum Singh pointed out that "in other countries like America, it is for
the Supreme Court to judge the matter, keeping in view all the circumstances,'' and asked for the deletion of the qualifying clauses altogether.
Mr. Damodar Swarup Seth referred to Ambedkar's explanation that
the qualifying clauses corresponded to the police powers judicially
evolved by the Supreme Court in the United States and said that "the
limitations embodied in the Draft Constitution are far wider than those
provided in the United States."9I
But perhaps the most pertinent criticism and the best suggestion
came from Pt. Thakur Das Bhargava. He endorsed the criticism made
by the earlier speakers and observed that the provision of sub-clauses
(2) to (6) would be satisfied as soon as a legislature claimed that it was
satisfied or it honestly believed that the restrictions on the freedom were
necessary for the purposes mentioned in those clauses. He, therefore,
suggested that the word "reasonable" should be inserted in each of the
clauses to qualify the permissible "restrictions." He said:
Sir, one speaker was asking where the soul in the lifeless Article 13 was?
I am putting the soul there. If you put the word "reasonable" there,
the court will have to say whether a particular Act is in the interests of
the public and, secondly, whether the restrictions imposed by the legislature are reasonable, proper and necessary in the circumstances of the
case. The courts will have to go into the question and it will not be the
legislature and the executive who could play with the fundamental
90. C.A.D., vol. VII, p. 733 (C.A.D. stands for Constituent Assembly Debates).
91. Ibid., p. 713.
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rights of the people. It is the courts who will have the final say. Therefore, my submission is that we must put in these words "reasonB:ble"
or "proper" or "necessary," or whatever good word the House hkes.
I understand that Dr. Ambedkar is agreeable to the word "reasonable."
Otherwise, Article 13 is a nullity. It is not fully justiciable now and the
courts will not be able to say whether the restrictions are necessary or
reasonable. 92

Ultimately, Ambedkar accepted, amongst others, the amendment
moved by Bhargava,93 and the restrictions permitted on the various
freedoms in Article 13 became justiciable.
Did. the several members of the Constituent Assembly who advocated and won the cause of liberty by introducing the element of
justiciability in regard to the seven freedoms in Article 13, beginning
with the freedom of speech, realize that they were striving for the
adoption of the "due process" doctrine so far as those freedoms were
concerned? It may be safely assumed that they did not have any
scholarly or technical knowledge of the doctrines of "due process" and
"police powers." They might not have been aware, for instance, that in
the Constitution of the United States the due process guarantee for "life,
liberty and property" figures at two different places, namely, in the
Fifth as well as in the Fourteenth Amendment. They might not have
been familiar with the doctrine of selective incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment through a progressively widening construction of the word "liberty." Mr. Mahboob Ali Baig, for
instance, while speaking of the distinction between leaving the determination of constitutionality to the judiciary, on the one hand, and to
the legislature, on the other, said:
This distinction was recognized by the framers of the American Constitution in that famous Fourteenth Amendment which clearly laid down that
no Congress can make any law to prejudice the freedom of speech, the
freedom of association and the freedom of the press. This was in 1791,
and if the American citizen transgressed the limits and endangered the
State, the judiciary would judge him and not the legislature or the
executive. 94

Yet, their sense of direction was perfect. They knew that the
freedoms enumerated in the Thirteenth Article were meaningful only if
legislation seeking to restrain them was justiciable on the ground of
propriety or reasonableness or some other standard of assessment of
desirability. They were also at least vaguely aware that in the United
92. Ibid., pp. 739-740.
93. Ibid., p. 741. For some reason, not quite apparent, the word "reasonable" was
not inserted in Clause (2) of Article 19 relating to freedom of speech and expression.
However, that was done a year and a half later, in June 1951, by the First Amendment to
the Constitution.
94. Ibid., p. 728.
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States the Constitution has carried out the experiment of authorizing
the judges to apply the standards, and the results there obtained
encourage emulation. And they all knew that the "due process" clause
was the key to the enforcement of judicially supervised standards. Some
among them, like Bhargava, were certainly more knowledgeable and
were able to see that the same standards can be enforced by using either
the expression "due process" or the expression ·'reasonable." In either
case, the standards are determined and the lines of demarcation between freedom and permissible restraint are drawn by the judges.
The next battle for judicial standards was fought over Article 15 of
the Draft Constitution. It was this Article which originally started with
a full-fledged enunciation of the guarantee of "due process" against
deprivation of "life, liberty or property." It was subsequently reduced to
"due process" guarantee for "life and personal liberty." And, finally,
"due process" was eliminated and the Article only guaranteed that no
person shall be deprived of his "life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law." Bhargava and like-minded
members moved amendments seeking to restore the "due process"
guarantee.
Bhargava himself moved that the Article should read: "No person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without due process of
law." In his speech explaining and supporting his amendment, Bhargava said:
The house has already accepted the word "reasonable" in Article 13.
At least seventy percent of the Acts which can involve personal liberty
have now come under the jurisdiction of the courts, and the courts are
competent to pronounce an opinion on such laws, whether they are
reasonable or not. The House is now estopped from adopting another
principle. In regard to personal liberty and life, the question is much
more important. So far as the questions of life and personal liberty are
concerned, they must also be under the category of subjects which are
within the jurisdiction of the courts. 95

The debate on the amendment to restore "due process" in the text
of Article 15 was, perhaps, one of the most assiduous debates in the
Assembly. Those who supported the amendment and those who favoured the status quo argued their cases with great zest, and opinion in
the House seemed to sway from one side to another, each time a speech
was made. The consideration of the amendment was postponed for a
week at the request of Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting
Committee. And, finally, Ambedkar announced that he was himself unable to decide whether to accept the amendment or not. He left the matter
to the decision of the House with these words: "It is rather a case where a
95. Ibid., p. 847.

96. Ibid., p. 1001.
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man has to sail between Charybdis and Scylla and I, therefore, would
not say anything. I would leave it to the House to decide in any way it
likes." 96
When put to a vote, the amendment was rejected by the House. But
the matter could not rest there. It was realized by the members of the
Drafting Committee itself that Article 15, as it stood, gave no guarantee of a ''reasonable" or "proper" or "due" procedure in matters of
life and personal liberty. In particular, it gave no guarantee of a fair
trial with aid of counsel in a duly established court of law. At the final
state of the deliberations of the Assembly, therefore, Ambedkar himself
moved an amendment introducing a new Article, 15A, to guarantee
every person accused of an offense a fair trial and the right, pending the
trial, not to be detained without the order of a magistrate. Introducing
this new article, Ambedkar referred to the great dissatisfaction expressed in the House and outside when the amendments seeking to
introduce the "due process" guarantee for "life and personal liberty"
were negatived, and observed:
We are, therefore, now, by introducing Article 15A, making, if I may say
so, compensation for what was done then in passing Article 15. In other
words, we are providing for the substance of the law of "due process"
by the introduction of Article 15A.97

Towards the end of the debate on the new article, Ambedkar again
said:
Ever since that Article (Article 15) was adopted, I and my friends had been
trying in some way to restore the content of due procedure with its
fundamentals without using the words "due process." I should have
thought that the Members who are interested in the liberty of the individual would be more than satisfied for being able to have the prospect
before them of the provisions contained in Article 15A.98

The new Article was, of course, approved by the House with certain
minor amendments.
Due Process: Courts Fail to Recognize
It is evident from the debates in the Constituent Assembly that the
framers of the Constitution of India consciously adopted the doctrines
of "due process" and "police powers.'· True, they did not adopt the
expressions "due process" and "police powers.'' They also did not use
the famous phrase "life, liberty and property." The exigencies of their
own circumstances led them to provide for the seven freedoms in a
separate article, and the compulsions of social milieu persuaded them to
accept departures from the textual and substantive details of the United
States Constitution. Yet, they basically stuck to the core of "due
97. C.A.D., vol. IX, p. 1497.

98. Ibid., p. 1556.
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process," which is that the principal rights of speech, religion, association, property, and so forth should be secure against arbitrary deprivation or encroachment by the executive as well as the legislature through
the operation of judicial review on the broad ground of reasonability or
propriety of all governmental action, and that fair trial with the help of
legal counsel should rule out arbitrary arrest, detention, or bodily
injury.
In fact, no constitution which secures liberties by providing for
judicial review of executive and legislative action on the basis of
judicially supervised standards of reasonableness can simply succeed in
avoiding the doctrines of "due processs" and "police powers." Because,
as Bhargava and other members of the Constituent Assembly rightly
understood, "due process'' is none other than the test of "reasonableness" applied by the judiciary in assessing the quality of the legislative
measures affecting the liberty of the individual. And what is police
power but the other side of the same coin? To define the boundary of an
island is no different from defining the boundary of the sea that
surrounds it. A statement of how far the State will be permitted to
encroach upon the liberty of the individual is identical with the statement of how far a citizen can enjoy his liberty without encroachment
from the State, although the one is characterized as a statement of
police powers and the other of liberty protected by due process. Consequently, when the Constitution of India provided for the various
freedoms in clause (1) of Article 19 and laid down the judicially
supervised limits of permissible restraint in clauses (2) to (6) of the same
Article, it provided for due process as well as police powers. The
reasonable restrictions permitted in those. clauses are none other than
the contours of the police powers permitted by the Constitution of
India in regard to the liberties mentione9 in the main part of the Article.
Similarly, Article 22, which secures the right to fair trial, and Article 20,
forbidding double jeopardy, ex post facto penal laws, and self-incrimination, constitute part of the same scheme of demarcating the line
dividing liberty and permissible restraint, or defining individual rights
protected by due process and corresponding police powers of the State.
It follows, therefore, that notwithstanding the differences of detail
-which might in some instances be of no inconsiderable significancethere is a basic identity of values and of the means and methods of
achieving them among all the countries where civil liberties or fundamental rights are secured by judicial review. Consequently, institutional
experiences of one country, particularly those concerning the judiciary
and its functional relationship with the other two branches of government, must have relevance and value for all others. Since the United
States has had the longest experience, extending over two centuries in
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this field where India is one of the latest to arrive, the experience of the
former can illuminate vistas in the path of the latter. In the early years
of the working of the Constitution of India, the United States precedents were cited before the Supreme Court and were received with
natural readiness. Gradually, however, their use has almost disappeared, and the keenness to maintain touch with the constitutional
developments in the United States has generally palled.
One reason for this decline of interest in United States jurisprudence has been the belief prevalent among Indian lawyers that the
Constitution of India has rejected the "due process" doctrine. 99 This, we
have noted, is evidently incorrect with regard to "liberty" as well as
"property.'' Even "personal liberty" in the narrowest sense of freedom
from imprisonment has been secured against arbitrary deprivation by
the laying down of requirements of fair trial in Articles 20 and 22. 100
99. This belief is grounded in certain observations in the Supreme Court opinions in
the very first case that came up before the Court, namely, A. K. Gopa/an v. State of
Madras (A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27). Chief Justice Kania observed: "A perusal of the report of
the drafting committee to which our attention was drawn shows clearly that the
Constituent Assembly had before it the American Article and the expression "due process
of law" but they deliberately dropped the use of that expression from our Constitution .
. . . If the Indian Constitution wanted to preserve to every person the protection given by
the due process clause of the American Constitution there was nothing to prevent the
Assembly from adopting the phrase, or if they wanted to limit the same to procedure
only, to adopt that expression with only the word 'procedure' prefixed to 'law."'
Mr. Justice B. K. Mukherjee (later he became Chief Justice) held: "In the first place it
is clear that the framers of the Indian Constitution did not desire to introduce into our
system the elements of uncertainty, vagueness and changeability that have grown round
the 'due process' doctrine in America. .
The uncertainty and elasticity are in the
doctrine itself which is a sort of hidden mine, the contents of which nobody knows and it
is merely revealed from time to time to the judicial conscience of the Judges .... In the
Indian Constitution, the word 'due' has been deliberately omitted and this shows clearly
that the Constitution makers of India had no intention of introducing the American
doctrine" (p. 102).
Mr. JusticeS. R. Das (later he became Chief Justice) observed: "That doctrine (due
process) can only thrive and work where the legislature is subordinate to the judiciary in
the sense that the latter can sit in judgment over and review all acts of the Legislature.
Such a doctrine can have no application to a field where the Legislature is supreme. That
is why the doctrine of 'due process of law' is quite different in England where Parliament
is supreme .... In the main, subject to the limitation I have mentioned, our Constitution
has preferred the supremacy of the Legislature to that of the judiciary. The English
principle of due process of law is, therefore, more in accord with our Constitution than
the American doctrine which has been evolved for serving quite a different system ... .In
the next place, it is common knowledge that our Constitution makers deliberately
declined to adopt the uncertain and shifting American doctrine of due process of law ....
Finally, it would be incongruous to import the doctrine of due process of law without its
palliative, the doctrine of police powers. It is impossible to read the last mentioned
doctrine into Article 21" (pp. 117-118).
I00. Obviously the learned judges missed the true significance of these two articles as
importing the essence of fair trial in the Constitution. As Ambedkar said, Article 22 (his
Article 15A) was to make amends or compensate for what was denied by weeding out the
expression "due process" from Article 21 (Article 15 of the Draft Constitution).
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"Liberty" in the broader sense as inclusive of the freedoms of speech,
and so forth, has been secured in Article 19. In spite of the fact that Rau
and Pant succeeded in withdrawing "property" from "due process"
protection, this right was also ultimately protected by sub-clause (f) of
Clause (I) of Article 19 which guaranteed the right to "acquire, hold
and dispose of property" subject only to "reasonable restrictions" like
the other rights in that article.
Another reason which made the doctrines of police powers and due
process unpopular among the Indian lawyers was the failure of some
early judges to perceive and recognize the police power in regard to the
right of property in Clause (5) of Article 19. 101 The confusion caused by
their unsuccessful explorations proved inhibitive.1o2 Lastly, perhaps the
most important reason for the cooling down of the Indian lawyer's
interest in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States is his
lack of acquaintance with it. Almost all the judges of the Supreme
Court and the lawyers who argue before them have, from the very
beginning, been persons familiar with the principles of English constitutional law but not with those of the United States Constitution. And,
as Indian precedents fill up the interstices of constitutional law even the
initial need to consult and explore unfamiliar foreign constitutions
seems gradually to wear down.
This is not to suggest that United States precedents on specific
issues should be regularly followed or even considered in India. That is
neither possible nor at all desirable. Indian courts must build, as they
have indeed been doing, their own corpus juris based on the text and
social background of the Constitution of India. This text, as we have
seen, makes significant departures from the United States Constitution
101. In Charanjit Lalv. Union of India (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 4!), State of West Benga/v.
Subodh Gopal (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 92), and Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning
and Weaving Mills (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 119), Mr. JusticeS. R. Das steadily took the view
that the police power in regard to the right of property is not to be found in Article 19
which-after guaranteeing the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property-permitted
the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the right for the social objectives mentioned
in Clause (6) of the Article. Instead, the learned Judge held that the doctrine of police
powers in regard to property was to be found in Clause ( l) of Article 31 which said, "No
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." This led him to two
indefensible conclusions: first, that Article 19 has no relevance when the property is
altogether lost to the owner, because then only Article 31 (I) is available; and second, that
when "total deprivation" occurs as a result of law without actual "acquisition" by the
State, there is no check of "reasonability" on the legislation, whereas that check is
available if there is no "total deprivation" but only slight encroachment. For criticism and
constructive suggestion, see P. K. Tripathi, op. cit. (n. 4 above), chapter 5 generally, and
especially pp. 241 and 249.
102. Thus, for instance, Seervai, in his Constitutional Law of India (N. M. Tripathi,
Bombay, 1967), has criticized Mr. Justice Das, not for his failure to locate the doctrine of
police powers in Article 19 (5), but for applying the doctrine at all (pp. 526-527). Seervai is
criticized by the present writer; see P. K. Tripathi, op. cit. (n. 54 above), p. 329 et seq.

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA

93

and makes its own innovations. It is meant to function in Indian
conditions and to guide the destinies of the people of India compatibly
with their genius. The Indian courts need not even care to think in terms
of the United States doctrines like police powers and due process. In
this regard the framers of the Constitution of India have themselves
given the lead by abandoning the use of those expressions. Nevertheless, since both constitutions seek to uphold the somewhat incompatible
principles of democracy and judicial review, there is bound to be a basic
similarity of tensions, experiences, and perceptions, especially in situations where this ipstitutional incompatibility threatens to erupt into
situations of crisis. In such matters the mature experience of the United
States is bound to have great relevance for India, and insulation from
that experience may prove needlessly expensive.
One such matter where the United States experience must be
emulated if the integrity of judicial review is to be seriously viewed as a
cherished value concerns the age of retirement of the judges of the
Supreme Court and the High Courts-the courts endowed with the
exercise of that enormous and delicate power. Independence of the
judges of any court, and especially of these courts, cannot be left merely
to the faith in the individuals appointed as judges, although that faith
remains a factor of considerable significance. The proved wisdom of the
Act of Settlement, 1701, and of the United States Constitution which
secures a life tenure for the federal judges cannot be brushed aside by
superficial observations that the judges in India already have a longer
and more secure tenure than the civil servants, or that Indian conditions of climate and expectation of life are different. IOJ Unless judges of
these courts are given a tenure up to the age of at least seventy years,
and a pension thereafter equal to their emoluments while in office, it
will be unfair to expect that they will not, immediately after retirement,
seek employment either from the government or from private companies-both powerful and wealthy clients before them while on the
bench. Is it very difficult to perceive the danger to the system from such
a situation? Is the danger too remote?I04
What is noted about the age of retirement also holds equally good
for their ridiculously low emoluments. Their salaries had been fixed
more than a quarter of a century ago, and were not handsome even
then. Since then, however, the decline in the buying power of the rupee
has rendered the salaries almost ridiculous. Is a decent salary for a
103. Under the Constitution of India, a judge of the Supreme Court is retired at the
age of sixty-five and that of a High Court at the age of sixty-two. Before that time they
can be removed only through the process of impeachment as in the United States. The
pension after retirement is paltry. Most judges like to get work after retirement.
104. In India nobody seems to bother.
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judge expected to devote all his energies and thoughts to the enunciation and application of the principles of the Constitution a price too
high?
In his report to the President of the Constituent Assembly after his
return from the United States, Rau had said:
Again, Justice Frankfurter was very emphatic that any jurisdiction exercisable by the Supreme Court should be exercised by the full Court. His view
is that the highest Court of appeal in the land should not sit in divisions.
Every Judge, except, of course, such Judges as may be disqualified by
personal interest or otherwise from hearing particular cases, should share
the responsibility for every decision of the Court.I05
It is difficult to see why this principle was not incorporated in the
Constitution. As things stand, all the judges seldom sit together. And
the possibility of a Chief Justice constituting benches altogether arbitrarily cannot be ruled out. Especially, some of the ablest judges may
never get the chance to contribute their best to constitutional interpretation. This has an obvious bearing on the independence of the Supreme Court judge.
There is yet another matter in regard to which United States
experience can be extremely valuable and has been unwisely ignored.
The anti-majoritarian element implicit in the doctrine of judicial review,
initially highlighted by Jefferson and Thayer, has been well recognized.
That recognition never led to the abandoning of judicial review, but it
did underscore the need for caution and restraint in its exercise. If ever
such caution and restraint are ignored, the democratic will can hope to
assert itself by the difficult but not altogether impracticable process of
constitutional amendment. As Dean Rostow rightly observed:
Where judges are carrying out the function of constitutional review, the
final responsibility of the people is appropriately guaranteed by the provisions for amending the Constitution itself, and by the benign influence
of time, which changes the personnel of the courts.I06
But can the judges obstruct the people from discharging this "final
responsibility" by striking down constitutional amendments themselves? Surely, if the Constitution itself confers that power in express
and unmistakable terms, it has to be exercised. It may, perhaps, in that
event, have to be exercised even more cautiously and sparingly than the
power to review ordinary legislation; but that is a different matter. Yet,
how express and unmistakable must those terms be? Can the power be
said to be conferred when there is no mention of it in the text of the
Constitution? Can it be read in the following text?
105. Shiva Rao, op. cit. (n. II above), vol. III, p. 219.
106. Eugene V. Rostow, "The Democratic Character of Judicial Review," 66
Harvard Law Review 193 (1952-53): 195.
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PART XX
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION
368. Procedure for amendment of the Constitution
An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the
introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and
when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total m~m
bership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thtrds
of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented
to the President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the
Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms
of the Bill:
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in(a) Article 53, Article 55, Article 73, Article 162 or Article 241, or
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of
Part XI, or
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or
(e) the provision of this article,
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of
not less than one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect passed
by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.

I take the liberty of quoting the entire Part XX of the Constitution
of India here because there comes a time when sophisticated argument
must yield place to each one's seeing it for himself. I respectfully take
the view that the Article does not empower the Court to strike down
constitutional amendments on substantive grounds, in such explicit
terms at least without which the power of judicial review ought not to
be extended to constitutional amendments. The Supreme Court of
India, in fact, held, as early as in the year 1951, that the "Constituent
power" of Parliament in Article 368 cannot be subjected to judicial
review on the ground that it offends the fundamental rights.I07 However, in 1967, by a majority of six against five in the Golak Nath case, 10s
the Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that constitutional
amendment was subject to the guarantee of fundamental rights in the
same way as ordinary legislation. This doctrine rested mainly on the
theory that there was no difference between ordinary law and the
Constitution, or, more realistically, on the inability of Government
lawyers to articulate the distinction between the two. Subsequently, the
present writer articulated that distinction in his first Telang Memorial
lecture at the Bombay University in 1971. 109 Consequently, in 1973, in
the Kesavananda Bharati case, the Supreme Court almost unanimously
107. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 458).
108. /. C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643).
109. P. K. Tripathi, op. cit. (n. 4 above), chapter I, "Golak Nath: A Critique," p. 17.
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overruled Golak N ath; IIO but at the same time what is claimed to be a
majority of the thirteen-judge bench has laid down that the "basic
structure and framework of the Constitution" cannot be altered or
impaired by a constitutional amendment under Article 368. That
position, again, as on earlier occasions, is sought to be reversed by a
constitutional amendment; 111 and the validity of the amendment will
itself depend upon the soundness of the "basic structure" ruling given
by the Supreme Court which it seeks to reverse!
That the power to strike down a constitutional amendment on the
ground that it affects or injures the "basic structure" of the Constitution
flows from the text of Article 368 is, with due respect, at best a
"benevolent illusion" of the type referred to by the late Professor
Alexander Bickel in the context of Justice Black's insistence that the
text of the First Amendment is absolute. til Such illusions help people
to imagine that they rule themselves. To quote Bickel's thoughtful
words:
But it is very dangerous. To begin with, the illusion is a two-edged
sword, which can be turned very sharply against the Court .... What is
even more ominous, the illusion may even engulf its maker and breed,
and it has occasionally done, free ranging "activist" government by the
judiciary. Such government is incompatible on principle with democratic
institutions, and in practice it will not be tolerated. This way lie crises
such as the Court-packing fight of 1937, in which the Court, if it persists, must ultimately be the loser. The truth is that the illusion of judicial impotence and automation may, when fostered, be first acquired by
the people and last, with the accompanying feel of omnipotence, by
the judges themselves. But it is also first lost by the people and last by
the judges. One day the judges may abandon it too late. 113

In Bickel's words, again, no court, like the Supreme Courts of the
United States and India, should "tell itself or the world that it draws
decisions from a text that is incapable of yielding them. That obscures
the actual process of decision, for the country, and for the judges
themselves, if they fall in with the illusion. "11 4 That also ignores the
ground rule that "the integrity of the Court's principled process should
remain unimpaired, since the Court does not involve itself in compromises and expedient actions."ll5
Nothing can furnish a more convincing vindication than recent
events in India of Thayer's view, endorsed by Bickel, that judicial
review "may, in a larger sense, have a tendency over time seriously to
110. KesavanaTda Bharati v. State of Kerala (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461).
Ill. The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976.
112. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis: HobbsMerrill, 1962), p. 92.
113. Ibid., pp. 92-93. 114. Ibid., pp. 96-97. 115. Ibid., p. 95.
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weaken the democratic process." Throughout the years when Mr.
Nehru was Prime Minister the opposition parties in the Parliament
were divided and weak. The fundamental right to get compensation for
property acquired by the State for public purpose was construed
throughout the period somewhat in favour of the individual, and
Parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments, to undo, as it
were, the damage caused by judicial interpretation to the provisions of
Article 31 of the Constitution.ll6 The people looked upon the Court
rather than the opposition parties for the vindication of the fundamental right, and the opposition remained weak, apologetic, and
ineffective. Then, after Nehru's death the Court gave, in 1967, the
wrong decision in Golak Nath, attempting to deny Parliament the
power to abridge a fundamental right by constitutional amendment. It
was followed, in 1970, by the decisions in the Bank Nationalisation
case, which invalidated a Central Act acquiring the business and assets
of the fourteen biggest Banking Companies in India, 117 and the Privy
Purse case, 11s which invalidated the Presidential Order terminating the
pensions and other privileges of the erstwhile princes. Both these
judgments could be criticized for departing from the strict constructionist views of the relevant constitutional provisions and excessive
concern for the property rights of the indivi'dual. In fact, they both
derived their strength from Golak Nath, which stood behind them to
assure that the fundamental right to property as construed by the
Supreme Court would remain beyond the reach of Parliament's power
of amendment. Thus judicial activism aiming to create new fundamental rights for the citizen had reached its zenith. It was at this stage
towards the end of 1970 that Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi snapped the
decision to hold the elections to Parliament a year earlier than due, with
the proclaimed objective of obtaining the electorate's approval for her
economic programmes and expropriatory legislation. Mrs. Gandhi's
party was returned to power with a stunning majority of more than twothirds in Parliament, and the opposition was completely routed. That
proved beyond doubt that judicial protection to fundamental rights had
blunted the edge of democratic protest.
Then came the declaration of emergency in June 1975, followed by
several arrests and occasional complaints of harsh treatment of jailed
politicians. But this time, in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v.
Shiv kant Shukla, 119 the Supreme Court refused to issue habeas corpus
during the period when a Presidential Order under Article 359 of the
Constitution had suspended the enforcement of the fundamental rights
116. See n. 4 above.
117. R. C. Cooper v. Union of India (n. 4 above).
118. Madhay Rao Scindia v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 530).
119. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207.
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of equal protection (Article 14), personal liberty (Article 21), and fair
trial (Article 22). Yet, no sooner did the Court step aside than the
Thayer doctrine began to operate in the reverse, as it were, and the
democratic forces began to rally around the fundamental rights of the
individual. The upshot of it all was that the opposition, which had laid
divided and ineffective and spurned by the electorate ever since the
commencement of the Constitution, was united and galvanized into a
single party, under the name of the Janata Party, and in an unprecedented response from the people secured an absolute majority in the
House of People, or the lower house of Parliament, relegating the
Congress Party for the first time in the history of the Constitution to the
opposition benches.l20 The Congress Party lost practically all the seats
to the House from the nine North-Indian states supposed to be the
bulwark of its strength;I2I and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was
herself defeated in her constituency by a convincing margin of over fifty
thousand votes. One is tempted to say, in retrospect, that the philosophy of judicial restraint and tolerance of the democratic processes
commended itself to the Supreme Court several years too late. It may
not be too rash to surmise, too, that if the Court had once again
persisted in assuming to itself the mantle of the Constitution makers, as
in Golak Nath and other cases, and if it persuaded itself to bypass the
barrier of the constitutional inhibition in Article 359 to enforce the
fundamental right by issuing the writ in the recent habeas corpus
cases, the democratic process would not have sprung into action as it
did. Anyone in India who cared to acquaint himself with the United
States experience and with the thinking of American jurists on these
matters would have known that the surest way to destroy fundamental
rights is to try to protect them Golak Nath style by stretching and
bending the text of the Constitution to the frustration of the democratically expressed will of the people-that there are no shortcuts to
the hard way of winning the support of the electorate for drubbing the
governmental policies one does not like. Also, it is hoped that Americans who care to know about events in India will find satisfying
confirmation of their own experience on this crucial aspect of the
working of their great institutions.
120.
a House
121.
Pradesh,

In the elections held in March 1977, the Congress Party secured only 151 seats in
of 542.
These are the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Madhya
Rajasthan. Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh.

v
Indonesia

Editorial Note

Fifth largest in population among the world's nations, with a population approaching 140 million, Indonesia's land area is nonetheless
scattered out over a 4,000-mile archipelago of nearly 14,000 islands.
One of these, Java (including here two small adjacent islands for
statistical convenience), though only 7 percent of Indonesia's land area,
houses four hundred volcanoes, more than two-thirds of the citizenry,
and, every year, an additional one and a half million new people on the
job market. Enriched and exacerbated by languages, dialects, and
ethnic groups numbering in the many hundreds, Indonesia's social and
political fabric is possibly unparalleled in diversity and complexity.
Exultant anticipation of dramatic advance upon the liberation
from Dutch political shackles in 1949 stumbled painfully upon Cold
War rocks, imposed and ill-fitted Western "problem-solving" mechanisms, the detritus of innumerable decades of Dutch exploitation and
neglect, and recrudescent traditional conflicts. Sporadic forays toward
independent development initiatives fell repeatedly afoul the vicious
cycle of rich nation/ poor nation disparities. Today, by standard
measure of income from such exports as oil, timber, tin, copper, nickel,
bauxite, coffee, and rubber, Indonesia-it is claimed-has made ten- to
Note: Chief Justice Seno-Adji's paper was adapted for this symposium by Lawrence W.
Beer, with the author's permission. All footnotes in this chapter have been added by the
Editor and Daniel S. Lev.
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twenty-five-fold brobdingnagian leaps forward toward a better life. One
counters that the average Indonesian remains by far the poorest Asian
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has had no schooling,
and grows perhaps less literate. And oil, the biggest bubble of sophisticated early seventies enterprise, representing some three-fourths of
Indonesia's annual increment of hard dollars and cents in the bank,
imploded overnight in 1975. It now represents a lead balloon of debt,
which despite Western rescue operations will encumber Indonesia for
years to come and which challenged the most basic premises of current
governmental policy. But Indonesia is rebounding.
The paraphernalia of constitutional democracy are maintained and
occasionally elaborated or simplified, but pressures of exigency-and
protection of incumbency-at times expanded the militarization of actual governmental functioning. Parliamentary bodies and political
parties are faint shadows of their former stature, yet even at their height
were derivative, faintly foreign, uncomfortable creations in their Indonesian incarnation. And the brutal reality may be that the survival of
these institutions is irrelevant before the immediate, material challenge
to alleviate the enduring problems of everyday survival.
No less complex is Indonesia's legal order, which has undergone
considerable evolution since the revolution of 1945-1950. The formal
base of Indonesian law is the colonial version of Dutch civil law, and
the Indonesian legal system remains fundamentally within the civil law
Rechtsstaat tradition. The colonial institutional heritage, which consisted of distinct court systems for various population groups, underwent a drastic revision that began during the Japanese occupation of
1942-1945. At that time the civil courts were unified into a single, threeinstance hierarchy, now consisting of first instance courts (pengadilan
negen) at the district level, appellate courts (pengadilan tinggl) generally at the provincial level, and a supreme court of cassation (Mahkamah Agung) in Jakarta. Customary courts were eliminated by 1960.
Alongside the civil judiciary, however, there remains a nationwide
system of Islamic courts, organized under the Ministry of Religon, as
well as a system of military justice under the Ministry of Defense.
Administrative courts are provided for in the Basic Law on Judicial
Organization of 1971, but have not yet been established. The Supreme
Court has no substantial review powers, though there have been lively
debates over the issue in Indonesia's recent legal history.
Indonesia's substantive law awaits major revision. The procedural
code (H.I.R.) inherited from the colony remains in force, as does the
criminal code (K.U.H.P.). The civil and commercial codes have been
amended considerably in fact by the operation of new statutes, but
there is yet to be a successful attempt at drafting wholly new codes. In

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA

101

one area of substantive law, however-family law, particularly with
respect to inheritance-the Supreme Court itself has been a major force
for innovation.
Indonesia's turbulent political history is reflected in its constitutional evolution. The first constitution in 1945 provided for strong
executive leadership, but was set aside in favour of a parliamentary order
in the constitution of 1950, which replaced a short-lived federal constitution. The 1950 constitution was provisional, however, pending debates over a new constitution in the Constituent Assembly elected in
1955. These debates did not progress very far before the Constituent
Assembly was permanently adjourned by President Sukarno in 1959. In
July of that year the 1945 constitution was restored and remains in
effect.
DANIEL S. LEV
ROGER K. PAGET

An Indonesian Perspective on
the American Constitutional Influence
Oemar Seno Adji
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Indonesia

Indonesia's Constitutional History
While discussing the principles and elements of the Indonesian State, one
of Indonesia's founding fathers stated that in framing our Constitution
he took the Constitution of the United States of America as a basic
source for comparison. The resultant Constitution of 1945 naturally
differs from the U.S. Constitution in many respects; but one can also
find parallelism and similarities in both spirit and structure. Was this
merely coincidence, or did the U.S. Constitution have a perceptible
influence on the Indonesian Constitution of 1945? We know that the
Dutch constitutional influence was not the basic source. But these
matters should be looked at in the context of the constitutional history
of Indonesia.
Indonesia was under Dutch colonial control for centuries prior to
World War II, when it was occupied by the Japanese. In the waning
days of that war in 1945, Indonesian nationalists proclaimed Independence and promulgated what is called "the Constitution of the Proclamation State." However, the Dutch still controlled large areas of the
country, and years of struggle and negotiation passed before all of
Indonesia was free of colonial control. 1 In 1949 a provisional constitution of the United States of Indonesia was developed; but the federal
structure of this constitution was ill-suited to the needs of a nation
composed of many thousands of islands, and so this system remained in
effect only from January to August 1950. At that point, in 1950, the
Provisional Constitution of the Unitary State was promulgated. This
1950 document, like the 1945 Constitution, provided for a unitary and
parliamentary system of government. But the 1945 Constitution differs
from both the 1949 and 1950 constitutions in that it established a
presidential cabinet system of a non-parliamentary character, under
I. On the history of Indonesia's nationalist movement, see George MeT. Kahin,
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia {Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).
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which the President is both the chief executive and the head of state, as
is the President of the United States. 2
In I 959 a movement emerged demanding a return to the I945
Constitution. This movement succeeded, and since that time the I945
Constitution has been in force in Indonesia.
Underlying all the constitutions of Indonesia and binding the State
together has been an unchanging State ideology, a string of unity, the
Poncosilo (Five Principles, or pillars) oflndonesian society: (I) belief in
God; (2) a humanism which is just and civilized; (3) the unity of
Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by prudence through consultation and
representation; and (5) social justice for the whole Indonesian people. 3
The Preamble to the Constitution of I 945 states, among other things:
. . that to be independent is indeed the right of every nation and therefore every kind of colonialism in the world shall be abolished, because
it is in discord with humanity and justice. And the struggle for independence already has arrived at the blessed moment, that brings Indonesia in happiness and safety to the gate of freedom, united, sovereign,
just and prosperous.
With the blessing of God, the Almighty and by the urge of noble
desire for an independent national existence, the Indonesian people
therefore hereby declares its independence. Pursuant to this declaration,
in order to establish an Indonesian Government, which protects the
whole Indonesian nation and the whole Indonesian fatherland, to promote the public welfare, to educate the nation, and to participate in
the implementation of a world order based on independence, eternal
peace and social justice, the independence of the Indonesian nation is
established under a Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and
embodied in the structure of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance
with popular sovereignty and (the Pancasila].

It can be said that this Pancasila ideology stands unchangeable, by
whatever legal means, whether the Constitution establishes a federal
system or a unitary system, and whether the government is or is not
parliamentary.
The Five Principles of the Pancasila were formulated in the
2. A translation of the 1950 constitution can be found in R. Supomo, The
Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, trans. Garth N. Jones (Ithaca:
CMIP, 1964). A translation of the 1945 constitution can be found in DanielS. Lev, The
Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: CMIP, 1966). Formal features of the federal
structure are discussed in A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia /9451949 (Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1955). Comparative discussions and analyses of
Indonesia's three constitutions are available in A. K. Pringgodigo, The Office of
President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice,
trans. Alexander Brotherton (Ithaca: CMIP, 1957); and J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesian
Constitutions, 1945-60," in R. N. Spann, Constitutionalism in Asia (Bombay: Asia
Publishing House, I963).
3. The Pancasila originated in a speech by the late President Sukarno, on June I,
I945, during discussions of a committee whose function it was to prepare for independence as the Japanese occupation drew to an end. See Kahin, op. cit., pp. 122ff.
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Preamble of the 1945 (and current) Constitution, which also includes a
declaration of independence by the Indonesian people. A comment of
one of the framers of our Constitution, Professor Mr. Mohd. Yamin,
calls to mind the drafting of the Constitution of the United States of
America: 4
Before me is the structure of the Republic of the United States of
America, which time and again has been used as an example for several
constitutions in the world, for this is the oldest constitution existing in
the world and contains three elements: (I) the Declaration of Rights in
the city of Philadelphia ( 1774); (2) the Declaration of Independence of
July 4, 1776; (3) finally, the Constitution of the United States of
America ( 1787).

The Indonesian declaration of independence in the preamble of its
Constitution reminds one of the U.S. Declaration of Independence,
which categorically states, in the following well-known formulation,
"that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable rights ... "and "to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed." The U.S. Constitution, embodying the
principles of the Declaration, is the true beginning of modern documentary constitutionalism, and shares much in spirit with the Indonesian Constitution.
The President, the Parliament,
and the People's Consultative Assembly
Indonesia's system is one of presidential government, in which the
President is not responsible to Parliament as under a parliamentary
structure. State Ministers are answerable to the President, not to the
legislature. The legislature, like the U.S. Congress and unlike a parliamentary system, does not have the power to remove an elected President; but Indonesia differs from the United States in that it does not
have such a legal institution as "impeachment." Instead, Indonesia has
a system of presidential responsibility to the People's Consultative
Assembly, and the President cannot dissolve either this body of 920
members or the Parliament. The elucidation of the 1945 Constitution
(the so-called "Proclamation Constitution") refers to the People's Consultative Assembly as the supreme holder of State power (Die gesamte
Staatsgewalt /iegt al/ein bei der Majelis) and, from the people's standpoint, a personification of the whole Indonesian people ( Vertretungsorgan des Willens des Staatsvolkes). The People's Consultative Assembly consists of all members of Parliament (460 persons) and an
4. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Documents on the
Preparation of the 1945 Constitution. Jakarta: Yayasan Prapanca, 1959), vol. I, p. 229.
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equal number of representatives drawn from regional groups and
functional groups.s The People's Consultative Assembly defines the
broad outlines of State policy, and elects the President and VicePresident by majority vote. If the President is seen to deviate from the
Constitution and basic State policy, the Parliament can convene an
extraordinary meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly, and the
People's Consultative Assembly can remove him from office. This
happened during the late 1960s in the case of the late President
Sukarno.
The Indonesian Constitution
and Forms of Law
The American Declaration of Independence goes side by side with the
United States Constitution as a constitutional document; similarly, the
Indonesian declaration of independence found in the Preamble is
historically inseparable from the 1945 Constitution. A constitution
embodies not only legal rules but also non-legal rules which express the
spirit of the constitution, a geistlichen Hintergrund, and the atmosphere
surrounding the text of the constitution. For Indonesian constitutionmakers, the U.S. Constitution was a "documentary forerunner,'' and
Rousseau's Social Contract was a "literary forerunner" contributing to
the constitutional spirit of Indonesia.
The election of 1971 constituted the present Parliament, and the
People's Consultative Assembly, which elected President Suharto and
his Vice-President, duly specified the outline ofState Policy.6 Provisions
for periodic general elections are not laid down in the 1945 Constitution,
but are stipulated in an organic Law (loi organique) of the Constitution.
A word about the relationships between the Constitution, State Policy,
and various forms of laws is in order.
The Constitution serves as the highest form of law and the basis
and sources of all subordinate legal provisions of the State, such as
Resolutions of the People's Consultative Assembly, Laws, Government
Regulations such as Substitutional Laws, Government Regulations,
Presidential Decrees, and other implementing regulations such as a
Minister's Regulations.
The Constitution of Indonesia, under Article 37, can be amended
under the following conditions: two-thirds of the members of the
5. Functional groups include, for example, students. women, intellectuals,
labor, etc.
6. General (now President) Suharto successfully crushed the attempted coup of
September 30, 1965. He thereafter assumed authority for maintaining order and in 1967
was designated acting President by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly. He
was made President in 1968 and reelected in 1973, when the Assembly also elected the
Sultan of Yogyakarta as Vice-President. Presidential elections are held every five years.
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People's Consultative Assembly must be present during discussions of
amendment, and at least two-thirds of those present during the discussions must approve an amendment. Thus, we have a "rigid constitution." As a matter of legal policy, there has been little tendency to alter
or amend the 1945 Constitution since its reinstatement. Mor.eover,
Indonesian jurists consider the Pancasila found in the Preamble unalterable by legal process.
The 1945 Constitution is very brief, containing only thirty-seven
Articles. This Constitution provides for the establishment of the basic
State organs, such as the Executive-the President, Vice-President, and
State Ministers-the People's Consultative Assembly, the Parliament,
the Supreme Court, the Supreme Advisory Council, and the Supreme
Auditing Office. But the organization, tasks, competence, and composition of these institutions are left to the lois organiques for further
specification. The Basic Police Law, the Basic Law on Public Prosecutors, the Basic Law of the Judiciary, the Law on General Elections,
the Laws on the Composition and Powers of the Parliament and the
People's Consultative Assembly, the Laws on the Supreme Advisory
Council, and the Laws on the Supreme Auditing Office are examples of
such legislation.
A Resolution of the People's Consultative Assembly is of a higher
legal order than a Law. A Law may be seen as executing not only the
Constitution but also Resolutions of the People's Consultative Assembly. Resolutions of the People's Consultative Assembly present policy
outlines to be implemented either by legislation or, in executive matters,
by presidential decree. Thus, for example, a Resolution of the People's
Consultative Assembly in the 1960s (No. II I 1966, 1968) requires that
general elections be held that are direct, public, independent, and secret;
and that the drawing up of the necessary pursuant laws be completed
within the period oftime specified by the Resolution ofthe Assembly. At
the same time, a Resolution of the People's Consultative Assembly
ordered the Government jointly with the Parliament to issue laws
simplifying and regulating party organizations and functional
organizations.
Indeed, based on the above-mentioned Resolution of the Assembly, the Law on General Elections, the Law concerning Members of the
People's Consultative Assembly and Representative Bodies, the Laws
on the Composition and Powers of the People's Consultative Assembly,
the Parliament, and the Regional Representative Councils were subsequently issued. Furthermore, based upon said laws, the General
Election of 1971 took place and the legislative bodies were established.
The brevity of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 calls to mind a
statement made by K. C. Wheare when replying to the question "What
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should a Constitution contain?" His answer was very brief: "The very
minimum and that minimum to be rules of Law"; and at another point
he summ~d up by saying, "One essential characteristic of the ideally
best form of Constitution is that it should be as short as possible." 7
Such a perspective accords with the spirit of the "Framers of the
Constitution of Indonesia," who limited themselves to establishing the
Basic Rules in the Constitution and assigned implementation thereof to
Resolutions of the People's Consultative Assembly. The Assembly in
turn entrusts to the Government the task of their execution, in executive matters, and to the Parliament the role of legislation ( Gesetzgebung). This charge to implement Resolutions is mandatory.
"Rechtsstaat" Indonesia and
Separation of Powers
The Indonesian State is a Rechtsstaat, not a Machtstaat, a constitutional system, not an absolutist State. Textually, the Constitution of
1945 contains no explicit provision calling for a Rechtsstaat, nor is any
further information on the subject offered in the Note of Explanation of
the 1945 Constitution.
However, the Indonesian conception of Rechtsstaat, as outlined in
jurisprudence and duly adopted by the government, contains three
special characteristics. These have arisen from comparisons made
between the principles of "Rule of Law" (in a sense broader than that of
A. V. Dicey)& and "Socialist Legality," as follows:
I. Recognition and protection of fundamental rights, embodying equality in the political field, in law, and in the social, economic, cultural
and educational fields.
2. Legality, in the sense of law in all its forms.
3. An independent judiciary, which is impartial and free from the influence of any other power or force.

As discussed earlier, the State ideology on which the Indonesian
Rechtsstaat is founded is the Pancasila (Five Principles). There is
similarity here with the principles of all "Rule of Law" states, including
the United States of America, particularly as those principles have been
broadly outlined by the International Commission of Jurists. The
International Commission of Jurists focuses on both the dignity of men
and their diversity, but not so as to prejudice the three above-mentioned
special characteristics of Indonesian constitutionalism.
In the Indonesian scheme of "separation of powers," there are five
powers, not three as in the U.S. Constitution: the Executive, the
7. K. C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions (London: Oxford University Press, 1966,
2nd ed.), pp. 33-34.
8. A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London:
Macmillan, 1961, lOth ed.), p. 183.
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Legislative, and the Judicial powers, the Supreme Advisory Council,
and the Supreme Auditing Office. These powers are separate. However,
as C. F. Strong notes, the business of constitutional government is so
complex that it is difficult to define the area of each department in such
a manner as to leave each independent and supreme in its allotted
sphere. 9 As an example, let us look briefly at the status of the Indonesian judiciary.
With respect to the courts of the Unitary Indonesian State, an
independent judiciary is one essential element of Indonesian constitutionalism. Article 24 of the Constitution stipulates that judicial power
shall be vested in the Supreme Court and such subordinate courts as
may be established by law, and that the organization and competence of
those courts shall be provided by law. A high point and crowning
achievement in judicial development came with the Basic Law of the
Judiciary in 1970.10 Courts of four different jurisdictions are established: Ordinary Courts of general jurisdiction, Religious Courts., Military Courts, and Administrative Courts. The Supreme Court, at the
pinnacle, holds exclusive jurisdiction over cases in cassation. The courts
are independent and free in carrying out their functions. But following
civil law traditions, rather than American common law tradition, the
Supreme Court does not have the power of judicial review over acts of
the executive or legislative branches of government, though it may
review regulations that are pursuant to legislative acts. Laws may be
interpreted, but not reviewed as in American judicial practice.
Indonesia does not have a body like the Conseil Constitutionelle of
France, which can rule on the constitutionality of organic laws before
their promulgation and on regulations of the parliamentary assemblies
before they are first applied. Neither is there found in Indonesia what is
called the Bundesverfassungs-gericht, or Constitutional Court, as in
West Germany, which has the competence to exercise judicial review of
the laws, and whose own position must be made to accord with that of
the Supreme Court, the highest tribunal.
In judicial decision-making, we rely upon a combination of code
law (in the civil law tradition), legislation, and jurisprudence more than
upon case law or precedent. However, Indonesian courts also follow
adat law (customary law) and enforce it in private disputes; this reminds
us of the common law and the law of equity. In this respect, our
approach to adat law in the courts places us in a unique intermediate
position between civil law courts and common law courts. As Professor
ter Haar has noted, the codification and court system under Indonesian
9. C. F. Strong, Modern Political Constitutions (London: Sidgwick and Jackson,
1958, 5th ed.), pp. 255-256.
10. Law 14/1970, Lembaran Negara (State Gazette) no. 74, elucidation no. 2951.
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statutory law is akin to the civil law system of Continental Europe, but
Indonesia's unwritten law resembles more the common law system and
the law of equity. 11
Fundamental Rights in
Indonesian Constitutionalism
Finally, the Indonesian Constitution, like that of the United States,
guarantees the freedom of opinion, expression, and religion, and
provides for equality before the law. (Article 27 provides that all
citizens are equal before the law and in government and shall without
exception respect the law and the government.) But as with the history
of United States "separate but equal" doctrine until 1954, our history,
society, and politics have conditioned the meaning of these principles in
Indonesia.
It is interesting to us that while our Basic Press Law upholds the
notion of "a free and responsible press," as recommended by the
American Commission on the Freedom of the Press chaired by Robert
Hutchins, the press in the United States takes a more libertarian view of
its functions. Furthermore, there are guarantees of press freedom in
both the U.S. Constitution (First Amendment) and the U.S.S.R.
Constitution (Article 25), but principles and performance are in fact
quite different in the two countries. Our press has observed at close
hand both authoritarian and libertarian conceptions in practice, and
Indonesia's law and journalists favor stress on the idea of the social
responsibility of the press, a free and responsible press.
As mentioned earlier, belief in God is a basic principle of our
constitutional State, and freedom of religion is guaranteed. Our historical experience leads us to a more positive affirmation of God than
is accepted by the American constitutional notion of freedom of
religion.'2 There does not exist in Indonesia a "wall of separation of
Church and State," rigidly dogmatic in character and without flexibility, such as that found in the rulings of the United States Supreme
Court and the Criminal Code of the U.S.S.R. Neither is there in
Indonesia a "separation" ( Trennung) that glorifies the separation ( vom
Staat und Kirche) in such a way as to encourage anti-God and antireligious conceptions and laws, as in the U.S.S.R. Such a spirit would
II. Of works available in English on Indonesia adat law the most prominent is B.
ter Haar, A dar Law in Indonesia (New York: IPR, 1948), a translation from the Dutch by
E. Adamson Hoebel and A. Arthur Schiller.
12. Indonesia is predominantly an Islamic country, with perhaps 90 percent of the
population professing to be Muslims, but with varying degrees of devoutness. Hinduism,
Catholicism, and Protestantism also have substantial followings and are recognized by
the Ministry of Religion, whose fundamental responsibilities, however, have mainly to do
with Islam. The political party system has traditionally been organized in part around
religious symbols, and religious conflict has been endemic.
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be contrary to that found in the legal life of Indonesia. Indonesia
accepts the principle of "non-preferential treatment" of all religions
existing in Indonesia, but does not recognize the unity of State and
Church (Einheit von Staat und Kirche). There is neither separation nor
unity of Church and State; the secular and the spiritual are distinguishable, but they flow together.
In conclusion then, along with the historical influence noted above
of the Declaration of Independence and the constitution of the United
States, I can say there are both similarities and differences in the
Indonesian and U.S. Constitutions deriving from the historical and
political development and the aspirations and ideologies of our two
states.

VI

Japan

Editorial Note

Japan is an ancient Northeast Asian country composed of the four
main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu, and thousands of small islands. In its premodern history, Japan was usually
isolated from substantial external contacts, but is now actively trading
with virtually all the nations of the world. No noteworthy in-migration
of foreign peoples has occurred in recorded Japanese history, apart
from the forced immigration of Koreans for war labor purposes before
1945. For many centuries the Japanese people have been remarkable
for their racial, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity. Since her
defeat in World War II (1945) Japan has been pacifist, in principle,
preference, and international practice, while becoming the world's
third-ranking economic power and a leader in science, technology,
education, and the arts. Japan and the United States carry on the
largest overseas trade in human history.
Japan is a bit smaller than California, and only 15 percent of the
land area can be farmed. About 80 percent of the 113 million people on
the islands live in urban environments. Japan is extraordinarily dependent on imports of food, industrial raw materials, and energy resources.
Her economy is oriented toward mass consumption and the export of
sophisticated manufactured goods.
Note: Footnotes have been added by Ronald G. Brown, who adapted Professor Ukai's
paper for this symposium. Professor Ukai then edited the chapter and notes.
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For almost a century, except during an interlude of firm-handed
military rule (ca. 1930-1945) and foreign expansion, Japan has chosen
to establish its system of law upon a constitutional form of government.
Since the forced opening of Japan to Western commerce and influence
in the 1850s, foreign categories have shaped the form, but not necessarily the content, of the legal system. Partly because of the changes to
dominance of German legal influence in the late nineteenth century and
of American legal impact after 1945, Japan has experienced two constitutions whose texts are fundamentally different in their visions of
national policy.
The first modern constitution, adopted in February 1889, came
after nearly two and a half centuries in which a fairly strong central
government (Tokugawa), presiding over hundreds of feudal domainS,
felt no need to set forth national ideals in a constitutional document.
Although Tokugawa law, feudal house law, and local customary law
constituted a sophisticated legal system, the only premodern constitution-like document in Japanese history was the seventeen articles
drafted by Prince Shotoku in A.D. 604 which exhorted the nation to
respect the Emperor and to follow certain moral principles. In the
Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1889), the Emperor Meiji was
"restored" (Meiji ishin) formally to his proper place as the nation's real,
not merely ritual sovereign. So it was said, but others continued to rule
Japan in the Emperor's name. The institutional forms were based, in
part, on the studies of officials and law students who had traveled to
Germany, France, and the United States. Legally protected opportunities for popular participation under the constitutional scheme were
rather narrow, but its major characteristics won approbation from
leading European and American legal scholars.
If the first constitution was foreign inspired, the second constitution may be said to have been foreign induced. Within five months after
the end of World War II, various constitutional revisions suggested by
the Japanese government to the American Occupation authorities were
rejected. However, after only one more month of Occupation-supervised constitution-writing, a document was produced which established
far-reaching protections of equality, freedom, and political participation. The Constitution of Japan (Nihonkoku Kempa) became effective,
without major changes, about a year later in the spring of 1947.
Certain features of the 1889 Constitution may still be found in the
1947 Constitution. The Emperor remains, but as a "symbol of the unity
of the people." Both documents provide guarantees of freedom of
expression, but the Meiji Constitution contains more restrictive qualifying clauses. Significantly, neither constitution was instituted on popular
demand; rather, the 1889 Constitution was an imperial gift, while that
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of 1947 was approved by the Diet and the Occupation authorities.
The present Constitution enumerates the basic rights of the people
in thirty-one articles (Chapter III). It expressly provides for rights of
univeral adult suffrage (Article I 5), education for all (Article 26),
freedom to travel (Article 22), and collective bargaining (Article 28),
rights which in the United States, by comparison, have only been
recognized as the result of judicial interpretation, laws, or constitutional amendment-not in the original Constitution itself. Other provisions in Japan's Constitution have yet to be adopted in the United
States or widely accepted elsewhere. For example, Article 9 is unique in
expressly renouncing war as a right or an instrument of national policy;
and in other countries, provisions like Article 24, which upholds the
"equality of the sexes," are still in dispute.
In Japan, as elsewhere, gaps exist between constitutional rights in
the text and in actual practice. Nevertheless, there is little influential
talk of rewriting or scrapping the present Constitution. In fact, it is
remarkable that despite heavy doses of foreign influence, neither constitution was or has been changed by amendment.
If the direction of Japanese constitutional law is to change toward
a restriction or strengthening of individual rights, the evolution most
likely will come about through interpretations by an independent
judiciary. Judges are constitutionally independent in administration
and decision-making under the Supreme Court, but are bound by the
Constitution (Article 76). The courts, in tandem with other forces in
Japan's political and economic life, will decide whether the Constitution will continue as a living and maturing document or will become but
a dead letter whose precepts have outlived their historical usefulness.
August 1977

RONALD G. BROWN

The Significance of the
Reception of American Constitutional
Institutions and Ideas in Japan
N obushige Ukai
Professor of Public Law, Senshu University

Japan's Modern Constitutional History
Commodore Perry's visit to Japan in 1853 was the fanfare to the
opening of a nation which had been closed to most outside influences,
especially that of modern Western civilization, for more than two
hundred years. The issue of the opening of Japan resulted in a split of
its leadership between two factions. One side supported the idea to open
the country to foreign influence. The other continued to believe in the
divine nature of Japan and strongly advocated the slogan "Respect the
Emperor and repel the barbarians!"I
In several instances, the threat of military force was necessary to
convince the more militant, anti-Western, feudal lords who controlled
Japan prior to Perry's visit. However, in one of history's little ironies,
those who earlier were so insistent on resisting the encroachment of the
West were the first to turn toward the adoption of Western-like institutions with admiration and to eagerly receive all the blessings that such
a society might provide.
The aim of the Meiji Restoration in 1867 was to restore the formal
powers of government to the Emperor, who was only a symbolic
figurehead under the prior feudal system. Nevertheless, much day-today political power remained in the hands of samurai leaders from two
prominent clans (Satsuma and Choshu) who served as the Emperor's
advisors. Immediately, they adopted an American type of organizational system in their government, which attempted to incorporate the
spirit of democracy by institutionalizing the election of government
officials.2 Later, when a Western type of electoral system of legislature
I. W. G. Beasley, The Modern History of Japan (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1963), pp. 85-87.
2. Ibid., p. 132. The organization of the Meiji era government, established January
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was adopted, squabbles among political parties and government efforts
to dictate voting behavior were notorious.
In 1889, the year before the first elections for the lower house of the
Japanese parliament were carried out, a written constitution was
promulgated by the Emperor as the "Constitution of the Empire of
Japan." Based on the monarchy-focused constitutions of Germany and
Austria in that period, the document was drafted by a group of
bureaucrats, led by Prince Hirobumi Ito, who believed both in imperial
sovereignty and in authoritarian administration.3 It was this vision of
government which established a pseudo-constitutional monarchy that
Jed, after a series of assassinations and revolts, to the takeover of the
government by the militarists in the 1930s, ultimately a deplorable war,
and then the subsequent surrender in 1945.
The text for Japan's modern-day Constitution was drafted by staff
members of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers (SCAP), and then, in effect, given to the
Japanese. It was officially promulgated in 1946 and became fully effective in May 1947. The new Constitution is generally a mixture of
American and British constitutions; its scope is quite unlike the basic
emphasis of the Meiji Constitution, since it embodies the principle of
popular sovereignty.4
In adjusting to the postwar Constitution, Japan clearly has evolved
political and legal institutions which at times accelerate Western constitutional tendencies while in great part retaining the vitality of the
indigenous forces of the Japanese social context. We can briefly
consider examples of this phenomenon. First, if we look at the political
scene, we can find that the General Headquarters of SCAP in 1945
encouraged Japan to adopt the American model of a strong legislature
3, 1868, revolved around "three offices" (sanshoku): (I) a General Director, the post
occupied by an imperial prince; (2) a group of Conferees, consisting of court nobles and
some daimyo, the feudal lords in the earlier period; and (3) a group of Councilors,
including many young samurai, the military leaders.
3. For a comparative analysis of pre-1945 and present-day Japanese constitutionalism, see "Introduction," H. Itoh and L. W. Beer, The Constitutional Case Law of
Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978). See also Nobutaka Ike, Beginnings of Political Democrac)' in Japan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 171-180,
188-191; Kenzo Takayanagi, "A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese
Law, 1868-1961," in Arthur T. Von Mehren (ed.), Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a
Changing Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); and Yosiyuki Noda,
Introduction to Japanese La~·· translated from French by A. H. Angelo (University of
Tokyo Press, 1976). An Enghsh translation of the Meiji Constitution can be found in
Hideo Tanaka, assisted by M. D. H. Smith, The Japanese Legal System (University of
Tokyo Press, 1976), p. 16.
4. The Emperor is regarded as the symbolic leader of the State, but his position is
derived from the will of the people. The Constitution of Japan (1947), art. I (hereafter
cited as Constitution).
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like the U.S. Congress. But although the present Japanese system is a
combination of the British parliamentary government and the American theories of separation of powers between executive and legislature,
the daily operations of government are controlled by a strong Cabinet.
In a similar way, the Japanese legal system also has selectively
adopted Western ideas. Supposedly, the Occupation in 1945 was initiated upon Japan's so-called unconditional surrender. But, actually, the
legal terms were not strictly unconditional. The conditions in the
Potsdam Declaration and the basic principles in the postwar
Constitution itself established that the Japanese government should
henceforth faithfully observe fundamental freedoms, such as freedom
of religion, thought, and the press. With its many centuries of tradition of strong government, Japan was not prepared for this sudden
burst of freedoms. But because of the importance of these rights the
Supreme Court's job of interpreting such fundamental freedoms in the
Japanese context has taken on added significance.
In both the political and the legal sphere, the example of the
United States has been instructive for comparative purposes. In the
United States, Cabinet members do not initiate bills directly in the
Congress. Similarly, in Japan, there is a theory that the Cabinet lacks
power to initiate bills in the Diet, the two-house Japanese parliament
(consisting of a House of Representatives and a House of Councilors).
This theory, however, is quite different from the Meiji Constitution,
which expressly provided for "government bills" on the principle that
legislative power was in the hands of the Emperor with the consent of
the Diet.5 Furthermore, there was a clear provision in the law of the
Diet that "government bills" would be considered prior to deliberation
of any individually sponsored bills.6 In practice, the present situation
has changed so that both the Cabinet and the Diet have legislative
bureaus which help prepare bills for consideration. As in Britain,
however, there may be little real difference between a "government bill"
and a "member's bill" of the majority party since the majority party
controls the Cabinet. 7
Judicial Review in Japan
In regard to judicial powers, we can make further useful comparisons
with the United States to illustrate. In the United States, the doctrine of
judicial review by which the Supreme Court has the power to review
legislative actions was announced by the Court itself in Marbury v.
5. The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 1889, Art. 38.
6. The Diet Law (Kokkai ho) of 1890, Art. 26.
7. Concerning delicate intra- as well as inter-party politics, see Hans Baerwald,
Japan's Parliament (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 82-102.
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Madison,s rather than explicitly stipulated in the U.S. Constitution. By
contrast, the postwar Japanese Constitution expressly sets forth the
power of judicial review of acts of the Diet as well as review of administrative rules and official acts. 9 Probably because the doctrine is so
clearly stated in the Japanese Constitution, the Supreme Court has
been extremely careful in declaring laws invalid. Prior to 1976, for
example, the Japanese Supreme Court had not followed the lead of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 1o in which the judicially imposed
barrier of "political questions" was removed to permit review of
legislative reapportionment cases. On April 14, 1976, the Japanese
Supreme Court found that the apportionment provisions of the Election Law were unconstitutional," since they were contrary to the
principle of political equality guaranteed by Article 14 of the
Constitution.' 2
Up to this point, I have commented generally on the development
of political and legal institutions that were adopted along with the
postwar Japanese Constitution. Beyond this initial discussion, however,
it is also instructive to consider the evolution in interpretations of the
Constitution as practiced by the lawyers and judges in Japan. In
particular, I feel that this is a good time to reconsider the legacy of the
Occupation in the light of fundamental concepts of political liberty in
the United States.
In 1949, the United States Cultural Mission, composed of five
distinguished American professors (including Professor Edwin 0. Reischauer), visited Japan. In its subsequent report, the scholarly panel
touched upon the importance of securing a greater degree of freedom in
Japan. They felt that, because of Japan's past record of direct government interference in universities, it was necessary to take extraordinary
precautions to insure the continuing intellectual freedom of scholars.l3
In a country like Japan, which has a long history of absolute
government control and strict limitations on basic civil rights, a much
larger degree of freedom should be recognized by the courts, perhaps
8. I Cranch 137 (1803). Concerning judicial review in Japan generally, see John M.
Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964),
pp. 306-348 passim; and Tanaka, op. cit. (note 3 above), pp. 686-694.
9. Constitution, Art. 81.
10. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Concerning "political questions" in Japan generally, see
Dan F. Henderson (ed.), The Constitution of Japan: Its First Twenty Years, /947-67
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), pp. 125, 145, 165.
II. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Supervision Commission, Hanrei
Jiho (No. 808) 24 (Sup. Ct., G. B., April 14, 1976).
12. Constitution, art. 14 (1): "All of the people are equal under the law and there
shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed,
sex, social status or family origin." See also the discussion in the text at note 35.
13. Civil Information and Education Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, Report of the U.S. Cultural Science Mission to Japan, January 1949, pp. 101-6.
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more even than in the United States. In a country that does not have a
tradition of basic freedoms, the people cannot be expected to exercise
their rights to the fullest extent immediately. In Japan, even the
slightest limitation on these freedoms may cause the people to back
away from asserting their rights, thus creating a much greater restrictive effect than is actually applied by the courts. This kind of effect is
what the United States Cultural Mission was referring to in its report. It
is in this area that the influence of the United States experience can play
a vital role.
During its first thirty years, the postwar Japanese Supreme Court
has decided in only two cases that laws were unconstitutional after it
was claimed that basic rights were infringed. The often stated judicial
pretext for this exceptionally careful attitude is that the Diet should be
the sole authority to decide the extent of legislative acts.
In the first instance in which a law or a State action was found
unconstitutional the case centered on a provision in the Customs Law
that permitted confiscation of goods and ships which were owned by
third parties and used in illegal customs activities. The Court ruled that
such confiscation could occur only when the third party had prior
knowledge that the goods were used illegally. 14 The Court concluded
that without notice and a hearing the provision in Article 31 of the
Constitution for due process of law had been violated. In 1963, the Diet
passed an additional law which now provides for detailed procedures,
including notice and a hearing, before confiscation is permitted of
property held by a third party in customs cases.Is
The second case concerned a defendant who was raped by her
father, bore several children, and was coerced into continuing the
irregular relationship even after she had a chance to start a normal,
married life. She was convicted of murdering her father under the
.. patricide provision" of the Japanese Criminal Code, which calls for a
more severe penalty in cases of patricide than in other cases of murder
or manslaughter.I6 In 1950, the Court had rendered a decision in a
similar case, declaring that the "patricide provision" was constitutional
14. Nakamura eta/. v. Japan, II Keishu (No. 16) 1593 (Sup. Ct., G. B., November
28, 1962). An English translation of this decision can be found in ltoh and Beer, op. cit.,
Case 7. See also Nobushige Ukai and Nathaniel L. Nathanson, "Protection of Property
Rights and Due Process of Law in the Japanese Constitution," in Henderson, op. cit.,
pp. 248-250.
15. Emergency Measure on Confiscation Procedure as to Third Party Possession in
Criminal Matters (Keiji jiken ni okeru daisansha shoyubursu no bosshu tetsuzuki ni
kansuru okyu sochi hO), Law No. 138 of 1963.
16. Article 199 of the Criminal Code specifies that the penalty in murder cases can
range from a minimum sentence of three years in prison to a maximum sentence of death.
However, in patricide cases, which are governed by Article 200, only the alternative
sentences of life imprisonment or death can be given by the judge.
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on the grounds that the distinction between patricide and other forms
of homicide was reasonable, and therefore differently assigned penalties
did not impair the "equality under the law" provision in Article 14 of
the Constitution. In that decision, only two dissenting opinions were
filed among the fifteen justices participating. 17 However, in 1973, given
the facts as stated above, the Supreme Court reversed itself and found
that another "patricide provision" was contrary to Article 14. 18 It is
interesting that although the decision was nearly unanimous (except for
one dissent based on precedent by Justice Takezo Shimoda, former
ambassador to the United States), the rationale for the decision was
divided into two points of view. Eight justices representing a clear
majority on the court, led by Chief Justice Kazuto Ishida, reasoned that
since the penalty for patricide was too heavy, it could not be deemed
constitutional. 19 Six other justices, a progressive group headed by
Justice Jiro Tanaka, argued that the "patricide provision" was per se
unconstitutional because establishing separate treatments and applying
unequal penalties according to family linear relationships was inherently a violation of Article 14. The concurring opinion stated that
the "patricide provision" reflected an undemocratic tendency remaining
from the Chinese codes and from the Tokugawa era of Jaw, which was
in effect just before the opening of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century
-a tendency which could not be tolerated in a modern democratic
nation such as Japan.
The effect of these two cases declaring Jaws unconstitutional is not
clear. In theory, we can say either that the decisions result in the
elimination of the offending unconstitutional provision from the text of
the Jaws or that the decisions merely bind only further cases which
appear before the courts. However, in my opinion, decisions of uncon17. Japan v. Yamato, 4 Keishii(No. 10) 2126 (Sup. Ct., G.B., October 25, 1950). See
Maki, op. cit. (n. 8 above), pp. 129-155.
18. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Keishii(No. 3) 256 (Sup. Ct., G.B., April4, 1973). See John
0. Haley, "Recent Developments-Constitutionality of Penalty Under Article 200 of the
Penal Code for Killing of Lineal Ascendant," 6 Law in Japan: An Annua/(1973), pp. 173174. While the court in Aizawa found the patricide provision in Article 200 of the Penal
Code unconstitutional, this decision did not upset the result in Yamato that the similar
provision in Article 205 of the Code was constitutional. Therefore, in a later case brought
under Article 205 (which establishes a comparatively severe penalty for accidental
patricide), the Supreme Court declared that provision constitutional. Matsui v. Japan, 28
Keishii (No. 6) 329 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, September 26, 1974).
19. If a defendant surrenders voluntarily, his sentence of life imprisonment,
according to Articles 42 and 68 of the Criminal Code, is automatically mitigated to a
seven-year term, and later, according to individual circumstances, under Articles 66, 71,
and 68 of that Code, can be reduced further to a term of half of that period, i.e., only three
and a half years. However, further mitigation of sentence, such as stay of execution,
cannot be granted, since it is possible only when the assessed sentence is three years or
less. Therefore, no such mitigation in penalty could apply to patricide cases, since only life
imprisonment or death are alternative sentences.
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stitutionality can be applied only to the actual parties affected by the
decisions. Differences in opinion among the justices as to the precise
ruling can be resolved by positive action by the Diet to clear up
ambiguities. For instance, it is necessary for the Diet either to strike a
provision from the code or to reduce penalties assigned to infractions
under the law to meet judicial objections of unconstitutionality. Until
the Diet acts, the possibility remains that the same question might again
be brought before the Supreme Court.
With regard to legal theories about the effect of a law that is
declared unconstitutional and with regard to other types of legal
questions, the Japanese judicial system could learn a great deal from the
constitutional experience of the United States. Today, in the Japanese
courts, we can find arguments about basic theories of U.S. constitutional law, such as "void on its face," "void for vagueness," and "prior
restraint," which can be used as the rationale to strike down or limit
laws which, if enforced, would be unjustly applied against fundamental
human rights. Leading U.S. cases which have shaped these theories are
often cited by the courts, opposing attorneys, and scholars in both law
and political science.2o In such a climate, I think that the need for
specific decisions by Japanese courts which guarantee fundamental civil
rights is evident, and, furthermore, I believe that the Supreme Court
can best assume this responsibility. But what form should this responsibility take? Using examples from individual cases, I should like
to indicate two points which seem important for clarification about the
areas into which the Supreme Court must move in order to guarantee
basic civil rights.
The "Dual Standard" Principle
and the "Public Welfare"
First of all, the Court must provide more clarifying distinctions between
property rights and personal rights. A "dual standard" approach would
apply different approaches to these two kinds of fundamental rights,
since there are genuine differences between rights derived from a
tangible or economic basis and those derived from an intangible or
moral basis. Both of these ideas are tied to the concept of "public
welfare," an expression developed in the American constitutional experience. In the United States, the battle in legal thinking was between
lawyers who believed that the U.S. Constitution protected the freedom
of contract and enabled unrestricted disposition of property, and the
lawmakers who believed that principles of social rights implied in the
20. Among the commonly cited U.S. cases are Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
( 1960), statute required membership reports, and Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 ( 1964), passport statute found restrictive of right to travel.
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same document required legislation to control big business in order to
help the less fortunate in society. An intermediary position would argue
that fundamental rights can be restricted if the public welfare demands
it. However, in the sphere of personal civil liberties, no restrictions
should be imposed. Such guarantees should be more or less absolute, as
in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In actual practice,
only the guarantees of economic rights should be limited by the phrase
"public welfare."
In a general way, the Japanese Constitution appears to be sympathetic toward the "dual standard" principle. Based on the United States
experience, the drafters of the Constitution were astute enough to place
the "public welfare" limit on human rights in two separate articles.
Article 22 guarantees the freedoms of residence and occupation, but
only "to the extent that [they] do not interfere with the public welfare."21 Article 29 guarantees the right to own or hold property, but
only "in conformity with the public welfare.'' The insertion of the
"public welfare" concept, especially in the light of the prior history in
the United States of constitutional disputes about economic and social
rights, was a wise precaution. On the other hand, the deletion of the
words "due" and "property" in Article 31, which describes the freedoms
of "life" and "liberty" that may not be taken away from a "person,"
clarifies the state of the law. This article makes it clear that restrictions
on property should be considered separately from questions about due
process of law, thus precluding Japan from the difficulties encountered
in the United States when the Supreme Court declared that an early
child labor law was unconstitutional.22 In Japan, the presence of the
"public welfare" language in Article 29 considerably strengthens the
impact of Article 31. An alternative interpretation, perhaps more
generally accepted, suggests that, although Article 31 guarantees "life"
21. General provisions concerning the "public welfare'" are found in the Constitution, Arts. 12 and 13: "Article 12. The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by
this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall
refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for
utilizing them for the public welfare. Article 13. All of the people shall be respected as
individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent
that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in
legislation and in other governmental affairs." Concerning the public welfare clause in
relation to civil liberties, see Lawrence W. Beer, "Freedom of Expression in Japan with
Comparative Reference to the United States," in R. P. Claude (ed.), Comparative Human
Rights (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 99.
22. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). After the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down child labor legislation based on the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, the Congress attempted to circumvent the decision by regulations through the
use of the congressional power to tax and at one time even considered a constitutional
amendment. However, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court
questioned the wisdom of the Hammer decision and upheld minimum wage provisions
based on the commerce power.
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and "liberty" but not "property," the rights of property are nevertheless
an authentic part of liberty, since they are implicitly guaranteed. By this
view, the guarantee of "due process of law" is nothing more than the allencompassing "by the law of the land," which is found in the British
tradition. The difficulty with this interpretation is whether it can be said
that, even if the key word "property" is eliminated, the same "due
process of law" guarantee still prevails. Despite the general acceptance
of the view of implicit guarantees, I still believe that the drafters
displayed wisdom and foresight in the selective insertion and exclusion
of key words.
Whichever interpretation is accepted, one can still observe that the
"dual standard" approach is maintained in constitutional litigation in
Japan. However, since it is not always easy to identify whether a
particular freedom should be classified as a property right or a personal
right, various cases have brought about a mixture of results. For
example, in a case involving the regulation of pharmaceuticals, the
Supreme Court declared that a law restricting the minimum distance
between two pharmacies was unconstitutional because it infringed upon
the guarantee of freedom of occupation in Article 22 of the Constitution.23 The Court reasoned that the distance requirement lacked a
necessary and rational relationship to the purpose, which was to
prevent the distribution of inferior medicines.2 4 In a different case, a
majority of the Court reached a contrary result, rejecting the claim that
a basic freedom had been impaired. The majority decision sustained a
penal provision 25 which regulated the distribution of books when the
purpose was to control the expression of obscenity.26 One indication
that the results in these two cases are not easily reconcilable is the fact
that some justices in the latter case filed strong dissents.
Japan's Supreme Court on
Individual Rights and Liberties
A second area which requires clarification in discussing the future
direction of the Japanese Supreme Court centers on the applicability of
constitutional guarantees to relationships among private citizens. This
area appears to be quite sensitive. Apparently, a theory that would
directly apply such guarantees has little support. But some urgent
23. Pharmaceutical Law ( Yakuji hO), Law No. 145 of 1960, Art. 6 (2), (4).
24. K. K. Sumil'oshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture. Saibansho Jiho (No.
665) (Sup. Ct., G.
April 30, 1975). See also John 0. Haley, "The Freedom to Choose
an Occupation and the Constitutional Limits of Legislative Discretion," Law in Japan:
An Annual 8 (1975), pp. 188-204, which includes a translation of the decision.
25. Criminal Code (Keiho), Law No. 45 of 1907, Art. 175.
26. Ishii eta/. v. Japan, 10 Keishil(No. 23) 1239 (Sup. Ct., G.B., October 15, 1969).
For a translation of the famous De Sade Decision, see H. ltoh and L. W. Beer, op. cit. (n.
3 above), Case 26.
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problems, such as matters in which private discrimination is alleged,
can be resolved by the indirect application of such guarantees. In
particular, the use of the judicial principle of "state action" as conceived
by the United States seems attractive to Japan in this respect.27 The
"state action" principle is based on the premise that private actions can
be regulated to the extent that private agreements will be enforced
through decisions by the courts. Essentially, the principle combines the
best of both the direct and indirect application methods. The principle
may not be as all encompassing as the direct approach, but at the same
time it is stronger than the indirect approach. I can best explain my
point of view by looking at some recent cases before the Japanese
Supreme Court. These cases, in general, indicate the need for more
judicial recognition of civil liberties. All three of the following cases
deal with incidents arising from employment relationships.
For convenience, we can refer to the first of these examples as the
Post Office Employees Case. The defendants, officers of the Post Office
Employees Union, were given criminal penalties for urging workers at
the Tokyo Central Post Office to participate in a union meeting during
working hours. Their efforts resulted in thirty-seven postal employees
leaving their working place. For our purposes here, the significance of
the case is whether the rights of the convicted union leaders to assemble
the work force should have been constitutionally protected by the
Supreme Court.
Two legal provisions are relevant to the case. First of all, Article 28
of the Japanese Constitution guarantees the right of workers to organize and act collectively. However, a special provision in the law
governing workers in the postal service provides a penalty for those
who obstruct postal service activities.2s
According to the Supreme Court decision, labor rights, alihough
guaranteeed as fundamental human rights, are not absolute in character, but may be restricted within constitutional limits. A majority of the
Court viewed the Constitution as requiring an equilibrium between
property rights and labor rights. The approach is flexible and purpose
oriented. In its view, the rational constitutional balance would apply
restrictions on labor only within a "necessary minimum." Although
acknowledging that public employees generally are denied the right to
strike, 29 the majority reasoned that an obstruction caused by a strike,
27. In the United States, the "state action" principle was initially applied to deny the
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in a property sale agreement, She/lev v.
Kraemer 334 U.S. I (1948). A narrower statement of the principle requires that the state
must be invo~ve~ "to some significant extent" before private conduct will be regulated,
Burton v. W1lmmgton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
28. Postal Law (Yubin hO), Law No. 165 of 1947, Art. 78.
29. Public Enterprise Labor Relations Law (Ko k l'o kigvotaito rodo kankei ho)
Law No. 257 of 1948, Art. 17 (I).
0

0

•
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even if illegal, would be justified if it was not accompanied by violence.
Since the applicable laws did not provide explicitly for a criminal
penalty in the case of an illegal strike, the punishment assessed against
the defendants could not be sustained. Therefore, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's decision which convicted the defendants, on
the grounds that the only proper sanctions were discharge from employment or civil compensation, not a criminal penalty.Jo
By contrast, the minority view provides a rigid, harsh, and textoriented approach which we can find repeated in later decisions. The
minority, looking at the strict language of the relevant laws,3t argued
that, since the right to strike was prohibited in the Public Enterprise
Labor Relations Law and a criminal penalty for obstructing the postal
service was specified in the Postal Service Law, the two statutes read
together left no room for denying the illegality of the defendants'
actions.
The same patterns in judicial approach, alternating between flexibility and rigidity, can be seen in the series of decisions in the Sarufutsu
case. The town of Sarufutsu, having a population of about 5,000
persons, lies on the extreme tip of Hokkaido, the large island in the
northernmost part of Japan. The case, again involving a post office
employee, dealt with a conviction under a provision of the National
Public Employees Law which generally prohibits political activities of
national government employees.32 For putting up political posters in his
spare time, the employee was convicted in the initial judicial proceeding
in the summary court and fined 5,000 yen (now about $20).
In this instance, a more flexible approach to basic freedoms was
based on the principle of the "least restrictive alternative," an American
legal doctrine, which was submitted in a brief by Professor Nobuyoshi
Ashibe of Tokyo University. The theory, which also is sometimes
described in terms of the "less drastic means" or the "less offensive
alternative," is designed to enable the court to choose a reasonable, less
difficult course in applying the law in order to sidestep the particular
problems of constitutional questions.33 In this instance, the Sapporo
High Court adopted the principle in order to declare the public service
law unconstitutional only insofar "as applied" to the facts here.34
30. Sotoyama v. Japan, 8 Keishii(No. 20) 901 (Sup. Ct., G. B., October 26, 1966).

31. Ibid.
32. National Public Employees Law (Kokka komuin ho), Law No. 120 of 1947, Art.
102 (1). See also Lawrence W. Beer, "Recent Developments-Constitutionality of
Restricting the Freedom of Expression of Public Employees," 8 Law in Japan: An
Annual (1975), pp. 205-8.

33. The criteria by which the U.S. Supreme Court may choose to apply a "least
restrictive alternative" rather than face a constitutional question directly appear in the
concurring opinion of Justice Louis Brandeis in Ash wander v. TV A. 297 U.S. 288 ( 1936).
34. Japan v. Ozawa, Hanrei Jiho(No. 560) 30 (Sapporo High Court, June 24, 1969).
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However, a newly emerging majority on the Supreme Court, which
favored the rigid approach, led to a reversal of the High Court decision.
The Court held that since government employees must be politically
neutral in order to retain the trust of the public, prohibitions on certain
political activities by government employees did not exceed the limits of
reasonable, necessary, and unavoidable restrictions on freedom of
expression under the Constitution.35 As a result, the Court refused to
loosen the restrictions on a basic freedom enjoyed by all other workers
in Japan except public employees. Control in Japan over a government
worker's political activities continues to be much stricter than in
Western countries.
As a final example of recent Supreme Court cases dealing with civil
liberties, we can consider the implications of the Mitsubishi Plastic
Company case. In this instance, a graduate of Tohoku University
successfully passed a placement examination at the plastic company
and was subsequently hired on a trial basis. At the end of the test
period, however, he was denied permanent employment on the grounds
that he had failed to disclose his political activities as a student. The
Supreme Court ruled on the case as a matter of law, but remanded to
the lower court on a question of fact-finding as to what the plaintiff
employee had actually said in the placement interview and what he
actually had done politically while a student.36
The precise question of law concerns whether a prospective employer may properly investigate a job applicant's creed or thought and
then require the applicant to report these matters. A unanimous
Supreme Court ruled that an enterprise, by denying employment on the
basis of an applicant's thought or creed, does not necessarily act
illegally. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited a law which
guarantees that laborers will not be discriminated against because of
their creed, 37 but it narrowly read the provision as not applying to job
applicants. Hence, an employer may freely choose his employees.
Furthermore, the Court noted, a reserve clause which gives an employer
the right to dismiss an employee after a trial period of evaluation and a
background investigation is proper within reasonable limits.
A short while ago, an out-of-court settlement was reached in this
case. The former employee was rehired, received the equivalent of
thirteen years of back pay and additional consolation payments totaling
35. Japan v. Ozawa, 28 Keishii (No. 9) 393 (Sup. Ct., G.B., November 6, 1974).
36. Takano v. Mitsubishi Jiishi K. K., 27 Minshii 1536 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 12,
1973). See "Recent Developments-Constitutional Law-Applicability of Civil Rights
and Freedom of Thought Clauses to Conduct of Private Parties," 7 Law in Japan: An
Annua/151 ( 1974). Constitution," Art. 19. Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be
violated."
37. Labor Standards Law (Rodo kijun hO), Law No. 49 of 1947, Art. 3.
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25 million yen (about $100,000), and also became entitled to all the
rights and privileges of other employees at the Mitsubishi Plastic
Company.
From these three cases which we have examined, I think it is
evident that strong support for imposing restrictions on civil liberties
still exists within the Japanese Supreme Court. In recent years, the
trend toward the more rigid, restrictive approach has resulted mainly
from the mandatory retirement of justices who favored the more
flexible approach. There is a particular danger in the implications of the
Mitsubishi case, since the ruling suggests that guarantees of equality
and freedom of thought and conscience do not apply to relations
between private persons. This problem can be analyzed by focusing on
the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution in connection with
racial discrimination problems. In the United States, discrimination in
restaurants, theaters, and other similar places cannot be regarded as
legal so long as the discriminatory acts are regarded as state action or as
denying rights against discrimination in particular places guaranteed in
such laws as the Civil Rights Act. However, in Japan we have the
situation that the Constitution protects those who suffer under discrimination, but does not apply to citizen-to-citizen relationships.
If a private person believes in a certain religious sect, can he
discharge an employee who does not believe in that religion? Can a
newspaper published by a certain political party discharge an employee
who is not loyal to the party? These questions can only be answered
affirmatively in a legal context in which constitutional guarantees are
not applied to cases between individuals. In such cases, as I mentioned
earlier, I feel that it is proper for the American theory of "state action"
to be applied.
Methods of Interpretation
What is basically important in comparative legal research is not to
concentrate on a detailed scrutiny of legal terminology used in the text
of the Constitution, a practice common in prewar Japan. Rather, the
emphasis must be on learning and understanding the differences in
historical backgrounds of the countries that are compared. Only then
can we construct the proper infrastructure which can serve as the
driving force in a remodeling of society based on structures that
facilitate freedom and peace. To this writer, there appears to be a
fundamental dichotomy between the new type of Japanese constitutional methodology based on the American approach and the older
type based on the German approach. Yet, we cannot call either right or
wrong, but must simply choose the method that suits the historical
context of Japan. In my opinion, for the last quarter of this century,
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and possibly for generations to come, the American type of constitutional methodology and interpretation will best suit Japan.
Under the old and new constitutions in Japan, different styles of
interpretation have become fashionable. Under the Meiji Constitution,
there existed only two schools of interpretation, one oriented toward
the Emperor and the other toward the Diet. All seventy-six articles in
the Constitution were interpreted according to one of these views with
the result that the prevailing tendency was toward an authoritarian
approach.38 Under the present Constitution, however, the interpretations are much more diversified. One interpretation becomes the guiding
principle to settle particular cases only after many ramifications and
contrasting views are discussed.
In conclusion, I believe that the constitutional experience of the
United States can be an important model for Japan, since the Japanese
Constitution itself is a direct result of the United States experience of
more than two hundred years. Since we have not yet developed a selforiented behavior pattern in the confusion of the postwar period, we
Japanese have tried to organize a new society with the Constitution of
Japan as its guiding star.
38. See Frank 0. Miller, MinlJbe Tatsukichi-lnterpreter of Constitutionalism in
Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), and Richard H.
Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1970).

VII
Malaysia

Editorial Note

Malaysia in its diversity and far-flung geographical profile bears some
similarity to Indonesia. Yet special problems have followed from the
fact that two groups perceived as ethnically alien to the region, Chinese
and Indians, make up nearly half the population. Malaysia's twelve
million people are preponderantly concentrated in peninsular Malaya,
leaving Sarawak and Sabah geographically distant, sparse in population, and appreciably less advanced, in conventional civilizational
terms, despite greater ethnic diversity.
Malaysia-formally proposed in 1961 to include peninsular Malaya, Singapore, and the northern Borneo territories of Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei-came into existence in 1963, but without Brunei,
which chose to remain separate. Like the several other federations
brought into existence under British auspices during the same period,
the creation of Malaysia entailed considerations of the dissolution of
the empire, reduction of military obligations balanced by offsetting
Western ally pressures to create viable states, and responsiveness to
genuine nationalist aspirations. Although, compared with the other
experiments in federationism, Malaysia boasts the distinction of survival, this has been accomplished only with considerable, ongoing costs.
The brittle fabric of contorted constitutional quid pro quo deEditor's Note: Concerning the author, see J. Victor Morais, A Man of His Time: Lord
President Tan Sri M. Suffian (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Perdana Sdn. Bhd., 1974).
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signed to appease the diverse territorial, ethnic, language, resource,
religious, and other interests first splintered in 1965, with potentially
ugly racial and territorial conflict resulting in the severance of Singapore, which became a separate, independent nation.
Some years of showcase democracy then transpired, until 1969
when racialism in peninsular Malaya erupted at a pitch of violence with
serious socio-political consequences in terms of the growth ofsecurity
forces and structured provisions for racial favoritism. And the Bornean
components, on a different plane altogether, chafe at what some feel is a
new form of colonial tutelage.
Still, Malaysia's complex party structure has endured in relative
success, helped by a healthy economic base, diversified in recent years
through aggressive programs to attract foreign investment and to
develop an industrial base. Staple exports such as rubber, palm oil, tin,
copper, and timber are increasingly augmented by sectors of urban
high-technology production. While Malaysia's $2,000 per capita gross
national product lags markedly behind Singapore, the fundamental
resources base affords more stable long-term economic security.
The heritage of English law in both Malaysia and Singapore
remains very influential, the links with the formal tradition having
suffered no major breaks through political revolution or domestic
upheaval. The strength of these links is manifest still in the Malaysian
provision for appeal from the Supreme Court to the British Privy
Council, a connection strongly favored by many lawyers. Similarly,
until recently, most lawyers in Malaysia and Singapore were trained in
England. Law training was begun at the University of Singapore in
1957, and the first law faculty in Malaysia was opened in the early
1970s.
In both countries there are unified civil judiciaries, whose Supreme
Courts exercise both original and appellate jurisdictions. In Malaysia
Islamic courts are organized in each constituent state, and in Singapore
also provision is made for Islamic justice for the minority Malay
population. The legal professions of Malaysia and Singapore are well
developed and growing.
Substantive law in Malaysia and Singapore has evolved also from
principles rooted in English common law tradition. In Malaysia, however, as in Indonesia, local customary (adat) law has always received
considerable attention as a special area of national law.
May 1978

DANIEL S. LEV
ROGER K. PAGET

The Malaysian Constitution and
the United States Constitution
Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim
Lord President of Malaysia

First, a few words about Malaysia. The country is to the south of
Vietnam about two hours away by jet and is in two parts: Peninsular
Malaysia on the Asian mainland and, across the South China Sea, two
states, Sabah and Sarawak, sometimes referred to collectively as East
Malaysia. Malaysia is about the same size as California and its population is approximately ten million.
Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states headed by His Majesty
the Yang Dipertuan Agung (King). The Federation has fourteen legislatures and fourteen governments: one for the Federation and one for
each of the thirteen states. Each of the nine Malay states is headed by a
hereditary Sultan, and each of the other four states by a Governor
federally appointed.
The Federation first came into existence in 1895, and in 1946 was
enlarged to embrace all the states in the Malay peninsula. On August
31, 1957, it was granted independence by the British, who had ruled for
125 years. (Previously we had been ruled for 125 years by the Portuguese, who conquered us in 1511, a few years after Columbus had
reached America and thought he was in the East Indies, and thereafter
by the Dutch for 150 years.) In 1963 the Federation, then named the
Federation of Malaya, was further enlarged and renamed Malaysia
when Singapore and the two states in Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak)
joined it on being granted independence by the British. (Singapore left
Malaysia in 1965.)
Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy and has held general
elections every five years as prescribed by the Constitution: in 1959,
1964, 1969, and 1974. The Malaysian King acts in accordance with the
advice of the federal Cabinet, and each Sultan and Governor in accordance with the advice of the state Cabinet. Legislative and executive
power is divided between the federal government on the one hand and
each of the state governments on the other by a written constitution.
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This constitution (promulgated on August 31, 1957) as amended is
known as the Malaysian Constitution and applies not only to the
federal government but also to all state governments. At the same time
each state has its own written constitution, applying only to that state.
In what way has the Malaysian Constitution been influenced by the
United States Constitution?
At the outset I should say that I learned my law in England, where
the law schools hardly touched on the U.S. Constitution, probably for
fear that Malaysians and others from the Empire might follow the bad
example set by the organizers of the Boston Tea Party, and so I should
admit that my knowledge of the United States Constitution is rather
meagre. I should further and frankly admit that the Malaysian Constitution has been little influenced by the U.S. Constitution, at least directly,
except for the incorporation of concepts that are universal and are found
in the constitutions of many countries, such as the separation of powers
between the three branches of government, the supremacy of the
constitution, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and of the
bar, the outlawing of discrimination, the guarantee of fundamental
liberties, and the like. Our Constitution has been little influenced by the
U.S. Constitution because, unlike the Philippines and Japan, we have
had little political and legal contact with the United States. Our main
legal links have been with Britain, India, and Australia.' (At one time
we were governed by the British from Calcutta.) The Malaysian Constitution is modelled on the Indian Constitution.2 It bears many similarities
to that Constitution and the Constitutions of many Commonwealth
countries that were granted independence after World War II as the
British dismantled their Empire. (It would have borne many more
similarities to the United States Constitution, if Americans had not two
hundred years ago jumped the gun and taken the law into their own
hands by unilaterally declaring their independence.)
Here I shall discuss the main similarities and the main differences
between the Malaysian and United States constitutions.
The main similarities are these: (I) Both constitutions are written.
(2) The United States and Malaysia both operate on the principle of
supremacy of the constitution and judicial review of legislative and
executive acts. (3) Both constitutions guarantee fundamental liberties,
I. Ed. note: Ahmad Bin Mohd. Ibrahim, Toward a History of Law in Malaysia
and Singapore (Singapore: Stamford College Press, 1970).
2. Ed. Note: For analysis, see the author's An Introduction to the Constitution of
Malaysia, 2nd ed. (Kuala Lumpur: Ibrahim Bin Johari, P. K. Govt. Printer, 1976); Tun
Mohamed Suffian, H. P. Lee, and F. A. Trindade (eds.), The Development of the
Constitution of Malaysia in Its First Twenty Years: 1957-1977 (Selangor, Malaysia:
Oxford University Press, 1978); and L. A. Sheridan and H. E. Groves, The Constitution
of Malaysia (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1967).
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which are, in the main, enforceable. (4) Both constitutions provide for
nations operating on the federal principle and provide for distribution
of power between federal and state organs. (5) Both federal legislatures
are bicameral.
The main differences are these: (I) The nature of the two constitutions is different. (2) The systems of government are different (parliamentary system versus presidential system). (3) Approaches to and
contents of fundamental liberties are different. (4) Methods of implementing the federal principle are different. (5) The Malaysian Constitution expressly allows derogation from certain fundamental liberties. (6)
Citizenship provisions differ. (7) Certain features of the Malaysian
Constitution are not found in the U.S. Constitution. Examples are the
position of our King (the Yang Dipertuan Agung), the position of
rulers, and the position of religion. Islam is a religion of the Federation,
but freedom of religion is guaranteed.
With regard to main similarity (1), though both are written, the
nature and approach of the two constitutions differ. The United States
Constitution is a short one, containing only seven articles in the original
text, and twenty-six subsequent amendments. It includes only essential
and fundamental provisions, which are written in general terms, leaving
other provisions to be worked out by legislation. The Malaysian
Constitution (like the Indian) is more elaborate and detailed; many
provisions which could have been left to legislation are included in the
Constitution. The Malaysian Constitution has Articles 1 to 181, but the
actual number of articles is more than 181 because many amendments
(19) have since 1957 introduced new articles which are referred to as, for
example, 16A, 43A, 43B, and also there are thirteen schedules. (The
United States Constitution, too, might have been a long and complex
document if it had not been drafted two hundred years ago by a small
elite serving a small population with not too many lawyers.)
The Malaysian Constitution was drafted in 1956-57 by an independent five-member Royal Commission headed by the late Lord Reid, a
distinguished Judge of the House of Lords, and consisting of Professor
lvor Jennings, a retired Governor-General of Australia, a retired Chief
Justice of the Allahabad High Court, and a Judge of the High Court of
Pakistan. At the last minute a Canadian member could not participate.
This Commission spent a year in the country traveling everywhere,
listening to the views of every political party, every organization, and
any individual who wished to make representations. Its draft was
published for further public discussion, debated, and, with amendments
to accommodate all conflicting interests, became our Constitution
when it was confirmed as law by the federal and state legislatures. (In
this way our constitution-makers secured public and social support for
our supreme law.)

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA

133

A second main similarity is that both our countries follow the
system of constitutional supremacy and judicial review of unconstitutional legislative and executive acts. As the Malaysian Constitution is
the supreme law of the land, the Malaysian government is a limited
government. Although the King enjoys legal immunity, he is sworn to
uphold the Constitution, and if any of his official acts is unconstitutional or unlawful, the minister through whom he acts may be called to
account in the courts. Similarly, the power of ministers and other public
officials is limited by the Constitution, and so is that of Parliament,
which may make law only on subjects specified in the Constitution and
provided that it is not contrary to the Constitution. To adjudicate on
the constitutionality or validity of executive and legislative acts, the
Malaysian Constitution establishes an independent judiciary whose
members may not be removed from office before the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five, except on the recommendation of a committee of five judges, whose salary and conditions of service cannot be
altered to their disadvantage, and who are entitled to a pension. (The
rest of the public service retire at fifty-five and are only eligible for a
pension.)
Though it is true that neither the Malaysian nor the United States
government enjoys plenary powers to do what it likes, yet there are
some differences in our systems. The first difference is that the United
States Constitution does not expressly say that laws which conflict with
the Constitution are invalid and can be so declared by the courts: that
basic principle had to be established by the courts. (What the United
States Constitution states in Article VI, Section 2, is that "this Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.") The
Malaysian Constitution, on the other hand, makes this concept explicit:
Article 162 (6) provides that any pre-independence law that is inconsistent with the Constitution has to be construed so as to bring it into
accord with the Constitution, and Article 4 provides that any postindependence law that is so inconsistent is to the extent of the inconsistency void.
The United States Constitution itself does not restrict judicial
review; any restrictions are imposed by the courts themselves, by
doctrine such as locus standi, or by the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions, and so forth. The Malaysian Constitution, however,
contains express provisions limiting the extent of judicial review.J For
instance, Article 4 (3) says that the validity of any law made by the
3. Ed. note: For judicial precedents, see S. Jayakumar, Constitutional Law Cases
from Malaysia and Singapore, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal Pte. Ltd.,
1976); for current developments, see The Malayan Law Journal (1302 Shenton House
'
Shenton Way, Singapore 1).
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legislature cannot be questioned on the ground that it is outside the
power of the legislature concerned except in three types of proceedings:
(a) in proceedings for a declaration that the law is invalid on the ground
that it is outside the power of the legislature; or (b) if the law is made by
the federal legislature, in proceedings between the Federation and one
or more states; or (c) if the law was made by a state legislature, in
proceedings between the Federation and that state. Article 4 (4) further
provides that proceedings of type (a) shall not be commenced without
leave of a judge of the Federal Court (the highest court in the land) and
that the Federation shall be entitled to be a party to any such proceedings, and so shall any state that would or might be a party to
proceedings brought for the same purpose under types {b) and (c).
With regard to main similarity (3), though both constitutions
guarantee fundamental liberties which are in the main enforceable, our
approach and the contents of our provisions are different from those of
the United States. The United States Constitution (so I understand)
enshrines fundamental liberties without restrictions and qualifications;
the U.S. courts take on the task of determining what kinds of restrictions are permissible in the interest of society as a whole. The Malaysian
Constitution, on the other hand (like the Indian), expressly provides
that certain fundamental liberties are qualified (not absolute) and may
be diminished.
For example, Clause (2) of Article 9 provides that every Malaysian
citizen has the right to move freely throughout and to reside anywhere
within the Federation, but at the same time it provides that this right is
subject to any law relating to security, public health, public order, or
the punishment of offenders.
Another example is Article 10, which provides that every citizen
has the right to freedom of speech and expression, but that Parliament
may by law restrict this right in the interest of security, friendly
relations with foreign states, public order or morality, and so forth.
Other examples of the different contents of our provision for fundamentalliberties are (a) equal protection, (b) due process of law, (c) right
to counsel, and (d) citizenship. In the U.S. Constitution the equal
protection concept is not elaborated, and the courts have to determine
what is and what is not in violation of equal protection. But in the
Malaysian Constitution, while certain types of discrimination are prohibited, yet exceptions are allowed. For example, Article 8 (2) provides
that there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the grounds
only of religion, race, descent, or place of birth in any law or in the
appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in
the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding, or
disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade,
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business, profession, vocation, or employment. At the same time it
provides that this prohibition is subject to exceptions authorized by the
Constitution: for example, Clause (5) of the Article provides that this
Article does not invalidate or prohibit, among other things, any provision relating to personal law, and Article 153 expressly provides for
favoured treatment of Malays and natives of Borneo.
The U.S. Constitution contains the due process concept whereby
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property ·'without due
process of law." This concept has been evolved by the U.S. courts in
such a way that the law must not be arbitrary or capricious, and the law
itself may have to conform to rules of natural justice. In Malaysia we
have Article 5 (I), which provides that no person shall be deprived of
life or personal liberty "save in accordance with law," and Article 13,
which provides that no person shall be deprived of property "save in
accordance with law." At first glance these two Articles seem similar to
the due process concept. But the Malaysian courts have interpreted
"law'' to mean enacted law, and therefore, first, Articles 5 and 13
impose restrictions only on the executive and not on the legislature,
and, second, there is no scope for including rules of natural justice in
"law."4
In the United States Constitution the Sixth Amendment provides
inter alia that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The U.S.
courts have interpreted this and other provisions in recent years to
mean that the right to counsel commences from the moment of arrest
and that the accused is entitled to counsel from that moment. In
Malaysia, on the other hand, the corresponding Article 5 (3) provides:
"Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may be of
the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be
defended by a legal practitioner of his choice." The courts have
interpreted this to mean that although the right to counsel commences
from arrest, the right cannot be exercised immediately, as a balance has
to be struck between that right and the duty of the police to protect the
public from wrongdoers by apprehending them and collecting whatever
evidence exists against them. 5 Also, in Malaysia there is no suggestion
that a person on a criminal charge is entitled to counsel at public
expense, though persons on a capital charge are as a matter of course
assigned counsel by the courts at the public expense. (A legal aid
scheme under the control of the Attorney-General is still in its infancy.)
4. Comptroller General of Inland Revenue v. N.P. (1973) I M.L.J. 165; and
Arumugam Pillai v. Government of Malaysia ( 1975) 2 M.L.J. 29.
5. Ooi Ah Phua v. Officer-in-Charge, Crimina/Investigation, Kedahf Per/is ( 1975)
2 M.L.J. 198.
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Concerning citizenship, the United States Constitution provides
simply that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside" (Fourteenth Amendment). So the
United States has only two categories of citizens: those born in the
United States and subject to its jurisdiction, and those who have been
naturalized. In Malaysia the Constitution provides for four categories
of citizenship: by operation of law, by registration, by naturalization,
and by incorporation of territory. Also, not everybody born in Malaysia is a citizen: one is so only if he was born on and after independence
(August 31, 1957) and before October 1962; if he was born after
September 1962, but before September 16, 1963, he is a citizen only if
one of his parents was at the time of his birth either a citizen or a
permanent resident, or if he was not born a citizen of any other country;
and if he was born on or after September 16, 1963, he is a citizen only if
one of his parents was at the time of the birth either a citizen or a
permanent resident.
As for main similarity (4) (both the United States and Malaysia
operate on the federal principle and provide for distribution of power
between federal and state organs), in the United States the Constitution spells out what powers "are delegated" to the centre "nor prohibited" to states and provides that anything not so delegated to the
centre nor prohibited to the states is reserved to the states respectively
or to the people. The Malaysian Constitution, on the other hand,
follows the Indian Constitution in providing for a federal list, a state
list, and a concurrent list, which spell out in great detail federal subjects,
state subjects, and concurrent subjects with respect to which the
federation, the states, and both the federation and states, respectively,
have legislative and executive power, and further in providing in Article
77 that residual power on subjects not in the lists shall be vested in
states. (Malaysia is a small country, and consequently the Constitution
deliberately provides for a strong central government: thus subjects like
the police and education, which in the United States are state subjects,
are federal in Malaysia.)
With respect to main similarity (5) (both the United States and
Malaysia have bicameral legislatures), in the United States members of
the Senate are elected directly by the people of each state, whereas in
Malaysia each state legislature elects two senators, and in addition the
federal government also has power to appoint thirty-two senators.
Also, the Malaysian Senate has less power than the lower house (the
House of Representatives); our Senate can at best delay but not veto
legislation (except for constitutional amendments), while in the United
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States the Senate's approval is essential. In both countries members of
the lower house are elected directly by the people.
Apart from the differences mentioned above, the most significant
difference relates to the system of government. The United States
follows the presidential system. The American President is elected
independently from legislators; he is not a member of the legislature
and not answerable to it (he is responsible to the people), nor can the
legislature throw him out on a vote of no confidence as in the United
Kingdom, India, and Malaysia (but he may be dismissed by impeachment). Furthermore, since the President is not a member of the
legislature, his party may not be the one in control of either house or
both. Also, in the American system only the President and VicePresident are elected. Cabinet members are not elected, and indeed they
must not be members of the legislature, and they may be (and have
been) appointed by the President even from amongst members of the
party in opposition to his. Prime Ministers envy the President his
ability to appoint to his Cabinet individuals of paramount ability from
outside of politics.
In Malaysia, because we follow the United Kingdom system of
parliamentary government, the head of state (the King) is distinct from
the head of government (the Prime Minister). The Prime Minister must
be a member of the legislature, and his choice of Ministers is limited to
persons who are willing enough to stand the rough and tumble of
politics to run for Parliament, not necessarily a good qualification for
high office. The Prime Minister's party or coalition is in the majority in
the legislature, and he and his Ministers are responsible to the people,
not directly but indirectly to their representatives in Parliament; his
party or coalition must give up office if they cease to enjoy the
confidence of the majority in the legislature. Our King, like the British
Queen and the Indian President, must act on Cabinet advice and has no
significant discretionary power.
Other main differences may be described thus:
Malaysia, as was already stated, is a federation of thirteen states,
nine of which are headed by a hereditary Sultan and four of which are
headed by a Governor. There is a Conference of Rulers, established by
the Constitution, in which Sultans and Governors are members; every
year this Conference meets three or four times, with the King and Prime
Minister present, to discuss and decide policies of national importance.
The King of Malaysia is unique. Although he is elected, only a
Sultan may stand. He is a hereditary Sultan, and yet he holds the office
of King for a fixed term of five years. He is elected by the Conference of
Rulers, yet Governors who are members of the Conference cannot
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participate in this election. While King he ceases to function as Sultan,
and before coming to Kuala Lumpur he appoints a Regent to exercise
his functions in his home state. The Constitution contains elaborate
rules regarding his election, but for the purpose of this discussion
suffice it to say that generally he is elected by seniority. (Some senior
Sultans decline to stand because the King is very much a prisoner of
palace and protocol.)
As for religion, while the American founding fathers, smarting
under the religious persecution of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Europe (when Christians were burning each other, all in the name of
God), forbade the establishment of any religion, the Malaysian Constitution expressly provides that Islam shall be the religion of the Federation. But this does not mean that there is no religious freedom, for the
Constitution further provides that other religions may be practiced in
peace and harmony in any part of the Federation. Because of her
geographical position at the crossroads of Asia, Malaysia has for
centuries been exposed to the influence of Arabia, India, China, and
Europe, and this has contributed to the spirit of religious and cultural
toleration that animates her people.
Personal Reflections
Our Constitution has been amended too many times, in my opinion
(nineteen times. It is amendable by Parliament; if two-thirds of the total
members of each house approve, no ratification by states is necessary).
This is regrettable, for a constitution should be regarded as sacrosanct
and should not be amended often; but it is also understandable because
our Constitution is long and contains many matters that should be left
to ordinary legislation. It is now too late to shorten it.
The trend of amendments is to further strengthen an already strong
central government. This is inevitable in a small country the size of
ours, but care should be taken not to destroy state autonomy altogether.
Our Constitution mentions the rights of citizens, but not their
duties to the country-and to their fellow-citizens-and this is a pity.
Rights should be balanced by duties, and this should be made clear in
the Constitution.
The Constitution mentions equality before law. It should also
mention other forms of equality-such as economic, social, and cultural equality. The government and Malaysian leaders are aware,
however, that without these other forms of equality there cannot be
social justice, and that without social justice the country will fall prey to
the Communist menace. Hence, vigorous efforts are being made to
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implement successive Five-Year Development Plans so as to increase
the size of the national cake and everybody's share of it.
The Constitution secures and is a symbol of our political independence. Malaysians should also strive for economic independence and
for a fair price for her produce compared with imported manufactures.
For instance, in my youth the price of I ,330 pounds of rubber (Malaysia is the world's greatest producer of natural rubber) bought a car (the
cheapest); today we have to sell six to seven times that much rubber to
buy the cheapest car. In international trade there must be interdependence, but at the same time newly independent countries should not
remain at the mercy of well-established trading nations.
Malaysia's Constitution and system of parliamentary democratic
government have survived for twenty years. During our limited experience we have found that the contents of a constitution are important,
but more important is the spirit of the men at the top whose duty it is to
carry out its provisions. Do they believe in the system? Were they
honest when they swore to uphold the Constitution and to uphold the
rule of Ia w? Do they believe in the independence of the judiciary and the
value of a strong bar, incorruptible and fearless? If they do, then the
Constitution is viable and there is hope and a future for the country.
But if they are rogues or charlatans, determined only to satisfy their
own personal and family ambitions, regardless of the wider interest of
the nation, then the country will head toward the abyss-no matter how
long and hard its founding fathers laboured to write the most nearly
perfect Constitution in the world. So far Malaysia has been fortunate in
having good men at the helm to guide her destiny.

VIII
The Philippines

Editorial Note

The Republic of the Philippines comprises an archipelago five hundred
miles off the southeast coast of Asia. It includes seven thousand islands,
of which several hundred exceed one square mile in area, and eleven
account for 95 percent of both the nation's population of 45,000,000
and its land area of 116,000 square miles.
The Filipino people are of mainly Malay origin, with a considerable Chinese and a lesser Spanish infusion. Population is increasing at
more than 3 percent per year. Nearly 85 percent of the people are
Roman Catholic. Muslims account for 5 percent of the population and
are dominant in the Sulu islands and parts of Mindanao. The Philippines has achieved relatively high standards of health and education,
with life expectancy now close to sixty years, and a literacy rate over 80
percent. Most Filipinos speak one or more of seventy indigenous
Malayo-Polynesian languages, many speak English as well, and a
declining number also speak Spanish. Tagalog, the language of the
Manila Region, and the basis of a national language known as Pilipino,
has gained increasing currency throughout the country. English and
Spanish are also recognized as official languages.
The Philippine economy is predominantly agricultural. Major
crops include rice for domestic consumption, and sugar, coconut
products, and bananas for export. Forestry and mining also contribute
importantly to export earnings. Major trading partners are Japan and
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the United States. Despite official policies to encourage domestic
ownership, the modern industrial sector remains dominated by American corporations. Gross national product per capita is estimated
at $350.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century the Philippine Islands
were inhabited principally by small Malay settlements along sea and
lake coasts, with little organization of society above the village and clan
level. In the southern islands, however, Islam was advancing rapidly,
bringing larger and more complex social and political forms. After
Magellan's "discovery" of the Philippines in 1521, Spain checked the
Islamic advance and established a colonial regime that lasted until the
Filipino revolution and American intervention at the end of the last
century.
The Americans forcibly suppressed the revolutionary movement
which the Filipinos had begun against Spain and continued against the
United States. The new rulers soon reached an accommodation with the
Filipino elite, and rapidly constituted a Filipino legislature, bureaucracy, and judiciary with considerable autonomy in internal affairs. The
American colonial regime developed extensive public health and education systems. It did little, however, to develop a strong economy and a
more equitable distribution of wealth and power. To the contrary, the
American policy of free trade perpetuated an essentially colonial economy, which persists to this day.
In 1934, after long but amicable struggle on the part of the Filipino
leadership, the United States Congress passed the Philippine Independence Act, providing for full independence in 1946 after a ten-year
transitional period as a largely autonomous Commonwealth under
American sovereignty. The following year the Filipino people voted
acceptance of a Constitution drafted by the Philippine Constitutional
Convention to establish both the transitional Commonwealth government and the independent Republic to be inaugurated in 1946. The
Commonwealth period was interrupted by the Japanese occupation
during World War II, but the Philippines attained independence as
scheduled in 1946.
As an independent nation the Philippines achieved rapid recovery
from the destruction of World War II, impressive standards of health
and education, and until 1972, a democratic, though in significant
aspects an ineffectual, government. Although heavily protective economic policies stimulated rapid growth of a complex of light importsubstitution industries under Filipino entrepreneurship, those policies
soon outlived their usefulness, and the economy stagnated. The government's effort to shift policy to promote labor-intensive export manufacturing met with only modest success. The crucial weakness of the
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government was its inability to implement fundamental reforms and to
subordinate special interests to the public good in accordance with
officially declared policies and standards. Land reform legislation was
not carried out effectively. Welfare and social justice programs were
overly ambitious in stated objectives and grossly deficient in the fiscal
and political support required for implementation. Economic and
political power remained concentrated in a few families. Political
conflict among powerful factions became increasingly violent, and
public order deteriorated.
In 1972, President Marcos declared martial law. This enabled him
to manipulate a sitting Constitutional Convention to elicit a proposed
new Constitution which would enable him to remain in office and,
particularly in its transitional provisions, assure him of continuing
power without interference by the legislature, the courts, the press, or
necessity of election. In 1973, he proclaimed the new Constitution to be
in effect by reason of approval in an informal plebiscite, which had been
conducted in many areas by a show of hands under military supervision.
Indigenous Filipino law prior to Spanish rule was embedded in the
norms, customs, and hierarchical patterns of a village society. The
colonial regime established a formal legal system but never gained
sufficient authority to give pervasive effect to formal law. By the end of
the Spanish period, the Philippines enjoyed (or was afflicted by) a full
array of codes and legal enactments, but these were of little effect in the
day-to-day life of most people.
American rule brought an infusion of liberal political doctrine and
constitutional law. When the struggle for independence shifted from
armed revolution to legal and political channels, lawyers became
prominent in politics and government, and they remain so today. The
Philippines now has more lawyers per capita than most European
nations.
The Constitution of 1935 incorporated fundamental principles of
American constitutional law, such as separation of powers, judicial
review of legislation, a bill of rights, and due process. The judiciary
assumed an important role in the government and politics of the
Commonwealth and the Republic. Although the lower courts were
congested, slow, and often accused of favoritism and corruption, the
Supreme Court enjoyed great respect and did not hesitate to nullify
legislative and executive action. Politically prominent lawyers vigorously defended criminal defendants and political dissidents, and major
political conflicts were translated into and resolved as legal disputes.
The Constitution of 1973 maintained most of the established
Constitutional principles in form, but the President, invoking its transitional provisions and emergency powers, has been able to exercise
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power without regard to constitutional constraint. Although the judicial system was left intact by the declaration of martial law, jurisdiction
of a number of politically sensitive cases was shifted to martial law
tribunals. The Supreme Court has remained free from overt presidential manipulation, and it has heard cases presenting political issues
of the most fundamental order. In a crucial case decided by a bare
majority, with four justices dissenting, the Court declared the new
Constitution to be in force and effect. To date, the Court has not
decided an important case in direct opposition to the position of the
President.
June 1978

JAMES L. MAGA VERN

The American Constitutional Impact
on the Philippine Legal System

Enrique M. Fernando
Senior Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines

It is a privilege highly esteemed to have been invited to take part, even if
in a modest capacity, in the Bicentennial celebration of the American
Declaration of Independence. Rightfully has it been observed by Laski
that the history of the United States "has changed the outlook of
mankind wherever there has been power to reflect on the meaning of
human affairs." As he stated further: "No state, until our own day, has
done so much to make the idea of progress part of the mental make-up
of man. No state, either, has done more to make freedom a dream
which overcame the claims both of birth and of wealth."! De Tocqueville and Bryce, writing at earlier periods, were similarly laudatory.2
There is considerable justification for the United States, then, to take
legitimate pride in what has been accomplished these past two hundred
years and to look forward with reasonable and cautious optimism to
what may be achieved in the next century.
As an Asian coming from a nation which for almost half a century,
from 1898 to 1946, was under American sovereignty, the author of this
paper is a product of the American system of education then followed
during that period. If the further consideration be borne in mind that
the Philippines was under Spanish colonial rule for over three hundred
years dating from 1565, it may be readily discernible why his thinking is
colored by Western legal ideas. There was a time when there was a wellnigh automatic acceptance of their applicability to Philippine conditions. Fortunately, that time is no more. Since independence, there has
been a greater sense of discrimination and a greater appreciation of the
nation's Oriental heritage, even insofar as the ways of the law are
concerned. The author, however, belongs to a generation that was not
the beneficiary of such an approach. As a result, his study of the legal
I. Harold Laski, The American Democracy (New York: Viking, 1948) p. 3.
2. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1830); Bryce, The American Commonwealth ( 1888).
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systems of neighboring Asiatic countries is rather meager. Nonetheless,
an attempt will be made to refer briefly to comparable constitutional
provisions in the charters of Southeast Asian states including India,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon. Japan and South Korea will
also receive some attention. The concentration though, for obvious
reasons, will be on the legal system of the Philippines.
The American influence in Asian constitutional systems may be
viewed from an abstract or conceptual level or in its more concrete or
specific manifestations in terms of actual provisions or doctrines embodied in Asian charters. The former deals with constitutionalism as
identified with a fundamental law, its supremacy being assured in the
United States through the function of judicial review. The latter may
refer to such broad categories as federalism, the presidential form of
government, and the Bill of Rights. As, by and large, the first two have
not recommended themselves for adoption in this part of the world, 3
necessarily, the major inquiry is centered on the extent to which
fundamental rights and freedoms, as protected in the United States
Constitution, have found their way in Asia. It may not be amiss,
however, to speak of the depth of nationalistic fervor in the Asian scene
and why, this factor notwithstanding, the United States Constitution
served as a model.
Nationalism in Asia
Nationalism embodies the principle of self-determination-one nation,
one state. It exemplifies the concept that a state is nothing but the
juridical personification of the nation. 4 President Woodrow Wilson was
its vigorous champion after World War I. His impassioned advocacy
struck a responsive chord: it intensified the feeling of nationalism
among peoples still smarting under foreign rule; it evoked their enthusiasm and stirred their hopes; it signified for them the end of colonialism-and it was high time, too. For those in Asia and Africa, the regret
was that the blessing of such a gospel was not extended to them until
after World War II. Then they had their day. Speaking of Asia alone,
the Philippines gained her independence on July 4, 1946. In 1947, India,
Pakistan, and Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, dissolved their ties with Great
Britain. Burma followed early in 1948; so did Malaysia, but not until
1957. The Indonesians broke away from Dutch rule as early as 1945.
The former French Indo-China now comprises Vietnam, Cambodia,
3. India and Malaysia are now the only two countries that have a federal structure.
It was so with Pakistan until Bangladesh seceded in 1971. The presidential system is also

in disfavor, except in Indonesia and Korea.
4. Cf. H. E. Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1937), p. 15.
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and Laos, the first of them asserting her freedom in 1945 and the last
two in 1949. Singapore left Malaysia in 1965, and Bangladesh seceded
from Pakistan in 1971. Korea, occupied by the United States and
Russian armed forces after World War II, was lost to Japan in 1945, at
present there being the Democratic People's Republic in the north, and,
in the south, the Republic of Korea.
At long last, a number of Asian peoples of diverse creeds and
cultures, but with the common objective of freeing themselves from the
grip of alien rule, assumed their independent status, full of hopes and
aspirations for a better way of life. Adlai Stevenson, writing in 1954,
could speak of millions of human beings from Africa to Indonesia,
·•emerging from foreign domination and fiercely demanding relief from
hunger, pestilence, and oppression." 5 There was, and understandably
so, the flowering of nationalism, as a means of attaining what he had so
felicitously termed their .. suddenly unattained aspirations." 6 Competent
observers of the Asian scene, Orientals and Occidentals alike, are thus
unanimous in their view of its potent influence at work. W. L. Holland
could picture it "as a huge and often controlled source of energy." 7
Asiatic peoples, according to C. A. Buss, "usually cool and unemotional about political programs, become heated over gationalism."s As
L. K. Rosinger stated, the "fires of nationalism" burn brightly, having
been fed by the "poverty and discontent of masses of people" and "the
deep Asian resentment at Western racial attitudes." 9 The same thought
was echoed by Stevenson: "Nationalism is rampant. And the West,
identified with the hated colonialism, is suspect." 10 G. E. Taylor, with
specific reference to American foreign policy, was quite categorical:
"Mutual confidence is hard to establish, for most of the countries of
Southeast Asia have been colonies for varying lengths of time and their
nationalist movements have a history of anti-West and often anticapitalist feeling. "11
There is pertinence to the query, therefore, of the effect of such
dominant sentiment on the influence of American constitutional ways
in the framing of the fundamental laws of each of these new states. The
question does not admit of a uniform answer. The fires of nationalism
burned just as brightly in the Philippines in the past as they do now, but
5. Adlai Stevenson, Call to Greatness (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 38.
6. Ibid., p. 43.
7. William L. Holland, ed., Asian Nationalism and the West (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 5.
8. Claude A. Buss, The Arc of Crisis (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 24.
9. Lawrence K. Rosinger et al. (eds.), The State of Asia (London: G. Allen,
1953), p.3.
10. Call to Greatness, p. 73.
II. George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States (New York: Praeger,
1964), p. 8.
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with only one exception there has never been any period marked by
deep resentment, much less bitter hostility, against the West. The last
decade of the nineteenth century and the first few years of the twentieth
century constitute the exception. For it was in 1896 that the full-scale
rebellion by the Filipinos against Spain started, although for several
years previous to that the separatist movement had been growing. From
our standpoint it was a success: by 1898, the Spanish resistance was
reduced to insignificance. It was the hope of the Filipinos that the
United States in view of her tradition and her philosophy would be
sympathetic to their cause. Such, unfortunately, was not the case; by
the Treaty of Paris of 1898, the United States, having gone to war
against Spain, acquired the Philippines by cession. The Filipinos had
no choice but to continue the struggle against that country. As could
have been expected, the superiority in arms and resources was too much
to overcome. By 1904 at the latest, what was referred to by us as the
Filipino-American War, and by Americans as the Philippine Insurrection, was at an end.
The policies adopted by the United States proved acceptable.
Autonomy was promised, ultimately to lead to independence. Education and health received preferential attention. The civil service was
efficient. While Protestant missionaries came to the Philippines, there
was no interference with Catholicism. Indeed, civil and political rights
were respected. With the acceptance of the democratic ways and institutions introduced by the United States, the rise of nationalism did not
pose an obstacle to Philippine-American friendship. World War II gave
further impetus to the cordiality that marked such relations. The Filipinos fought by the side of the Americans. After the surrender of
Bataan and Corregidor, guerrillas continued to harass Japanese troops
in the Philippines. They aided in the liberation of the Philippines by the
American armed forces in 1945, ending the grim period of Japanese
Occupation. 12 Then in 1946, the promised independence became a
reality.
That was in accordance with the Philippine Independence Act
enacted by the United States Congress in 1934. The recognition of
Philippine political freedom was postponed until after a ten-year
transition period under a Commonwealth status, the last stage from an
American unincorporated territory to an independent existence. As was
12. As was noted in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, L-20812,
September 22, 1967, 21 Supreme Court Reports Annotated, hereinafter referred to as
SCRA, 180, the role that the United States played in liberating the Philippines,
considering that from 1942 to 1945 the Japanese army during the occupation period
enforced repressive measures, severe in character, "elicited a vast reservoir of goodwill for
the United States, one that has lasted to this day notwithstanding irritants that mar ever
so often the relationship even among the most friendly of nations." At 188.
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to be expected, there was a requirement that there be a constitution for
such a regime. The understanding of the Philippine Constitutional
Convention of 1934-35 was that the fundamental law to be drafted was
not only for the Commonwealth but for the future Republic. With the
training in self-government under American tutelage in the past three
decades, it is easy to understand why such Constitution would embody
certain basic features of that polity, such as the presidential form of
government, the function of judicial review, and a bill of rights. It thus
becomes even more evident why the upsurge of nationalism in the
Philippines with its vehement cry for membership in the world community was certainly no bar to practices followed the years past. The
United States Constitution, serving as a fit model, was ready-made for
the purpose.
South Korea, now the Republic of Korea, is equally nationalistic,
but having been spared from domination by a Western power, experienced no sense of dissatisfaction with the United States, to which,
moreover, she is bound by ties of gratitude, as it was U.S. troops that
played a decisive role in the bitter fratricidal conflict with the North.
India, Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Singapore, all
former colonies of Britain-even if there were long pent-up grievances
against the latter-appeared content with the introduction in their
respective legal systems of the English common law, the merits of which
they recognized. It is easily understandable, then, why for them there
may be certain American constitutional concepts that could serve as
models for possible inclusion in their respective charters. Indonesia,
formerly a Dutch possession, was hardly an enthusiast as far as occidental culture is concerned. It does not mean, however, that the United
States has nothing to offer as far as drafting a constitution is concerned.
Considering recent events, it would be highly unrealistic to look for
traces of American influence in the fundamental laws still in the making
in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
The case of Japan is unique. She has been and is now fiercely
nationalistic. For a long time she kept the West away from her shores,
but from the Meiji era in the last third of the nineteenth century, she
successfully made use of occidental institutions and practices suitable to
her needs. Then came World War II, where she was among the
vanquished. That was followed by the framing of her present Constitution, under Allied occupation with General Douglas MacArthur as the
Supreme Commander. There is nothing surprising in her incorporating
therein a large number of well-known American doctrines, especially
where individual rights are involved. There is, in addition, the adoption
of the concept of judicial review.
What may be impressed with more significance, however, is not so
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much the absence of any evidence indicative of displeasure with or
resentment against the United States as a major Western power-this in
the face of the brand of nationalism aroused in these new Asian states.
It is the relative freedom possessed by them in the framing of their
constitutions upon assuming their independent status. They could
examine the contents of existing charters and determine which were
suitable. They had, as it were, a wide counter from which to make their
selection. To paraphrase Alexander Hamilton, they were given the
opportunity to show their capability of establishing a good government
from reflection and choice rather than depending solely on accident and
force.n They could and did envision their constitutions as a vehicle, in
the language of A. J. Zurcher, "to codify a rational and progressive
political order [and] to discourage the abuse of political power." 14 Not
only could they serve as symbols of political unity or as instruments of
political discipline, they could also demonstrate political maturity.
With such ideals in mind, certainly, the U.S. Constitution of 1787, as
amended and as interpreted in landmark decisions, could very well
serve as a fit model. That would be to reinforce faith in the possibility
that what Jefferson called "the disease of liberty" may be spread in
distant lands and far-off domains.
The influence of the United States, as was noted, could be shown
by the incorporation, whether in express terms or by implication, of
selected provisions or doctrines traceable to her Constitution. To be
realistic, it may be on a purely verbal level, for the warning of the great
jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes is ever timely. Constitutional provisions are
not to be considered in the light of mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form. They are organic living institutions, and their
significance is vital, not formaJ. 1S As he so emphatically pointed out:
"Constitutions are intended to preserve practical and substantial rights,
not to maintain theories." 16 It would be to err on the side of undue
optimism if the presence in the charters of these new Asian states of
juridical formulations traceable to the U.S. Constitution were to be
equated with the complete acceptance of what they signify for the
American legal system. It does not admit of doubt, though, that by their
inclusion there is at least manifest an intention not to ignore the
meaning attached to them in the country of origin. There is likely to be
that subtle weaving of what is native with what is foreign. It would be
disappointing if the result is merely a canonization of accepted and
13. Cf. Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist (Modern Library Edition, 1937),
p. 3.
14. Arnold J. Zurcher, Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War
II (New York: New York University Press, 1951), p. I.
15. Cf. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
16. Cf. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904).
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traditional concepts, divorced from the actualities in their new locales.
No juridical bridge of firmness could be built on so shaky a foundation.
The Supremacy of the Constitution
American influence on Asiatic constitutions, as was set forth at the
outset, may be both on an abstract or conceptual level or in concrete or
specific manifestations as evidenced by the adoption of provisions
found in the United States Constitution or of doctrines based on them.
Insofar as the former is concerned, reference may be made to the
fundamental postulate of the supremacy of a constitution, the idea of a
higher law, one which has superior obligation and validity. As far back
as 1803, in the landmark decision Marbury v. Madison,l 7 Chief Justice
Marshall, after taking note of "the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is," continued:
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and
the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the
court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.
This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then, the courts are to
regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary
act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply. Those then who controvert
the principle that the constitution is to be considered in court, as a
paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts
must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. This
doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. 18

That fundamental postulate of a fundamental law setting forth the
criterion for the validity of any public act, whether proceeding from the
highest official or the lowest functionary, is basic to the American
system of a constitutional democracy. That is, to manifest fealty to the
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost
rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the
discharge of the functions with which they are entrusted have no choice
but to yield obedience to constitutional commands. Whatever limits are
imposed must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must
ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The presidency in the execution of
the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of
applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is
called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental
law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the
acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical
17. I Cranch 137.

18. Ibid., 176-177.
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corollary of this overriding principle that the Constitution is paramount.
Any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates falls to
the ground. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme
law. 19
The Function of Judicial Review
It is through the awesome and delicate power of judicial review, to
follow the oft-quoted observation of Chief Justice Hughes made at a
time before he became the chief magistrate, that while the United States
is under a Constitution, "it is what the judges say it is." 2 For in
discharging the task of inquiring into whether a challenged executive or
legislative action is in conformity with, or repugnant to, its Constitution, the meaning attached to its provisions becomes authoritative
when it is the United States Supreme Court that speaks. Such a
pronouncement, Justice Jackson, in a work published when he was
Attorney General, characterized as "the most understandable and
comprehensive summary of American constitutional law. He pointed
out, though, that there was no explicit constitutional grant of this
power, that it was "left to lurk in an inference." At any rate, he
continued, "Political evolution has supplied the omission, and the
course of history has established that power in the Supreme Court."21 It
had its genesis in the aforesaid Marbury decision, where the doctrine
was first enunciated and applied by the Supreme Court of the United
States. It declined to issue the writ of mandamus to the then Secretary
of State, James Madison, on the ground that it was not vested with such
original jurisdiction under the Constitution of the United States. The
authority conferred by a congressional act was not warranted by the
fundamental law and hence was declared void. What is to be stressed is
the absence in the Constitution of any such explicit grant of competence
to annul statutes. It was merely an implied power, on the basis of the
cardinal precept that the Constitution is paramount and thus overrides
any statute that conflicts with its mandate.
The course of history, or "political evolution" in the words of
Justice Jackson, has at any rate erased any doubts as to the existence of
the power of judicial review. It did not take long. Justice Story, in his
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, published in
1833, could speak of "the duty or course of justice to declare any

°

19. Cf. Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, L-32717, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA
228, 234-5.
20. Cf. W. B. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar, J. H. Choper, Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. (St.
Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1970), p. 8, citing a speech of Chief Justice Hughes delivered
on May 3, 1907.
21. Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (New York: Knopf,
1941), pp. 3, 4, 5.
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unconstitutional law passed by Congress or by State Legislaturevoid."22
Even as of that time, he could affirm that "the right of all courts, state
as well as national, to declare unconstitutional laws void, seems settled
beyond the reach of judicial controversy."23 The power of judicial
review was not again utilized to nullify an act of Congress untill857 in
the Dred Scott decision,2 4 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
act known as the Missouri Compromise was void, as Congress was
without power to legislate on the issue of slavery. This attempt on the
part of the Supreme Court to settle the slavery question proved
singularly ineffective. It was in the crucible of the Civil War that the
issue was decided. Nonetheless, Thomas Cooley in his Constitutional
Limitations, first published in I 868, affirmed that "under some circumstances, it may become the duty of the courts to declare that what the
legislature has assumed to enact is void, either from want of constitutional power to enact it, or because the constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed."25 D. Watson, in his treatise on the
Constitution of the United States, could by 1910 categorically state:
"The Constitution does not confer authority upon the courts to declare
an act of Congress to be in conflict with that instrument, yet from the
beginning of the Government the courts have exercised such power, and
will continue to do so."2 6 W. W. Willoughby, in 1929, in his threevolume work on the Constitutional Law of the United States, could
emphatically assert:
The principle that statutory law, in order to be recognized as valid by
the courts, must, in all cases, be in conformity with constitutional
requirements, is a product of American law, and though now found in
the jurisprudential systems of some other countries, has nowhere received
the development and extended application that it has received in the
United States.27

Judicial Review in the Philippines
In a leading case, the first of its kind after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, Angara v. Electoral Commission, 28 the Philippine Supreme Court stated that the power of judicial review "is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our
Constitution."29 This Article stated that the Supreme Court was not to
22. Third ed., 1858, p. 645. 23. Ibid.
24. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857).
25. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1927), vol. I, p. 332.
26. D. Watson, Constitution of the United States, vol. 2 (Chicago: Callaghan,
1910), p. 1168.
27. W. W. Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States, 2d ed. (New
York: Baker Voorhis, 1929), p. I.
28. 63 Phil. 139 ( 1936).
29. Ibid., 158. The opinion was penned by Justice Jose P. Laurel, the delegate who
was the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights in the 1934 Convention.
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be deprived of its jurisdiction "to review, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, final judgments and decrees in
... (l) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question." Then in
a subsequent section, the number of votes required was provided for:
"All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en bane, and no treaty or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds
of all the members of the Court" (Sec. I 0). In the present Constitution,
which became effective in 1973, with a Supreme Court of fifteen
members, four more than was formerly the case, there were necessarily
some changes. Thus: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en bane, and no treaty, executive agreement, or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least
ten Members" (Art. X, Sec. 2, par. [2]).
A brief historical background is not amiss. At the time when the
United States acquired the Philippines from Spain in 1899, one of the
principles of constitutional law binding on the territorial government
established by her in the Philippines was this same principle of judicial
review. It was natural for American lawyers admitted to practice in the
Philippines to challenge the validity of statutes or executive orders,
whenever the interests of their clients so demanded. The Filipino
justices and judges, who with their American brethren administered
justice, were soon made aware that the power to pass on the constitutionality of such statutes and executive orders was part of their judicial
function. The Filipino lawyers vied with the American members of the
bar in raising the question of constitutionality whenever appropriate.
The American practice, therefore, of appealing to courts, by means
of lawsuits, decisions reached by either the executive or legislative
branches of the government, became a part of the accepted doctrines of
constitutional law in the Philippines early in the period of American
sovereignty.
Although it was not until March 22, 1907, that the Supreme Court
of the Philippines set aside an act of the legislative branch in the case of
Casannovas v. Hord, 30 as early as February 14, 1902, the Court in the
case of In re Prauteh,3 1 dismissed as untenable the objection that there
was an impairment of contractual obligation. A year later, on May 16,
1903, in United States v. Dorr, 32 it firmly rejected the assertion that the
judgment of the lower court was void, as it did not provide for a jury
trial as required by the American Constitution. In a disbarment proceeding in 1904, In re Montagne,JJ the plea by respondent attorney that
30. 8 Phil. 125.

31. I Phil. 132.

32. 2 Phil. 269.

33. 4 Phil. 1.
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he was denied due process of law met with no sympathetic response
from the Supreme Court. Various other cases could be cited to show the
readiness with which counsel would seize upon an alleged infringement
of constitutional rights and call upon the Court to exercise the power of
judicial review.
Then came the period under the 1935 and the present constitutions. It may safely be asserted that the Philippine Supreme Court was
and is ever alert to entertain constitutional questions. In the valedictory
address before the 1934 Constitutional Convention, Claro M. Recto, its
President, spoke of the trust reposed in the judiciary, in these words: "It
is one of the paradoxes of democracy that the people at times place
more confidence in instrumentalities of the State other than those
directly chosen by them for the exercise of their sovereignty."J4 The
assumption was that whenever a constitutional question was posed, the
Court should act. It was expected that it would discharge such a task
without regard to political considerations and with no thought except
that of discharging its trust. Witness these words of the same Justice
Laurel in an early landmark case, People v. Vera,35 decided in 1937:
If it is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance during
this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our
government-independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity,
and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as
we see it and as we understand it.36

The hope, of course, was that such assertion of independence and
impartiality was not mere rhetoric. There could not be the least doubt
that what elicited the approval of the Filipino people was the belief that
the judiciary is called upon to inquire into alleged breaches of the
fundamental law to avoid its being infringed. To do so is merely to do
what is expected of it. Thereby no invasion of spheres appropriately
belonging to the political branches occurred. The judiciary had to act
only when there was a suit with proper parties before it, wherein rights
appropriate for judicial enforcement were sought to be vindicated. Nor
would it approach constitutional questions with dogmatism or apodictic certainty. There was also the expectation that there would be the
search for jural consistency and rational coherence. Once allowance is
made for the fact that, for all its care and circumspection, a Supreme
Court is manned by human beings fettered by fallibility, but nonetheless earnestly and sincerely striving to do right, it is easy to under34. VII Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (S. Laurel, ed.),

Appendix L, 800.
35. 65 Phil. 56 ( 1937).

36. Ibid., 96.
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stand the public acceptance of its vigorous pursuit of the task of
assuring that the Constitution be obeyed.
On a more specific level, reference may be made to an impressive
number of cases to show that in the Philippines there had been neither
judicial timidity nor reluctance in the exercise of the power of judicial
review. In the period before the Japanese Occupation in 1942, the
Supreme Court was called upon to rule on a dispute between two
constitutional agencies, the National Assembly and the then Electoral
Commission,3 7 on the reorganization of the judiciary, 38 and on the
extent of the supervisory power over local governments.39 After liberation, controversies more momentous in their implications for the
welfare of the country were taken to the Supreme Court for resolution.
Again it had its hands full of cases decisive in their impact on the
political and economic future of the Philippines. The presence of the
United States Army in the Philippines introduced added complications.
Instances of its none-too-tender regard for the liberties of individuals
were called, in appropriate cases, to the attention of the Supreme
Court. 40 The legality of proceedings against those Filipinos who worked
with the Japanese with such intensity and enthusiasm as to qualify their
collaboration as treasonable was dumped in its lap. 41 Thereafter came
cases of equal significance, among them those involving the suspension
of three Senators allegedly owing their election to terroristic activities
of certain radical groups; 42 the sufficiency of the votes on the parity
rights amendment to constitute a valid proposal, with three Senators
and eight Representatives still under suspension and thus unable to
participate; 43 the near-crisis brought about by well-nigh one-half of the
Senators refusing to attend sessions after the incumbent Senate President was ousted by declaring the office vacant at a time when according
to them there was no quorum; 44 the exercise by at least two Presidents
(Roxas and Quirino) of the power to legislate under the Emergency
Powers Act even after the return of normalcy with Congress actually in
operation; 45 the independence of the Commission on Elections from the
Executive, 46 and the scope of its authority to assure free and honest
37. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
38. Zandueta v. De Ia Costa, 66 Phil. 615 ( 1938).
39. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 ( 1939), and Vi/lena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil.
451 (1939).
40. Raquiza v. Bradford, 76 Phil. 50 (1945); Tubb v. Griess, 78 Phil. 249 (1947).
41. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 (1947).
42. Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
43. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. I (1947).
44. Avelino v. Cuenca, 83 Phil. 17 (1949).
45. Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), and Rodriguez v. Gel/a, 92 Phil. 603
( 1953).
46. Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101 (1949).
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elections; 47 the legal consequence of there being a lone Senator from the
opposition, thus tilting the balance in favor of the majority party in the
Electoral Tribunal; 48 the limits that should be placed on presidential
authority over local governments; 49 the legality of midnight appointments by the President, whether during the closing days of the Garcia so
or the Macapagal5 1 administration; the restrictions placed on political
parties as well as civic groups to nominate candidates for the 1971
Constitutional Convention,s 2 as well as the limits on the freedom of
expression of candidates to such body;sJ and the piecemeal submission
of proposals to amend the 1935 Constitution for ratification.s4
How far the Supreme Court of the Philippines in the exercise of
the function of judicial review could participate in the power process of
the government was indicated by four cases arising from the present
state of emergency. The first, Lansang v. Garcia,ss overruled earlier
Philippine decisionss6 by its pronouncement that the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus is a judicial not a political question. It also
held that the test of whether or not such power was unconstitutionally
exercised is arbitrariness. There being no such showing, the 1971
suspension of the privilege by President Marcos was sustained. The
next three decisions all were promulgated under a regime of martial law
declared under the 1935 Constitution. Aquino v. Ponce EnrifeS 7 was a
habeas corpus petition seeking the release of a detained Senator, one of
the many filed by a number of those individuals who were detained
after martial law for possible complicity in the insurrection, the main
ground being the nullity of such proclamation.s 8 The challenge was
unsuccessful. Again there was no showing of arbitrariness, considering
the Muslim rebellion by the Muslim Filipinos in the second biggest
island in the Philippines, Mindanao, and the Maoist uprising in Luzon,
where Manila is located. The validity of the martial law proclamation
was thus upheld. The then Chief Justice Makalintal and seven other
47. Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149 (1949).
48. Tafiada v. Cuenca, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
49. Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 ( 1958).
50. Aytona v. Castillo, L-19313, January 19, 1962, 4 SCRA I (1962).
51. Guevara v. lnocentes, L-25577, March 15, 1966, 16 SCRA 379 (1966).
52. Jmbong v. Ferrer, L-32432, September II, 1970, 35 SCRA 28 (1970).
53. Badoy v. Comelec, L-32546, October 17, 1970, 35 SCRA 285 (1970).
54. Tolentino v. Comelec, L-34150, October 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702 (1971).
55. 42 SCRA 448.
56. Barcelona v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905), and Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 Phil.
882 (1952). The latter case dealt with the suspension of the privilege under Philippine
President Elipidio Quirino in 1950.
57. 59 SCRA 183 (1974).
58. Petitioner Aquino was the only political figure of consequence, being one of the
leaders of the Liberal Party who was still under detention when the case was decided.
Charges had been preferred against him, but there was still a pending action, Aquino v.
Military Commission, to determine whether he could be tried by respondent body.
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members of the Court spoke their minds on the crucial issue of martial
law.59 The presidential action under martial law was challenged in the
two other petitions,6o the first assailing the power of the President to
call a referendum on crucial issues, and the second questioning the
jurisdiction of a military commission to try petitioner, a civilian. Again,
no constitutional infirmity was found. The unanimity that characterized the decision arrived at in the first case6 1 was no bar to seven
Justices submittiQg their considered views on the various constitutional
aspects of the litigation.62 It was again a divided Court in the latter
suit, 63 with two outright dissents, 64 two concurring and dissenting
opinions,65 and one concurrence66 to the main opinion. What clearly
emerges is that even during a period of martial law, any order of the
President, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, could still be
tested for alleged constitutional infirmity. The vitality of the institution
of judicial review even during emergency times is thus evident.
Judicial Review in Other Asiatic Countries
Judicial review as a mode of assuring the supremacy of the Constitution is now an accepted legal institution in other Asiatic countries.
The American influence is marked, as could be expected, in Japan and
Korea. What is remarkable is that, even in those nations with previous
ties to Great Britain, it has found acceptance. In that group may be
included Burma, India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka.
The Constitution of Japan is quite explicit: "The Supreme Court is
the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of
any law, order, regulation or official act" (Art. 81). On this point, the
words of a distinguished Japanese constitutionalist, Professor Masami
Ito, are instructive:
59. The reference was to the eight other petitions docketed: L-35538, Races v.
Ponce Enrile; L-35539, Diokno v. Ponce Enrile; L-35540, Soliven v. Ponce Enrile; L35547, Voltaire Garcia v. Fidel Ramos; L-35556, Yuyitung v. Ponce Enrile; L-35567,
Doronila v. Ponce Enrile; L-35571, Guiao v. Ponce Enrile; L-35573, Rondon v. Ponce
Enrile. Respondent in eight such suits is the Secretary of National Defense. In the other,
the party against whom the action was brought, General Ramos, is the Chief of the
Constabulary.
60. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275, and Aquino v. Military
Commission, 63 SCRA 546.
61. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275 (1975). Justice Makasiar
spoke for the Court.
62. Justices Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez, and Munoz Palma,
along with the writer, spelled out their thinking on the subject. The main opinion was
penned by Justice Antonio.
63. Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546 (1975).
64. Justices Teehankee and Muiloz Palma dissented.
65. Justice Castro and the writer qualified their acceptance of the judgment of the
Court.
66. It came from Justice Barredo.
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The Japanese Constitution legalizes the doctrine in two ways. In the first
place, fundamental human rights receive strong guarantees against arbitrary exercise of any governmental power. Under the present Constitution, even a law enacted by the Diet, which under Article 41 of the
Constitution is the highest organ of state power, shall not have legal
force when it invades the constitutional area of individual freedoms and
rights. In the second place, judicial review of legislation is recognized.
Modeled after American constitutional practice, article 81 vests the
courts, especially the Supreme Court, with the power to determine the
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act. The power
of judicial review seems to be the most universally typical institution
embodying rule of law. "It was Coke's version of the supremacy of the
common law principles as exemplification of rules of reason and of
justice that served as a convenient precedent when American justices
were confronted with the demand that limits must be placed on legislative powers in order to safeguard individual rights and privileges."67

In the Korean Constitution, there is a variant of the function of
judicial review as traditionally known in the United States. Chapter
VIII, Article 109, provides that it shall be vested not in its Supreme
Court but in a Constitution Committee, which "shall judge the following matters: I. The constitutionality of a law at the request of the Court.
2. Impeachment. 3. Dissolution of a political party." It is "composed of
nine members, who are appointed by the President." Three of them are
to "be appointed from persons selected by the National Assembly, and
[three others from those] nominated by the Chief Justice
." It is
further provided: "( l) When the Constitution Committee makes a
decision in the case of a constitutional violation, impeachment or dissolution of a political party, the approval of more than six members shall be
required. (2) The organization, operation and other necessary matters
of the Constitution Committee shall be determined by law" (Art. Ill).
Thus, instead of the Korean Supreme Court passing upon the constitutionality of any challenged legislation, the function is exercised by
this Constitution Committee.
Then, there are the other Asiatic countries, Burma, India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka, with their constitutional practices deriving mainly
from English legal institutions. Nonetheless, as was noted, judicial
review is now an accepted feature in their polity.
Great Britain, while lacking a written charter, is justly famed for its
respect for constitutionalism. It is traceable, according to a number of
scholars, to the Magna Charta. This is how Professor Dunham puts the
matter:
67. Masami Ito, "The Rule of Law: Constitutional Development in Law in Japan,"
in Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society, Arthur T. Von Mehren (ed.)
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 207-8.
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First of all, the Charter did help to stimulate and to sanction the formulation of the concept, the due process of law. It also preserved the
medieval ideal of the law's supremacy and so promoted the principle
of the rule of law. Furthermore, the fact of the Great Charter itself,
following a century-old tradition of coronation charters-virtually, engagements between sovereign and subject-and the subsequent forty-four
confirmations of the Charter, all these fostered the principle of contract,
government by agreement. Also, the inviolability that men attributed
to the Charter made of it a higher kind of law by which they might
appraise the validity of ordinances and statutes. Thus Magna Carta, as
a criterion of recognition of validity, inspired Englishmen eventually to
create a set of principles that have assured the certainty in public law
and the consistency in governance that form the quintessence of British
constitutionalism. 68

The view expressed by the late Professor de Smith in his work The
New Commonwealth and Its Constitution would indicate that there is a
fundamental agreement between the American and British concepts as
to the significance of a constitution. According to him, a constitution
defines and establishes the principal organs of government; it is the
source of their authority, it prescribes the manner in which and the
limits within which their functions are to be exercised, and it determines
their interrelationship. In this sense, it is a body of fundamental law.
It is, moreover, hierarchically superior to rules of law enacted by the
legislature except insofar as they have been made in a manner and form
which, in terms of the constitution itself, clothes them with validity.69

He had occasion to note that among
the characteristic features of modern Commonwealth constitutions are
the limitation of parliamentary sovereignty, guarantees of fundamental
human rights, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, the
transfer of the responsibility for terminating a superior judge's tenure
of office from a legislative to a judicial forum, and the vesting of full
control over the public service and the conduct of elections in the
hands of independent commissions.70

Such an observation was repeated later in his work in the following
words:
Each country has a written constitution, the more important provisions
of which cannot be altered except by a special procedure requiring more
than a bare legislative majority vote, and in each of them the courts have
jurisdiction to pronounce a measure void if it is repugnant to the
constitution. 71

More specifically, the Constitution of India has this provision:
68.
69.
Stevens,
70.

Samuel E. Thorne et al., The Great Charter(New York: Pantheon, 1965), p. 41.
S. A. de Smith, The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions (London:
1964), pp. 109-110.
Ibid., pp. 107-108. 71. Ibid.
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(I) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings
for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders
or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate,
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. (3)
Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by
clauses (I) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court
to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the
powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). (4) The right
guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution. (Art. 32)

This other provision is equally relevant:
(I) If at any time it appears to the President that a question of Jaw
or fact has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and
of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion
of the Supreme Court upon it, he may refer the question to that Court
for consideration and the Court may, after such hearing as it thinks
fit, report to the President its opinion thereon. (2) The President may,
notwithstanding anything in the proviso to Article 131, refer a dispute
of the kind mentioned in the said proviso to the Supreme Court for
opinion and the Supreme Court shall, after such hearing as it thinks
fit, report to the President its opinion thereon. (Art. 143)

The Constitution of Malaysia states the following:
(I) The Federal Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have
jurisdiction to determine: (a) any question whether a law made by
Parliament or by the Legislature of a State is invalid on the ground that it
makes provision with respect to a matter with respect to which Parliament or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State has no power to
make Jaws; and (b) disputes on any other question between States or
between the Federation and any State. (2) Without prejudice to any
appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court, where in any proceedings
before another court a question arises as to the effect of any provision of
this Constitution, the Federal Court shall have jurisdiction (subject to
any rules of court regulating the exercise of that jurisdiction) to determine the question and remit the case to the other court to be disposed of
in accordance with the determination. (3) The jurisdiction of the Federal
Court to determine appeals from a High Court or a judge thereof shall be
such as may be provided by federal Jaw. (Art. 128)

This power was characterized by Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, in
these words:
If Parliament is not supreme and its Jaws may be invalidated by the
courts, are the courts then supreme? The answer is yes and no-the
courts are supreme in some ways but not in others. They are supreme in
the sense that they have the right-indeed the duty-to invalidate Acts
enacted outside Parliament's power, or Acts that are within Parliament's
power but inconsistent with the constitution. But they are not supreme as
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regards Acts that are within Parliament's power and are consistent with
the constitution. The court's duty then is quite clear; they must apply the
law in those Acts without question, irrespective of their private view and
prejudice. If judges are free to inject personal prejudice into their duty,
there will be grave disquiet_72

The Constitutuion of Burma provides for judicial review in this
wise: "No law shall be enacted excepting from the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court cases which involve questions as to the validity of
any law having regard to the provisions of this Constitution" (Art. 137).
Sri Lanka has a separate Constitutional Court. In the language of its
Constitution:
(I) There shall be a Constitutional Court for the performance of the

functions assigned to it by the Constitution. The President shall appoint,
for a term of four years, five persons to be members of the Constitutional
Court. Whenever occasion arises for the determination of any matter
arising under subsection (2) of this section or of section 55, three
members of the Constitutional Court chosen in accordance with the rules
of the Constitutional Court shall determine such matter. (2) Any question as to whether any provision in a Bill is inconsistent with the
Constitution shall be referred by the Speaker or, when he is unable to
perform the functions of his office, the Deputy Speaker to the Constitutional Court for decision if (a) the Attorney-General communicates his
opinion to the Speaker under section 53; or (b) the Speaker receives
within a week of the Bill being placed on the Agenda of the National
State Assembly a written notice raising such a question signed by the
leader in the National State Assembly of a recognized political party; or
(c) the question is raised within a week of the Bill being placed on the
Agenda of the National State Assembly and signed by at least such
number of members of the National State Assembly as would constitute
quorum of the National State Assembly; or (d) the Speaker or, when he is
unable to perform the functions of his office, the Deputy Speaker takes
the view that there is such a question; or (e) the Constitutional Court on
being moved by any citizen within a week of the Bill being placed on the
Agenda of the National State Assembly, advises the Speaker that there is
such a question. (3) No proceedings shall be had in the National State
Assembly in relation to a Bill referred to the Constitutional Court under
subsection (2) of this section or of section 55 until the decision of the
Constitutional Court under subsection (4) of this section or its opinion
under section 55 has been given. (4) The decision of the Constitutional
Court upon a reference under subsection (2) of this section shall bind the
Speaker and shall be conclusive for all purposes. No institution administering justice and likewise no other institution, person or authority shall
have the power or jurisdiction to inquire into, pronounce upon or in any
manner call in question a decision of the Constitutional Court. (Art. 54)

72. Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1976), p. 18.
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The Bill of Rights
The United States Bill of Rights
The United States Constitution, as drafted by the Philadelphia
Convention in 1787 and as ratified, had no separate article on a Bill of
Rights. Not that the subject was completely ignored. Article I, dealing
with legislative power, explicitly provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it" (Sec. 9, par. [2)).
The very next paragraph reads: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
law will be passed" (par. 3). Moreover, as far as a State of the Union is
concerned, it is prohibited from passing "any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... "(Sec. 10,
par. [1]). It was not until 1791, however, when the first Ten Amendments were adopted, that the United States was thought to have a
comprehensive Bill of Rights. (It was supplemented by the so-called
Civil War Amendments: the Thirteenth, ratified in 1865, prohibited
slavery and involuntary servitude, the Fourteenth, in 1868, provided for
national citizenship and required the conformity of state action to the
standards of due process and equal protection, and the Fifteenth, in
1870, assured the right to vote to any American citizen irrespective of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 extended the right of suffrage to women.) It is thus
apparent that as of 1791 the prime safeguards of American freedom
became part and parcel of the United States Constitution.
The civil liberties guaranteed in the original text and in the first
eight Amendments identified, in Laski's formulation, "rights as boundary marks which traced out areas of conduct the state [is] not normally
entitled to invade." 73 There was necessity, as far as the United States
was concerned, for all ten of them. From the standpoint of the influence
they were to exert in other lands and later times, only the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth of these amendments call for further
treatment. The First Amendment deserves to be quoted in full:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Of equal importance for the rights of man is the due process amendment, the Fifth:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
73. Harold Laski, The S1a1e in Theory and Praclice (New York: Viking, 1935),p. 35.
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service in time of War of public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

This guarantee, as was noted, applies to state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, which likewise assures equal protection. Moreover,
the safeguards thrown around an accused include the prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be more secure in their pers·ons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Sixth and Seventh Amendments safeguard the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury with the assistance of counsel:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by Jaw, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
In suits at common Jaw, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common Jaw.

The Eighth Amendment provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.

It is thus rendered clear that what is found in a constitution is a
recognition, not a grant, or rights-and, at that, not a comprehensive
one either. There was thus acceptance of the view as far back as 1791 of
their being possessed by every human being.
It was not too long ago (1963) that the New York University
School of Law published a volume entitled The Great Rights, edited by
the late Professor Edmond Cahn, containing the James Madison
Lectures by four distinguished American jurists, Justices Hugo L.
Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Earl Warren, and William 0. Douglas.
The volume opens with Cahn's essay emphasizing the great debt owed
Madison for the American Bill of Rights.
Something daring and novel was in the wind which caught the finest
minds of the time and inflamed them. To men like James Madison,
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the war against Britain was only the military aspect of an all-pervasive
American Revolution and the question to be decided was not whether
Americans should regain the rights that Englishmen had considered
customary but whether for the first time in human history any man
anywhere could enjoy the full political dignity to which all men were
born. Though English notions of liberty were obviously useful, they
were inadequate. What America promised must be nothing less than a
new kind of society-fresh, equal, just, open, free, and forever respectful
of conscience. (P. 3)

To the question of how "to implement this vision and find constitutional machinery" to lend it force and effectivity, he answered:
The breakthrough came because Madison believed profoundly that in
America the people were sovereign and the officials their mere trustees,
agents and servants. He put it neatly: "In Europe," he wrote, "charters
of liberty have been granted by power." And in America? "Charters
of power granted by liberty." In Magna Carta where King John, though
acting under coercion of powerful nobles, nevertheless spoke as monarch,
"We will not" was deemed fitting (in Latin, of course, for the benefit
of the common man.) In the English Bill of Rights where William and
Mary, though accepting the conditions that Parliament had exacted, still
spoke as sovereign, "ought not" was deemed bold enough for the protection of the rights of subject. But when the American people in 1789
prescribed the acts that their new Federal Government must either not
do or do only in a particular manner, they were entitled to say "shall
not," the language of command. Thus, the old flaccid promises and
pious exhortations were at last toughened into imperative law. (P. 5)

What is embraced in the term "imperative law" is not limited to the
literal language of the provisions as found, which in most cases are
phrased in general terms allowing a great deal of discretion and
flexibility in their application. Their history, of course, cannot be
ignored. There is truth, moreover, in this observation of Justice Frankfurter: "Deeply imbedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy
... are often tougher and truer law than the dead words of the written
text."74 The main reliance, though, in ascertaining the meaning rightfully attached to the constitutional commands should be on U.S.
Supreme Court decisions. For the United States Constitution is not
merely law, it is the supreme law. It is the judiciary, then, ultimately the
Supreme Court, which, in the language of Charles G. Haines, "interpreted and applied its terms as they did the language of statutes so that
matters of great political import were passed upon apparently with the
same ease, simplicity, and procedure as the interpretation of a contract
or the defining of the rights of persons under a will." 75 What is more, as
74. Nashville C. & St. L. Railway v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940).
75. Charles G. Haines, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Gol'ernment
and Politics, 1789-1835 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), p. II.
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Charles Fairman noted: "It has seemed far more consistent with our
polity that for the protection of individual rights the citizen look to the
Courts rather than be dependent upon the fluctuating views of the
legislature. " 76
A careful and precise appraisal and study of such decisions and the
opinions rendered would require a painstaking analysis, but the necessity for this is not apparent. Rather, viewed solely in terms of their
impact on Asiatic constitutions, it may suffice to refer to the approach
taken and the language employed to show adherence and fealty to the
concept of fundamental rights, without ignoring, of course, the judgment rendered. It may be that the ideals professed rather than the ideals
realized may in the end prove to be more influential as far as foreign
lands are concerned. It will also have the merit of treading on grounds
of a none-too-familiar terrain. More simply put, the peculiar and
singular circumstances of each case may not be too apparent to a
foreign observer. Even if the identical phraseology of the provisions as
found in the U.S. Constitution is followed in the Asiatic nations to be
referred to, there has to be an appreciation of the varying conditions
and the flux of circumstances of each country involved. This is not to
deny, however, that where no deviation of wording exists, there is at
least a prima facie case for the persuasive character of the United States
Supreme Court decisions in the interpretation of the provisions in
question.
It only remains to be added that, considering the time when the
Asiatic constitutions were framed, just after the close of World War II,
aside from the deference and respect elicited by the majestic utterances
of a Marshall, a Holmes, a Brandeis, or a Cardozo, the influence of the
U.S. Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Hughes and
Stone covering the period of 1930 to 1946 is quite apparent. 77 A
word more about the present Constitution of the Philippines, which
became effective on January 17, 1973. It was framed by the Constitutional Convention, which opened its session on June I, 1971, and it was
approved on November 30, 1972. It is not surprising, then, that traces
of the Warren Court's leading decisions can be discerned in its Bill of
Rights, 78 which, again not surprisingly, reiterated what was earlier
76. Charles Fairman, "The Attack on the Segregation Cases," 70 Harv. Law Rev.,
85 (1960).
77. The Constitutional opinions of both Chief Justices and. in the case of the latter,
even those penned when he was an Associate Justice, received their due attention. From
the late thirties and during this era, certain pronouncements on civil liberties by Justices
Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, Jackson, Murphy, and Rutledge also came to be highly
regarded.
78. In addition to those of Chief Justice Warren, the views of Justices Black and
Douglas, as could have been expected, as well as others were duly taken into account by
the framers of the Philippine Constitution.
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contained in the Commonwealth Constitution of 1935. In that sense,
the debt owed to the earlier Hughes and Stone eras must be acknowledged.
The fundamental rights to which further reference will be made
insofar as they have found their way into Asiatic constitutions may be
categorized into freedom of belief and expression, whether religious or
secular, including freedom of assembly and of association in accordance with the First Amendment; the due process and equal protection
guarantees, as ordained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
in the case of the former, not only insofar as the procedural aspect is
concerned but also insofar as it formerly constituted the main reliance
for the protection of property interests; and the rights of an accused
individual safeguarded by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Amendments. To repeat, while the rulings announced should be kept in
mind, the aspect to be emphasized will be the constitutional objectives
sought to be attained, even if, from a more detailed study of the
technical and intricate questions raised, it may be difficult to resist the
conclusion that, at times, performance did not match aspiration.

The Philippine Bill of Rights
The extent of the American influence in the Philippines so far as
the liberties of the individual are concerned is easily discernible. All that
needs to be done is to set forth the Bill of Rights as found in the 1935
Constitution, reproduced well-nigh ipsissimis verbis in the present
fundamental law. It was embodied in a single section (Article III,
Section I) with the following paragraphs:
(I) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
(2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
(4) The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired.
(5) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and
order require otherwise.
(6) The right to farm associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
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(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination ~r preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be requ1red for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
(8) No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances.
(9) No law granting a title of nobility shall be enacted, and no person
holding any office of profit or trust shall, without the consent of the
Congress of the Philippines, accept any present, emolument, office, or
title of any kind whatever from any foreign state.
(10) No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
(II) No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
(12) No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
poll tax.
( 13) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
(14) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity of such suspension
shall exist.
( 15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
(16) All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt
is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required.
( 17) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
(18) No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
(19) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted.
(20) No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
(21) Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty.

Nothing can be clearer than that the bill of rights provision in the
1935 Constitution was patterned after that of the United States. That
was the way the Filipinos wanted it, and it is easy to understand why. A
great Filipino jurist, Claro M. Recto, as the President of the 1934
Constitutional Convention, observed how firm was the conviction held
by so many leading delegates, products of the American system of
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education, that a constitutional democracy of the American type was
the one most suited to Philippine conditions. Moreover, there was a
practical reason. Care was taken by the Convention to avoid any
radical departure from the United States constitutional system inasmuch as the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 contained a provision
that the American President had to certify that the constitution drafted
would provide for a republican form of government and contain a bill
of rights. Without such certification, the Commonwealth of the Philippines could not be established. Since the long-sought independence was
promised after a ten-year Commonwealth transition period, it was
imperative, in the thinking of the Filipino leaders then, that there be no
obstacle to its coming into existence as soon as possible, which might
not be the case if the proposed constitution were to be indicted for
unorthodoxy. There was, moreover, another consideration present in
the mind of the delegates. Government, if viewed as a science, involves
problems and difficulties formidable in character. If the technique of
leadership by which it is carried out is looked upon as an art, it is
baffling and complex. There is need then for caution and prudence, not
the duty but the necessity (to paraphrase Holmes) to keep continuity
with the past, to adhere to what has been insofar as it proved beneficial
or to the extent that it has formed part of the people's accustomed ways.
Nor can it be doubted that, from the inception of the American tutelage
at the beginning of the century, and even earlier for that matter, the
Filipinos were aware of the need for a bill of rights.
Moreover, by the time the Constitutional Convention met in 1934,
the Supreme Court of the Philippines had for over three decades been
busy at work construing the fundamental rights provisions of previous
organic acts enacted by the United States for this country, with
fundamental rights being embodied in nearly the very same language.
That was an added reason for a bill of rights of a distinctly
American cast.
The Filipino people were thus familiar with such guarantees, and
their retention as worded would be most natural. Some intellectuals
with a European background and a number of the surviving leaders of
the revolution-first against Spain and thereafter against the United
States in the early years of American rule, as was noted-were desirous
of incorporating some changes. They had in mind certain provisions of
the 1898 Malolos Constitution of the Philippines. In their opinion, that
was more in keeping with Filipino tradition and would reflect greater
responsiveness to local needs and conditions. While they were unable to
persuade the Convention to go as far as they might wish, they met with
some measure of success. By and large, though, the Bill of Rights of the
1935 Constitution adhered to what had been. Such a result, in light of
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what has been said, had almost the imprint of inevitability. There was
a contributing factor: The draft was prepared by a committee headed by
Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, the leading Filipino authority on
the subject of constitutional law and a Doctor of Civil Laws graduate of
the Yale Law School. He sponsored the draft, and he pressed for its
approval with all the persuasive powers at his command, arising from
the breadth of his scholarship and his gift of oratory.
So much for the fundamental rights provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is no longer in force. The present Constitution of the
Philippines was drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention. It came
into force and effect on January 17, 1973. The amendments to the Bill
of Rights (now Article IV of the Revised Constitution) are minimal.
Two new rights have been added, one being an express recognition of the
right of the people to have "access to official records and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions ...
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" (Sec. 6). The
other new right assures the speedy disposition of cases "before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies" (Sec. 16). The promptness required in the disposition of cases may be looked upon as implied
in the due process clause.
The search and seizure clause has been modified. It now reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 3)

Thus any possible ambiguity as to this guarantee being applicable to a
warrant of arrest has been dissipated. The former language gave rise to
doubts, as a literal reading would confine its scope only to search
warrants. Now there is the express requirement that for such arrest to be
constitutionally permissible there must be a "probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law .... " This last phrase is also an alteration. Where
formerly it was only a judge who could do so, now legislation may be
enacted vesting such competence in "such other responsible officer."
This innovation may be fraught with undesirable consequences. With a
judge, the element of impartiality is easier to attain: unlike a fiscal or
some other executive official, he is under no pressure to have the party
before him apprehended so that the prosecution can be started.
In the 1935 Constitution it was made clear that communication
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and correspondence "shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court or when public safety and order require otherwise" (Art. III, Sec.
I, par. [5]). A second paragraph has been added to Article IV, Section4,
in the present Constitution. It is therein explicitly provided: "Any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." This is a most
welcome feature of the new Constitution.
The present Constitution is likewise notable for the added vitality
accorded the guarantee against self-incrimination. It now reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.79

The epochal American Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizonaso supplied the basis for this mandate in the present Philippine
Constitution. If fully implemented, the opportunity for abusive practices committed against individuals interrogated under police custody
would be minimized. Without such a safeguard, there were fears that
their right against self-incrimination could be rendered futile.
There was also an addition to the provisions dealing with the rights
of an accused at the trial: "However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified" (Sec. 19).
Finally, it now suffices that the punishment be either cruel or unusual
(Sec. 21), where formerly it had to be both, to be unconstitutional.
Social and Economic Rights in the Philippines
There is a feature of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, even
more emphasized in the present Charter, that marked an advance in the
field of fundamental freedoms. In addition to the traditional civil and
political rights, there were provisions on social and economic rights, to
which not much thought appeared to have been paid when the laissez
faire theory was dominant. With the grave problem posed by the great
number of the poor and the needy in the developing countries-and this
observation would be applicable to most of the Asiatic nations, except
possibly Japan-it was imperative that the State actively participate in
its solution. Reliance on the free play of the market would not only be
futile but would even exacerbate the problem of the rich becoming even
79. Art. IV, Sec. 20. Only the first sentence was found in the former Bill of Rights,
Art. III, Sec. I, par. (18).
80. 348 us 436 (1966).
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more affluent and the poor becoming even more penurious. To avoid
any constitutional question, it was thought best to adopt guarantees of a
social and economic character, referring to those claims that have to be
attended to by the government to assure the promotion of individual
welfare and well-being. It is ironic to speak of the human dignity to
which everyone is entitled when decent living conditions still elude so
many of the poverty-stricken inhabitants of Asia.
In this regard, the American influence, as might have been expected, was minimal. While the United States can boast of a glorious
tradition in the field of traditional political and civil rights expressive of
the humanistic values that rightly elicited predominant judicial concern,
social and economic rights hardly formed part of the judicial agenda.
To repeat, in a developing country like the Philippines, that is a matter
of urgency. Without such rights, constitutional democracy will fail of
acceptance. So the 1934 Constitutional Convention believed, and it
acted on such conviction. The 1935 Constitution represented a departure from, and to that extent could be said to be an improvement of, its
American counterpart. That the Convention was moved to act thus was
in large part due to the vigorous advocacy of Delegate Manuel Roxas,
later the first President of the Republic of the Philippines. For him the
Constitution that was to be drafted should have
a definite and well defined philosophy, not only political but social and
economic. A constitution that in 1776 or in 1789 was sufficient in the
United States, considering the problems they had at that time, may not
now be sufficient with the growing and ever-widening complexities of
social and economic problems and relations .... If in this constitution
the gentleman will find declarations of economic policy, they are there
because they are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the
Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in selfdefense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the
patrimony, the freedom to grow; the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional provision automatically imposes.s1

One of the most vital national interests, an aspect of the country's
aspirations, is the promotion of a social order truly concerned with the
satisfaction of the primary needs of the common man. Accordingly, in
the Declaration of Principles, an Article that was itself an innovation, it
was expressly provided: "The promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people should be the
concern of the State" (Revised Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 5). This
provision is supplemented by this requirement: "The State shall afford
protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall
81. Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, vol. 3 (S. Laurel,
ed.), pp. 177-178.
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regulate the relation between landowner and tenant, and between labor
and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration" (Art. IV, Sec. 6). The power of eminent
domain was expanded to carry out the policy of transferring the
ownership of lands to tenants: "The Congress may authorize, upon
payment of just compensation the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals" (Art XIII,
Sec. 4). There was another manifestation of the enlarged sphere of
governmental power (Art. XIII, Sec. 6):
The State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense, establish
and operate industries and means of transportation and communications, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
Government. (Art. XII, Sec. 6)
As for social and economic rights, the changes in the present
Constitution are extensive. The social justice provision in the 1935
Constitution was limited to an expression of a general principle: "The
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of the State" (Art. II,
Sec. 5). There is a restatement of such a mandate in the present Charter
less productive of doubts as to how far it can affect property rights:
The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and
security of all the people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profit5. (Art. II,
Sec. 6)
The duty cast on government as to its implementation is made explicit:
The State shall establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social services
in the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare, and
social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent
standard of living (Sec. 7).
The age-old evil of tenancy was likewise sought to be met frontally:
The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program
aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and
achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution. (Art. XIV, Sec. 12)
The constitutional policy on social justice in the 1935 Constitution was
supplemented by the requirement that the State "shall afford protection
to labor, especially to working women and minors" (Art. XIV, Sec. 6).
The new fundamental law is much more definite:
The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment
and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless
of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organiza-
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tion, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and ~umane
conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arb1tratwn.
(Art. II, Sec. 9)

The Bill of Rights in Other Asiatic Countries
As far as the other Asiatic countries mentioned earlier are concerned, it may be said that the influence of the United States Constitution in their fundamental laws was not as considerable as in the case of
the Philippines, for which, as was noted, there is a historical explanation. Of those nations, the constitutions of Japan and Korea contain a
number of provisions of American origin. The fundamental laws of
Burma, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan, to a lesser degree, bear traces of
American concepts. The Constitution of Indonesia appears to have the
least connection.
Of the cognate rights of due process and equal protection, which
contributed much to the growth of American constitutional law, there
is no mention in those constitutions whatsoever of the former. Such an
omission may be due to the fears entertained that (as was the case for a
rather long time in the United States) due process could be availed of to
press the right to property to unreasonable extremes. That would
indeed be regrettable, for in all these countries, except perhaps Malaysia, social and economic rights are a prominent feature.
The Constitution of Burma speaks of cultural and educational
rights (Sec. 22) as well as economic rights (Sec. 23). India's Constitution in its Directive Principles of State Policy ordains: "The State shall
strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting
as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social,
economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national
life" (Part IV, Sec. 38). Section 39 is specific:
The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing: (a) that
the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate
means of livelihood; (b) that the ownership and control of the material
resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the
common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not
result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the
common detriment; (d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both
men and women: (e) that the health and strength of workers, men and
women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that the
citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited
to their age or strength; (f) that childhood and youth are protected
against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.

The Constitution of Indonesia provides for social welfare:
Economy shall be organized cooperatively. Branches of production
which are important to the State and which affect the life of most people,
shall be controlled by the State. Land and water and the natural riches
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therein shall be controlled by the State and shall be exploited for the
greatest welfare of the people. (Chap. XIV, Art. 33, Sees. 1-3)

The right to education is found in the Constitution of the Republic of
Korea:
(I) All citizens shall have the right to receive an equal education
corresponding to their abilities. (2) All citizens who have children under
their protection shall be responsible for at least their elementary education and other education as required by law. (3) Such compulsory
education shall be free. (4) Independence and political impartiality of
education shall be guaranteed. (5) Fundamental matters pertaining to the
educational system and its operation shall be determined by law. (Art.
27)

The right as well as the duty to work comes next:
(I) All citizens shall have the right to work. The State shall endeavor to
promote the employment of workers through social and economic
means. (2) All citizens shall have the duty to work. The contents and
conditions of the duty to work shall be determined by law in conformity
with democratic principles. (3) Standards of working conditions shall be
determined by law. (4) Special protection shall be accorded to working
women and children. (Art. 28)

Provision is then made for the right to association and collective
bargaining:
(I) The right to association, collective bargaining, and collective action of
workers shall be guaranteed within the scope defined by law. (2) The
right to association, collective bargaining, and collective action shall not
be accorded to workers who are public officials, except for those
authorized by the provisions oflaw. (3) The right to collective action may
be either restricted or may not be recognized in accordance with the
provisions of law for public officials and workers engaged in State, local,
autonomous governments, state-run enterprises, public utility businesses,
and enterprises which have serious influence on the national economy.
(Art. 29)

What is more, there is recognition of the goal of decent human
existence and social security:
(I) All citizens shall be entitled to a decent human life. (2) The State

shall endeavor to promote social security. (3) Citizens who are incapable
of making a living shall be protected by the State in accordance with
the provisions of law. (Art. 30)

The Constitution of Japan, after mentioning the right and obligation to
work, requires that standards for wages, hours, rest, and other working
conditions shall be fixed by law, and children "shall not be exploited"
(Art. 27). Article 28 guarantees the "right of workers to organize and to
bargain and act collectively."
So much then for substantive due process, which, as formerly
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interpreted by courts in the United States, could be attended with
mischievous consequences for the welfare of those at the bottom of the
economic pyramid. Procedural due process, however, even if not
referred to by such term, is not ignored. The Constitution of Burma is
quite clear: "No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty, nor his
dwelling entered, nor his property confiscated, save in accordance with
law" (Sec. 16). The same may be said of the Constitution of India: "No
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to procedure established by law" (Part III, Sec. 21 ). The Constitution of
Japan is well-nigh identical: "No person shall be deprived of life or
liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by Jaw" (Art. 31 ). The Constitution of
Korea is worded in a similar fashion: "All citizens shall enjoy personal
liberty. No person shall be arrested, detained, seized, searched, interrogated, punished, subjected to involuntary labor, or branded as security risk except as provided by law" (Art. 10, par. [1]). The Constitution of Malaysia is categorical: "No person shall be deprived of his life
or personal liberty save in accordance with law" (Part II, Art. 5, par.
[1]). The same thought in language that is not distinguishable appears
in the Constitution of Pakistan: "No person shall be deprived of life or
liberty save in accordance with law" (Part II, Chap. I, Sec. I).
Equality is an ideal highly prized by the Asiatic peoples. The
Constitution of Burma is explicit on the matter: .. All citizens irrespective of birth, religion, sex or race are equal before the law; that is to say,
there shall not be any arbitrary discrimination between one citizen or
class of citizens and another" (Sec. 13). Then: "There shall be equality
of opportunity for all citizens in matters of public employment and in the
exercise or carrying on of any occupation, trade, business or profession" (Sec. 14). After which comes a provision that is a step in the
direction of sexual equality: "Women shall be entitled to the same pay
as that received by men in respect of similar work" (Sec. 15). The
Constitution of India has an expanded equal protection clause: "The
State shall not deny to any person equality before the law, or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India" (Part III, Sec. 14).
The guarantee is made more specific:
The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. No citizen
shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any
of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition
with re~ard to: (~) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places
of pubhc entertamment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats,
roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of
St~te f~nds or dedicated to the use of the general public. Nothing in
this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for
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women and children. Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article
29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. (Sec. 15)
There is also equality prescribed for public service:
There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating
to employment or appointment to any office under the State. No citizen
shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of
birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated
against in respect of any employment or office under the State. Nothing
in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing,
in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an
office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within,
a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that
State or Union territory prior to such employment or appointment.
Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision
for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward
class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately
represented in the services under the State. Nothing in this article shall
affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an
office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational
institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination. (Sec. 16)
The concept of equality is set forth in the Constitution of Japan in
these terms:
All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race,
creed, sex, social status or family origin. Peers and peerage shall not be
recognized. No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall any such award be valid beyond the
lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it.
(Chap. III, Art. 14)
The Constitution of the Republic of Korea provides for the matter thus:
(I) All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no

discrimination in political, economic, social, or cultural life on account
of sex, religion or social status. (2) No privileged castes shall qe recognized, nor ever be established in any form. (3) The awarding of decorations or distinctions of honor in any form shall be effective only for
recipients, and no privileged status shall be created thereby. (Art. 9)
The Constitution of Malaysia has an equal protection clause similar to
that of India: "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled to
the equal protection of the law" (Part II, Art. 8, par. [1]). The next three
paragraphs of this article expand the guarantee thus:
(2) Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be
no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race,

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA

177

descent or place of birth in any law or in the appointment to any
office or employment under a public authority or in the administration
of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property
or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession,
vocation or employment. (3) There shall be no discrimination in favour
of any person on the ground that he is a subject of the Ruler of any State.
(4) No public authority shall discriminate against any person on the
ground that he is resident or carrying on business in any part of the
Federation outside the jurisdiction of the authority.

The Constitution of Pakistan, as does those of India and Malaysia, has
a similar version of the equal protection clause: "All citizens are equal
before the law and are entitled to equal protection of law" (Part II,
Chap. I, Art. 15). It also prescribes non-discrimination in respect of
access to public places:
In respect of access to places of public entertainment or resort, not
intended for religious purposes only, there shall be no discrimination
against any citizen on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex or
place of birth, but nothing herein shall be deemed to prevent the making
of any special provision for women. (Art. 16)

By Way of Conclusion
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the United States Constitution has had an impact, both deep-seated and profound, on the
fundamental laws of practically all the Asiatic countries that have
recently attained their statehood, as well as of Japan. That is easily
understandable. The United States has the oldest living written Constitution. It has stood the test of time and circumstance. Through its
judicious construction, it has been made adaptable to the constant flux
of events. It has more than proven its worth. It is a living instrument.
To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, it is not a printed finality but a
dynamic process.
There is this caveat, however. Necessarily, in view of the difference
of conditions in Asiatic countries, there cannot be literal adherence in
most cases to its leading constitutional law doctrines, even on the
assumption that they are possessed of the highest merit. Environmental
facts and the social milieu have to be taken into account. It cannot be
denied, though, that the spirit that informs a constitution, namely, as
the instrument to assure the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of
a country, has a significance that transcends national boundaries. To
that extent, Asia has kept the constitutional faith.
More specifically, the Bill of Rights as a limitation on the powers
of government is appreciated and to a great extent followed notwithstanding emergency or crisis conditions. Where judicial review is concerned, even now the landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison
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commands the utmost respect and provides an authoritative guide.
Lastly, there may be need to mention anew that in the sphere of social
and economic rights, in an area where the grave problems of poverty
and disease continue to plague the governments, the reliance on American concepts is understandably not as great, the United States having
the good fortune to have more than its share of the goods of existence
and to be blessed with affluence.

IX

Singapore

Editorial Note

Singapore, roughly two-thirds the area of New York City, with two and
one half million residents, generates well over twice the export income
of Indonesia, whose population is sixty times greater. On a similar scale
of contrast Singapore's approximate $6,000 per capita gross national
product contrasts with Indonesia's $100. These statistics serve merely to
illustrate the singularity of Singapore.
Autonomous in 1959, except for defense and foreign affairs,
Singapore was subsequently coupled, reluctantly, with peninsular Malaya, Sarawak, and Sa bah, to form the Federation of Malaysia in 1963.
The vicissitudes of the Confrontation with Indonesia, exacerbated by
Malay fears of potential domination of the Federation by Singapore
Chinese, led to Singapore's severance and emergence as an independent
nation two years later.
Beginning as Southeast Asia's preeminent entrepot, independent
Singapore under the tutelage of Lee Kuan Yew rapidly expanded
processing, trade, manufacturing, and industrial sectors. Precision
engineering, sophisticated electronics, shipbuilding, and textile manufacture represent the scope of exploitation of Singapore's only resource,
labor.
Note: This chapter was written in December 1977.
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The problems of miniscule territory, mushrooming population, and
absence of natural resources contributed to partial movement away
from democratic government and toward personalist rule and a oneparty system. Communalist conflict, though hardly so severe as in
Malaysia, reflects the division among 76 percent Chinese, 15 percent
Malays, and 7 percent Indians. Elections today are aptly described as
"Gallic referenda."
For treatment of the background of Singapore's legal apparatus,
see the chapter on Malaysia.
May 1978

ROGER K. PAGET

The Singapore Constitution
and the United States Constitution
S. Jayakumar
Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Singapore

Introduction

A quick overview of Singapore's constitutional development is essential
to our subsequent discussion.' Singapore's constitutional development
can be separated into four phases. The first phase was the colonial
phase. From the founding of Singapore in 1819 and until 1959, the
British administered Singapore as a colony. Until the Japanese Occupation Singapore was part of the Straits Settlements, but after World War
II, in 1946, Singapore was administered as a separate Crown Colony.
The second phase was that of self-government. In 1959 Singapore
achieved self-government and then received a new constitution from the
United Kingdom providing for a wholly elected legislature having
control over all matters except defence and foreign affairs and with a
limited role in internal security. The United Kingdom was responsible
for defence and external affairs. Third, there was the Malaysian phase,
when Singapore (together with the two Borneo states of Sabah and
Sarawak) became part of the Federation. Singapore, apart from now
being subject to the Malaysian federal constitution, also received then a
new state constitution. Singapore was part of Malaysia from September
16, 1963, until August 9, 1965. The final phase is the post-independence
era. Due to various irreconcilable differences between the Singapore
government and the Malaysian federal government, it was agreed by
both sides that Singapore would separate and become an independent
nation. This was effected through a mutual agreement, the Independence of Singapore Agreement, August 7, 1965.2
To the question of whether the Constitution of the United States
has influenced the Singapore Constitution, the candid answer must be
I. For a brief introduction to Singapore constitutional law, see the writer's Constitutional Law. with Documentary Materials (No. I in Singapore Law Series), 1976.
2. Singapore Government Gazette Extraordinary No. 66 of 1965; also in International Legal Materials, 932 (1965).
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in the negative. This, however, ought not be surprising, because (as was
seen in the preceding paragraph) prior to independence as well as after
independence there has not been a very intense relationship between the
political and legal systems of the two countries.
If the constitutional systems of any other countries have influenced
Singapore's Constitution, they are those of the United Kingdom and
Malaysia. The United Kingdom's influence on Singapore's constitutional law can be appreciated in the light of the British colonial
administration of Singapore over a long period, bringing with it the
influence of the English legal system, legal concepts, and law. In today's
independent Singapore, the legal system and much of the laws are still
influenced by English parallels, and indeed in some areas English law is
directly applicable. In the area of constitutional law, even though
Singapore has a written constitution and the United Kingdom has not,
English influence is nonetheless prominent, particularly in the parliamentary system of government which operates instead of a presidential
system like that of the United States. Furthermore, Singapore courts
have also been influenced by English judicial decisions in certain areas
of constitutional law such as that concerning preventive detention. The
facts that all the older-generation legal practitioners received their legal
training in the United Kingdom and that several key political leaders
studied in the United Kingdom are also important explanatory factors.
More recently, however, Malaysian influence on Singapore's constitutional development has been significant. One factor explaining this
is that both Singapore and the states which make up the Malaysian
federation were administered by Britain, and this common feature
resulted in many similarities concerning the administration of law and
legal systems. Even now when the two countries are separate independent sovereign states, it is quite common for courts in both countries to refer to each other's judicial decisions in various fields, including
constitutional law. The Malaysian constitutional influence on Singapore
came to a climax when Singapore was part of Malaysia from September 16, 1963, to August 9, 1965, during which period Singapore was
governed by the federal Constitution. After Singapore separated from
Malaysia, the Malaysian influence was maintained to a large extent
because independent Singapore's legislature provided that certain Articles of the Malaysian Constitution would continue to have force in
Singapore (including most of the provisions dealing with fundamental
liberties). Therefore, Malaysian judicial decisions interpreting these
provisions are also relevant to Singapore. For these reasons, much of
what the Honourable Tun Mohamed Suffian, Lord President of Malaysia, has said in his chapter in this book would, mutatis mutandis, be
applicable for Singapore, too, especially his comments on the scope of
the provisions for fundamental liberties.
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The relevance and extent of the Malaysian influence can best be
illustrated by reference to the perspectives of the 1966 Constitutional
Commission of Singapore. This commission, chaired by the Chief
Justice, was appointed to make recommendations to the government,
inter alia, on constitutional provisions to safeguard rights of minorities
and to prevent discrimination. In its Report the Commission made it
clear that, regarding fundamental rights, it was of the opinion that the
preexisting influence of Malaysian constitutional provisions should in
the main be maintained and in this connection stressed the "common
destiny" of the peoples of the two countries:
We approached this task bearing in mind that the provisions of Part
II of the present Constitution of Malaysia-being provisions dealing with
fundamental rights-were applicable to Singapore when it was a part of
Malaysia and continue with one exception to apply in Singapore since
its separation from Malaysia. We have looked at a large number of
Constitutions which contain provisions dealing with fundamental rights
and freedoms, but believing, as we do, that it would be wise, desirable
and practical, having regard to the past, the present and the future, to
preserve the common destiny of the peoples of Singapore and Malaysia,
we do not propose in our recommendations on fundamental rights to
depart, except where we think it is necessary and desirable, from the
form and substance of similar provisions in the Malaysian Constitution.J

Notwithstanding such English and Malaysian influences, the constitutional law of Singapore has its unique characteristics, which will be
brought out later in this chapter.
Extent of American Influence
on Singapore's Constitutional Documents
One index of contemporary American influence would be the extent to
which legislators and draftsmen, when addressing themselves to major
constitutional questions, borrow ideas from the United States Constitution. The evidence that is available does not disclose any significant
direct American influence on the drafting and development of Singapore's constitutional documents. Three different instances may be
considered.
The 1963 Constitution for the State of Singapore, promulgated
when Singapore joined Malaysia, was legally effected by a United
Kingdom Order-in-Council. 4 It must, however, be viewed as a negotiated document, as the draft was annexed to the Malaysia Agreement.
This 1963 Constitution, which with later amendments continues to be
the republic's Constitution, does not reveal any special influence of the
3. Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966, par. 14.
4. The Sabah. Sarawak and Singapore (State Constitutions) Order in Council
(1963) 2 U.K. S.l. 2656 (No. 1493).
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U.S. Constitution apart from the "supremacy clause,"5 which provided
that statutes inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution would
be invalid. It cannot be disputed that this "supremacy clause,'' which
can be found in the modern constitutions of many nations, owes its
origins to the constitutional doctrine of supremacy of the Constitution
and judicial review established by the United States Supreme Court in
the classic case of Marbury v. Madison.6
Next, we may consider the Report of the 1966 Constitutional
Commission. The Commission discussed in detail important questions
of fundamental liberties, including the concepts of equality and equal
protection. An American scholar might logically have thought that this
would be a likely occasion where American constitutional concepts and
doctrine might have been discussed. The Report, however, does not
disclose this; there is no express reference to the provisions or position
in the United States (although on other matters the Commission
referred to the positions of Guyana and Scandinavian nations). It
should be mentioned that the Commission recommended a new provision to deal with fundamental liberty:
No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
punishment or other treatment. 7

This bears a close resemblance to the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments."
The Commission did not say that it was borrowing from the U.S.
Constitution, but it did say that it looked "at other written constitutions" and found this right to be acknowledged and protected in
all of them.
It could well be that American constitutional provisions were
discussed in the proceedings of the Commission, but, unfortunately,
there is no published record of its detailed deliberations. (We should
here recall that the Constitutional Commission in its Report revealed
its inclination to maintain as much as possible of the provisions for
fundamental liberties inherited from Malaysia).
It is also useful to consider the Singapore Parliament's debate on
the Report of the 1966 Constitutional Commission, for that represents
the latest major legislative debate in Singapore on constitutional questions. In this parliamentary debate at least twenty-five legislators
5. S. 52 reads" Any law enacted by the Legislature after the coming into operation
of this Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be void."
6. I Cranch 137, 2 LEd. 60 (1803).
7. This, together with certain other recommendations of the Commission which
were in principle acceptable to the government, has not yet been incorporated in the
Constitution.
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participated, including three Cabinet Members (Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister for Law). Here again the record of the
legislative debate shows that none of the legislators who spoke on the
Commission's proposals referred to provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
It is interesting, on the other hand, to note that several speakers
referred to the American experience, especially with regard to the
question of moulding a united nation out of a cosmopolitan population. That this should have been their preoccupation is understandable,
since Singapore is multi-racial, and one of the specific matters dealt with
by the Commission was the safeguarding of minority interests to ensure
non-discrimination. Thus the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
referred to the American experience in making his point that the
American multi-ethnic society was distinguishable from Singapore's
multi-racial society:
I am not suggesting that a multi-racial society is the ideal society in all
circumstances. In fact, the great powers of this world today consist of
nations which are ethno-centric in composition. True, both the Americans and the Russians have more than one single race or one single
language group or one single religion. But there is in both countries one
single race or ethnic group which shares one common language and
whose culture is, by reason of its dynamism or aggressiveness, far in
dominance over the others comprised in the nation. Be that as it may for
aspirants to world powers, we are confronted, as a young migrant
community, with the problem of continuing a tolerant, meaningful
society for some two million people nearly all of whom cannot trace their
links with the Republic for more than 150 years. s

Similarly, the Foreign Minister referred to the American multi-racial
situation:
If you were to read the history of modern nations, for example Britain-I

used to read English history when I was a boy-you will discover that
once upon a time, there was no such thing as "Britain." There were
"English," "Saxons" and "Normans." They thought of themselves as
minority groups. Only 100 years ago, there was no such thing as a
German nation; there was no such thing as an Italian nation. In fact,
there was no such thing as an American nation when Malacca was
founded. There were Poles, immigrants of all kinds-just like us. Then
over a period of years, the Americans had to constitute themselves into a
nation. It was necessary. For example, the early settlers of America
thought of themselves as Dutch, French, German, English and Irish and
over a period of 100 years or more, they had learned to think of
themselves as Americans. They have not yet completed the process, but
today, a Dutchman or even a Japanese or Chinese or Negro from
America will tell you that he is an American.9
8. Parliamentary Debates, Republic of Singapore, Official Report, Vol. 25,
col. 1283.
9. Ibid., at col. 1363.
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Influence of American Judicial Decisions
From what has already been said about the little influence of the United
States Constitution on Singapore's constitutional concepts and institutions, it should not be surprising that American judicial decisions are
seldom mentioned in judgments by Singapore courts in constitutional
Jaw cases. Because of the influences of the English legal system and the
affinity with Malaysian constitutional provisions, Singapore courts are
influenced more by United Kingdom and Malaysian judicial decisions.
Indian constitutional Jaw judgments are also heavily drawn upon as
persuasive authorities; this is also the position in Malaysia. The explanation for the relevance of Indian judgments in Singapore and Malaysian courts is that the Malaysia and Singapore constitutional provisions
in several respects have close similarity with the provisions of the Indian
Constitution (concerning, e.g., public servants, fundamental liberties,
emergency powers, and preventive detention). However, where the
courts feel that the position here is different, they will not follow the
Indian judgments.
The last reported instance when a Singapore court had to assess
the relevance of American authorities was in Lee Mau Seng v. Minister
for Home Affairs, Singapore and Anor. 10 Here a person detained under
preventive detention legislation had been denied for twenty days after
his arrest his constitutional right to counsel. In an application for
habeas corpus it was argued that this amounted to an abuse of power
justifying an order for release. United States and Indian authorities
were cited.
Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin, who decided the case, held, however,
that "habeas corpus is not an available remedy to a person who, after
his arrest by the police and under lawful detention by the police under
powers conferred [by the legislation], has been refused by the police his
constitutional right under article 5 (3) of the Constitution to be allowed
to consult a legal practitioner of his choice." The learned judge felt that
some other available remedy ought to be sought.
In handling the American authorities cited by counsel, Chief
Justice Wee Chong Jin distinguished them by saying:
The American authorities all deal with the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States of America, the relevant provisions
of which provide that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right
to have the assistance of counsel for his defence."
As I understand the law in America to be, it has been decided that under
the Sixth Amendment, unless an accused at his trial has waived his
right to be assisted by counsel, "compliance with this constitutional
mandate is an essential prerequisite to a Federal Court's authority to
10. [1971) 2 Malayan Law Journal (hereinafter cited at M.L.J.).
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deprive an accused of his life or liberty," so that a conviction of a
person who did not effectively waive his constit~tional .rig.ht .to. counsel
for his defence is void as having been rendered Without JUnsdlctwn thus
entitling the accused person, to whom expiration of time has rendered
relief by way of application for a new trial or by appeal unavailable, to
habeas corpus as an available remedy (Johnson v. Zerbst 11 ). In America,
therefore, habeas corpus is available because a conviction being void,
the convicted person's imprisonment is unlawful. 12

In a recently decided Singapore constitutional law case, Lee Keng
Guan and Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, 13 the Court of Criminal Appeal
had to decide a significant argument on equal protection of the law.
However, no American cases were referred to in the judgment; instead,
the Court accepted certain principles enunciated in an Indian decision.
The Written Constitution
It could be said that Singapore's constitutional system is similar to that
of the United States and Malaysia in that Singapore's Constitution also
is in written form. However, unlike the United States or Malaysia,
which have their constitutional provisions in one single composite
constitution (at least their federal constitutions), this is not the case in
Singapore. In Singapore there is a plurality of basic constitutional
documents, and therefore reference has to be made to the following
three basic constitutional documents: The Constitution of Singapore
(including amendments made after Singapore's separation); The Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 (No. 9 of 1965); The
Constitution of Malaysia, certain provisons of which were made applicable by The Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965.' 4
The "Constitution of Singapore" refers to the state constitution
which Singapore received when it joined Malaysia. When it separated
from Malaysia, this continued to have legal effect, but being a state
constitution it was inadequate in many respects for an independent
nation. Since separation this document has been amended on several
occasions. The Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 is a
significant statute enacted by Singapore's legislature four months after
separation to provide, inter alia, "that all existing laws shall continue in
force on or after Singapore Day.'' But this was subject to "modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to
bring them into conformity with this Act and with the independent
status of Singapore upon separation from Malaysia.'' Certain provisions of the Constitution of Malaysia were made applicable in Singapore as a result of Section 6 of the aforementioned Republic of
II. 58 S.Ct. 1019.
12. [1971] 2 M.L.J. 141.
13. [1977) 2 M.L.J. 95.
14. The texts of these three documents are set out in the appendices in the writer's
book Constitutional Law (cited in n. I above).
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Singapore Independence Act, which prescribed that certain specified
provisions of the Malaysian Constitution (including most of the provisions concerning fundamental liberties and emergency powers) would
continue to have force in Singapore. This was because the Singapore
state constitution lacked these provisions. Thus, although the Singapore Constitution was not expressly amended to incorporate these
Malaysian provisions, there is no doubt that these Malaysian. provisions are an integral part of Singapore's constitutional law. The
Republic of Singapore Independence Act, in this regard, must be
viewed not as routine legislation but as fundamental legislation enacted
by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power.
In 1970 the government indicated that a new composite Constitution was in the making, but, as this has not yet been promulgated, the
above mentioned plurality of constitutional documents continues.
Supremacy of the Constitution
The Singapore Constitution can be said to have a similarity with United
States constitutional law in that it embodies the concept of the
supremacy of the Constitution. Article 52 of the Constitution provides
that "Any law enacted by the Legislature after the coming into operation of this Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution
shall, to the extent of this inconsistency, be void. "15
A constitutional lawyer, however, must recognize that the efficacy
of the concept of the supremacy clause and of the general concept of a
written constitution limiting legislative powers depends on several other
factors. One such factor is whether the constitution can be easily
amended.
In this regard the Singapore Constitution, with the exception of
one Part, is very flexible. Article 90 provides that the Constitution can
be amended "by a law enacted by the Legislature"; that is, the procedure for amending the Constitution is the same as that for amending
any other law. The exception is that Part 28 of the Constitution
(Protection of the Sovereignty of the Republic of Singapore) can be
amended only if there is support of not less than two-thirds of the total
number of votes cast by electors at a national referendum.
These provisions on amendment of the Singapore Constitution can
provide an interesting basis for discussing the following remarks of
Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated American case of Marbury v.
Madison:
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution
controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the Legislature may
15. The date of coming into operation was September 16, 1963.

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA

189

alter the Constitution bl' an ordinarl' act. Between these alternatives
there is no middle grou~i The Cons.titution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the
Legislature shall please alter it. If the former _of . the. alternativ~s
be true, then a legislative act contrary to the ConstitutiOn IS not law; If
the latter be true, then written Constitutions are absurd attempts, on the
part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
(Emphasis added.)l6

The fascinating question is whether the Singapore Constitution is
"middle ground," which Chief Justice Marshall claims can never exist.
It is true that most of the provisions of the Singapore Constitution may
be altered by the legislature "by an ordinary act." But this does not
mean that the Singapore Constitution is "an absurd attempt ... to limit
a power in its own nature illimitable" because, as was pointed out,
where a statute is in conflict with the constitutional provisions, Article
52 states that the statutory provision shall be void. The courts have
proceeded on the basis that they can strike down a statute for invalidity.
However, if every statute that conflicts with the Constitution is to
be regarded as an "implied amendment" to the Constitution, then the
supremacy clause would be rendered otiose and the courts would never
be able to strike down a statute as invalid for inconsistency with the
Constitution. It is interesting to note that in the few occasions where the
courts had to consider the constitutional validity of statutory provisions, the argument of implied amendment has not been raised.
Fundamental Liberties
In General
Most of the articles on fundamental liberties in the Malaysian
Constitution are still applicable in Singapore. In view of this, much of
what the Honourable Tun Suffian, the Lord President of Malaysia, has
said (in his chapter on Malaysia) on fundamental liberties would be also
descriptive of the position in Singapore. Therefore I shall not repeat all
the points mentioned by him. There are, however, two important
qualifications concerning the applicability of the Malaysian fundamental liberties provisions in Singapore.
The first qualification is that, in my view, the Malaysian constitutional provisions apply in Singapore as they stood on August 9, 1965,
the date of separation and date of operation of the Republic of
Singapore Independence Act, 1965, and I submit that this is the proper
interpretation of the Act.I 7 Thus, amendments to the Malaysian provisions made by the Malaysian legislature after the operative date do not
16. I Cranch 137 at 177.
17. See pp. 6 and 7 of the writer's Constitutional Law.
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apply in Singapore. This point is important because after separation
Malaysia amended some provisions of the Constitution, including those
on fundamental liberties.
The second qualification is that one provision dealing with fundamental liberties found in the Malaysian Constitution was expressly
declared by the Singapore legislature to cease to have effect in Singapore.18 This was Article 13, which stated that no person shall be
deprived of property ··save in accordance with law" and that no law
shall provide for compulsory acquisition or use of property "without
adequate compensation." The statements made in Parliament suggest
that the government was not in favour of this provision insofar as it
allowed judicial review over the quantum of compensation.'9

"Due Process of Law" and "In Accordance with Law··
The Honourable Tun Suffian has pointed out that while in America no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property "without
due process of law," the Malaysian Article 5 (1), which applies in
Singapore, states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty "save in accordance with law."
In an article published ten years ago,2° well before the provision
was considered by Singapore or Malaysian courts, I considered the
possible interpretation of the Malaysian provision and also considered
an Indian case, Gopalan v. State of Madras, 21 and a Burmese case,
Tinsa Maw Naing v. Commissioner of Police, Rangoon. 22 These two
cases had interpreted "in accordance with law" in the Indian and
Burmese constitutions to mean merely compliance with enacted law. I
analyzed these cases and argued that "reliance on these cases is unwise
in interpreting our provision," and stated that while "opposition to the
adoption of a controversial concept such as the substantive due process" is understandable "there appear to be no good reasons why Article
5 (1) should be incapable of being interpreted to require any law (or
executive act) depriving persons of life or personal liberty to comply
with the rules of natural justice. It will be interesting to await the
interpretation which the judges will give to this provision." 23
In Comptroller General of Inland Revenue v. N.P. 24 and in
Arumugam Pillai v. Government of Malaysia2 5 the Malaysian courts
18. S. 6 (3) of the Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965, Act No.9 of 1965.
19. See statement of Minister for Law, Mr. E. W. Barker, Singapore Parliamentary
Debates, Official Report, vol 25, col. 1054.
20. "Constitutional Limitations on Legislative Powers in Malaysia" (1967) 9
Malava Law Review 96.
·21. A.I.R. (1950) S.C. 27. 22. 1950 Burma Law Rep. 17.
23. "Constitutional Limitations . . . ," n. 20 at p. I0 I.
24. [1973] I M.L.J. 165. 25. [1975] 2 M.L.J. 29.
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have indeed interpreted Article 5 (I), though not in a detailed manner.
These two decisions suggest that the courts follow the Indian and
Burmese cases in holding that "law" means only enacted law and that
there was no scope for including rules of natural justice as a criterion
with which to assess the validity of laws. It is most likely that, if the
question arose in Singapore, the Singapore courts would take a similar
approach.

Right to Counsel
The Singapore courts interpreted the Malaysian Article 5 (3) in the
same way as the Malaysian courts (see the chapter on Malaysia). Thus,
it was held in Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs, Singapore
and Anor.26 that:
The language of Article 5 (3) of the Constitution is clear and simple.
If a person who is arrested wishes to consult a legal practitioner of his
choice, he is, beyond a shadow of doubt, entitled to have this constitutional right granted to him by the authority who has custody of him
after his arrest and this right must be granted to him within a reasonable time after his arrest. (Emphasis added.)

Note that the Court did not say that the right must always be granted
from the moment of arrest. Thus the position is different from the right
to counsel in the United States.
Other Similarities and Differences
When the Singapore and United States constitutions or constitutional
systems are compared, their other similarities and differences can be
summarized as follows:

Absence of Federalism
Singapore is a unitary state, and the federal principle has never
operated within Singapore, although Singapore had a taste of federalism when it was a constituent state within Malaysia. Therefore, all rules
and concepts of American constitutional law turning on the federalstate division of powers find no analogy in Singapore.
Parliamentary System of Government
While the United States has the presidential system, Singapore, like
Malaysia, is influenced by the United Kingdom and has the parliamentary system, whereby the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues are
members of the legislature and elected as such. Certain concepts which
are unwritten conventions in England are expressly incorporated in the
26. [1971] 2 M.L.J. 137.
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Singapore Constitution, such as the principle of the Cabinet's collective
responsibility to Parliament.
It is true that in Singapore there is a President, but like the English,
Indian, or Malaysian heads of state he has no major discretionary
functions, and the general rule is that he must act on advice of the
Cabinet.
Unicameral Legislature
Singapore, being a small, compact country, has always had a
unicameral legislature and in this respect differs from the U.S., the
U.K., Malaysia, and India, which have bicameral legislatures. It should
be pointed out here that there exists a Presidential Council for Minority
Rights,27 which, while not part of the legislature, performs an advisory
role to the legislature and is linked with the legislative process because
the Council has to consider all legislative bills28 and report whether
there are any provisions which are discriminatory.
27. Part IV A of the Singapore Constitution.
28. But the following legislative bills are excluded: a money bill; a bill certified by
the Prime Minister as being one which affects the defence or the security of Singapore or
which relates to public safety, peace, or good order in Singapore; or a bill certified by the
Prime Minister to be so urgent that it is not in the public__interest to delay its enactment.

Biographical Sketches of
the Asian Authors

Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, BANGLADESH
Abu Sayeed Chowdhury was born in Tangail on January 31, 1921, during the
British colonial period. He graduated from the Presidency College in Calcutta
in 1940, and went on to earn his M.A. and Bachelor of Laws degrees from
Calcutta University. In 1947 he was called to the English Bar from Lincoln's
Inn. As a student he was General Secretary of the Presidency College Union
and, in 1946, President of the British Branch of the All-India Muslim Students
Federation.
The positions Mr. Justice Chowdhury has held include the following: Advocate-General of East Pakistan, 1960-61; Member of the Constitution Convention, 1960-61; Judge, Dacca High Court, 1961-1972; Member, United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, 1971-74; Member or Leader of the Delegation
of Bangladesh to many international conferences, including Leader of the
Bangladesh Delegation to the 30th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly in 1975; and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dacca.
In 1971 he organized and led the Bangladesh liberation movement abroad,
with headquarters in London. He was sworn in as the first President of
Bangladesh on January 12, 1972. He was reelected by Parliament for a five-year
term in the spring of 1973, but served in that capacity only until he took a
position as Cabinet Minister on December 24, 1973. He was Foreign Minister
of Bangladesh when a change of government in November 1975 led him to
move to London, where he resides at present. He visited Bangladesh in 1977.
Mr. Justice Chowdhury married Begum Khurshid Chowdhury in 1948; they
have one daughter and two sons. His hobbies are reading and gardening.
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Professor Herbert Han-Pao Ma, REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Herbert H. P. Ma was born on November 27, 1926, in Hankow, Hupei
Province, China. He attended National Futan University in Shanghai, China,
from 1944 to 1947. He received his LL.B. degree from National Taiwan
University in Taipei, Taiwan, in 1950. He conducted advanced research in law
at Harvard University in 1964 and again during the 1975-76 academic year.
Professor Ma taught in the School of Law of the University of Washington
(Seattle) in 1971.
From 1966 to 1971 he was Executive Secretary, China Council on SinoAmerican Cooperation in Humanities and Social Sciences of the Academia
Sinica. He held the appointment of Research Professor, National Science
Council, Republic of China, 1969-71, and received the Distinguished Service
Award of that nation's Ministry of Education in both 1967 and 1971.
Professor Ma is currently Professor of Law at National Taiwan University,
and Member, Examination Yuan, Republic of China. His scholarly publications include such works as Essays on Western Legal Thought (in Chinese),
General Principles of Private International Law (in Chinese), Trade and
Investment in Taiwan: The Legal and Economic Environment in the Republic
of China (in English), and numerous articles.
Dr. Pradyumna Kumar Tripathi, INDIA
P. K. Tripathi was born on May 24, 1924, in Bhanpura, Madhya Pradesh,
British India. He graduated from Maharaja Shivaji Rao High School, Indore,
in 1940, and then attended Holkar College in Indore, from which he received a
diploma in intermediate science (1942), a B.S. (1944), and his LL.B. (1946). In
1949 he earned the LL.M. degree from the University of Delhi, and completed
his work for the J.S.D. at Columbia University in New York in 1957. In the
same year he married Kusum Tendulkar; they have one son, Pradar.
In his academic career, Dr. Tripathi progressed from Lecturer ( 1949-59) to
Reader in Law at the University of Delhi (1959-61 ), to Professor and Head of
Department (University of Allahabad, 1961-65; University of Delhi, 1965-71).
From 1971 until late 1977 he served as a Member of the Law Commission of
India and its Executive Committee and then returned to his professorial duties
at the University of Delhi. He was Parker Fellow at the Law School of
Columbia University ( 1955-56), visiting Professor of Law at the University of
Singapore (1963), and Leverhulm Visiting Fellow at the Law School of the
University of Melbourne, Australia, in 1971. Dr. Tripathi is also a member both
of the Legal Education Committee of the Bar Council of India, and of the
Executive Committee of the Indian Law Institute. He was National Lecturer for
Law, 1971-72, and was the first Indian academic lawyer to present the Kashinath Trimbak Telang Endowment Lectures in 1971. His lectures were published
by Bombay University as Some Insights into the Fundamental Rights. Besides
his other book, Spotlights on Constitutional Interpretation (Bombay, 1972), he
has published many papers in Indian journals and in American legal
periodicals.
Chief Justice Dr. Oemar Seno Adji, INDONESIA
Oemar Seno Adji was born in Solo, Central Java, on December 5, 1915,
when most of present Indonesia was the Dutch East Indies. He earned his
degree from the Faculty of Law, Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, in 1949.
In 1964 Dr. Seno Adji visited the United States on an Eisenhower Exchange
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Fellowship. Before assuming his present duties as Chief Justice of the Supre~e
Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr. Seno Adji served as Minister of Justice
(1966-1974) and Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of
Indonesia, Jakarta. He represented Indonesia at the United Nations Conference
on Crime Prevention. Among his writings are Innovation in Criminal Justice in
Indonesia, "Indonesia Rechstaat," "Press Freedom, Mass Media, and the
Law," and publications on criminal law. He is married and has eight children.
Professor Nobushige Ukai, JAPAN
Nobushige Ukai was born on March 9, 1906, in Tokyo, Japan. He received
his B.Juris. degree from Tokyo Imperial University in 1930, and taught at Seoul
Imperial University in Korea from 1931 to 1946, except for studies at Harvard
Law School and teaching at Carleton College in 1940. He received his D.Juris.
degree from the University of Tokyo in 1955, where he was Professor from 1947
until 1961, and Director of the Social Science Research Institute in 1952 and
1953. In this country, he has lectured extensively, at such schools as Southern
Illinois University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts
University ( 1960-61) and Stanford University ( 1956-57). He served as President
of International Christian University in Tokyo from 1961 to 1967, and returned
to teaching at Seikei University (1968-75) and Senshu University (1975).
Professor Ukai has been President of the Japan Public Law Association, and
member of such agencies as the Experts Committees of the Ministry of Local
Autonomy and the National Personnel Authority of Japan, the Library Committee of the Supreme Court, and the Public Safety Commission of the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government. He has also been associated closely with the work
of the Grew Foundation, the Bancroft Foundation, and the American Studies
Foundation of Japan.
Among Professor Ukai's numerous publications in Japanese are books on
Japan's constitutional law, administrative law, local government system, public
employee laws, civil liberties, and judiciary, as well as on America's jurisprudence. His writings in English on civil liberties, politics, and law in Japan
have appeared in several American law and social science journals.
Lord President Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, MALAYSIA
Tun Mohamed Suffian was born on December II, 1917, at Kota Lama Kiri
near Kuala Kangsar, Malaysia. ("Tun" is a title conferred by His Majesty the
King of Malaysia.) He was educated at Clifford School (Kuala Kangsar,
Perak). From Gonville and Caius ~ollege, Cambridge University, he earned his
M.A. and LL.B. degrees. He became Barrister-at-Law in 1941 after studies at
the Middle Temple, London. Tun Suffian served as a radio announcer on AllIndia Radio ( 1942-45) and on BBC (London, 1945-46). He was in the Malayan
Civil Service in 1948 and the Malayan Judicial and Legal Service from 1949 to
1961. In international service, he was Malayan delegate to the U.N. Conferences on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1960 and 1961. He was awarded an
Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship in 1964, and the Ramon Magsaysay Award
(the Philippines) in 1975.
Tun Suffian played a notable role as advisor in the drafting of the Malayan
constitution ( 1956), and was honorary advisor on constitutional matters to the
Sultan of Brunei in 1959. He has served as President of the Council for the
Promotion of Higher Education in Malaysia ( 1973-76), and Pro-Chancellor of
the University of Malaya (1963- ). Before assuming the position of Lord
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President of the Federal Court of Malaysia in 1974 (the equivalent of the U.S.
Chief Justice), he was Solicitor General (1959-61) and a member of the
appellate bench. He is author of An Introduction to the Constitution of
Malaysia, and the famous "Suffian Report," as Chairman of the Royal
Commission on Salaries in the Public Service. Tun Suffian has long been an
active member of the Advisory Editorial Board of The Malal'an Law Journal.
He is married to Toh Puan Bunny.
·

Senior Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando, THE PHILIPPINES
Enrique M. Fernando was born in 1915 during the period when the Philippines was under American sovereignty. He earned his law degree, magna cum
laude, at the University of the Philippines in 1938, and obtained his LL.M.
degree in 1948 after studying as the first Filipino Sterling Fellow at Yale
University. While serving on his nation's highest tribunal, he retains his
positions as George A. Malcolm Professor of Constitutional law at the University of the Philippines, and Professor of Law in the Lyceum of the Philippines,
and Santo Tomas University. His past positions of responsibility have included
the following: legal advisor to three Filipino Presidents (R. Magsaysay, C. P.
Garcia, and F. E. Marcos); Philippines' representative to four United Nations
Southeast Asian Regional Seminars on Human Rights; Co-Chairman, Philippine Delegation, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 1968;
Member, Philippine Delegation to the United Nations, 1977. Justice Fernando
has twice been chosen Chairman of the Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines. He has written and spoken frequently on human rights and the Constitution of the Philippines, in recent years under a martial law situation. He was a
major speaker at the World Peace Through Law Conference in Washington,
D.C., in 1975, and in Manila in 1977, when he was Chairman of the
Resolutions Committee. He was invited to present the First Tun Razak
Memorial Lecture in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1977. He is the author of a
treatise on the Constitution of the Philippines.
Justice Fernando is married to Emma Quisumbing, also a member of the
Philippine Bar; they have five children.
Dean S. Jayakumar, SINGAPORE
S. Jayakumar is Associate Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law,
University of Singapore, where he has been teaching since 1964. He earned his
law degrees from the University of Singapore (LL.B.) and Yale University Law
School (LL.M.). From 1971 to 1974 he served as Singapore's Permanent
Representative to the United Nations and as High Commissioner to Canada
with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
His articles and notes on issues of constitutional law, international law, and
legal education in various law journals are many. He has published three books:
Public International Law Cases from Malaysia and Singapore ( 1974); Constitutional Law Cases from Malaysia and Singapore ( 1976, 2nd ed.); and Constitutional Law, No. I in the Singapore Law Series (1976).

Short Bibliography
on Law and Constitutionalism in Asia

General
Bayley, David H. Public Liberties in the New States (Chicago: Rand McNally
& Co., 1964).
Carey, John. UN Protection of Civil and Political Rights (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1971 ).
Claude, Richard P., ed. Comparative Human Rights (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
Duchacek, Ivo. Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions (Santa
Barbara: ABC Clio Press, 1973).
Ehrmann, Henry W. Comparative Legal Cultures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1976).
Groves, Harry E. Comparative Constitutional Law (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1963).
Hooker, M. B. Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and NeoColonial Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
Lawasia. Journal of the Law Association of Asia and the Western Pacific,
c/o Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Kensington, N.S.W.
2033, Australia.
Spann, R.N., ed. Constitutionalism in Asia (Bombay: Asia Publishing House,
1963).
Studies in the Law of the Far East and Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.:
Washington Foreign Law Society, 1956).
Universal Human Rights: An International Scholar(l' Journal of Law, Philosophy and the Social Sciences (New York: Earl M. Coleman Publishers).
Weeramantry, C. G. Equality and Freedom: Some Third World Perspectives
(Colombo: Hansa Publishers Ltd., 1976).

(197)

198

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

East Asia
Cohen. Jerome A. Criminal Processes in the People's Republic of China,
1949-1963 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).
- - - · ed. Contemporary Chinese Law: Research Problems and Perspectives
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
Hahm, Pyong-choon. The Korean Political Tradition and Law (Seoul: Hollym
Publishers, 1967).
Henderson, Dan Fenno, ed. The Constitution of Japan: Its First Twenty
Years, 1947-67 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969).
Henderson, Gregory. Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1968).
Itoh, Hiroshi, and Lawrence W. Beer. The Constitutional Case Law of Japan:
Selected Supreme Court Decisions, 1961-1970 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978).
Law in Japan: An Annual, Japanese American Society for Legal Studies,
Seattle and Tokyo, cj o Asian Law Program, University of Washington,
Seattle, Washington 98195.
Laws of the Republic of Korea (Seoul: The Korean Legal Center, 1975).
Translations of 101 laws, including the six Codes.
Li, Victor H. Law without Lawyers (Stanford: Stanford Alumni Association,
1977).
Maki, John M. Court and Constitution in Japan: Selected Supreme Court
Decisions, 1948-1960 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964).
Tsao, W. Y. The Constitutional Structure of Modern China (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1947).
Southeast Asia
Badgley, John, et a!. The Future of Burma in Perspective (Columbus: Ohio
State University Press, 1978).
Brown, B. J., ed. Fashion of Law in New Guinea: Being an Account of the
Past, Present and Developing System of Laws in Papua and New Guinea
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1969).
Butler, William J., eta!. The Decline of Democracy in the Philippines (Geneva:
International Commission of Jurists, 1977).
Fernando, Enrique M. Reflections on the Revised Constitution (Manila:
Supreme Court Press, 1974).
- - - · The Rule of Law under Martial Law: The Philippine Experience (Manila: Supreme Court Press, 1975).
Jayakumar, S. Constitutional La-.v (with Documentary Materials). Singapore
Law Series, No. I (Singapore: Malaya Law Review, 1976).
- - - · Constitutional Law Cases from Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore:
Malayan Law Journal "Pte. Ltd., 1976, 2nd ed.).
Lev, Daniel S. Islamic Courts in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972).
Steinberg, Joel, ed. In Search of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971 ).
Suffian bin Hashim, Tun Mohamed. An Introduction to the Constitution of
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1976, 2nd ed.).
___ , H. P. Lee, and F. A. Trindade, eds. The Development of the Constitution of Malaysia in Its First Twenty Years: 1957-1977 (Selangor, Malaysia:
Oxford University Press, 1978).

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA

199

Ter Haar, B. Adat Law in Indonesia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948).
South Asia
Choudhury, G. W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan (London: Longman, 1969, 2nd ed.).
- - - · The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1974).
- - - · India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers (Riverside, N.J.:
The Free Press, 1976).
Cooray, Joseph A. L. Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri Lanka
(Ceylon) (Colombo: Hansa Publishers, 1973).
Jahan, Rounaq. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
- - - · "India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.'' In Gregory Henderson et at..
eds., Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay,
1974), pp. 299-399.
Lal, Jagdish. The Constitution of India, as Amended by Forty-Second Amendment (Delhi: Delhi Law House, 1977).
Pylee, M. V. Constitutional Government in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing
House, 1975, 3rd ed.).
Tripathi, P. K. Some Insights into Fundamental Rights (Bombay: University
of Bombay, N. M. Tripathi, 1972).
Ziring, Lawrence, et at. Pakistan: The Long View (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1977).

Index

Adat law (customary law): in Indonesia, 108, 129; in Malaysia, 129
Administrative Courts (Indonesia),
108
Africa: and comparative legal studies,
10; national aspirations, 146
Allied Occupation (Japan), 5. See
also Occupation of Japan
Ambedkar, B. R.: as chairman of
Indian constitution drafting committee, 66, 70, 71; as representative
of untouchables, 66n; on individual rights, 77-74, 77; on due process,
87
Amendment of constitution: in Asia,
18-19; in Bangladesh, 22, 32, 33; in
India, 61; India's provisions quoted,
95; in Indonesia, 105-106; in Malaysia, 138; in Singapore, 188-189
American colonialism: in the Philippines, 141
Angara v. Electoral Commission (Philippines): quoted, on judicial review,
152-153
Animism: and rule of law, 13
Aquino v. Ponce Enrile (Philippines),
156, I56n

Arabia: and Malaysia, 138
Articles of Confederation (U.S.A.):
similar Indian system advocated, 64
Ashibe, Nobuyoshi: on "least restrictive alternative" principle, 124
Attlee, Clement (Prime Minister): and
Indian independence, 63
Australia: and Papua-New Guinea, 7;
independence, 62; and Government
of India Act, 62-63, 76; and Malaysian law, 131, 132
Awami League (Bangladesh and Pakistan), 21-22
Ayyar, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy: in
making of India's constitution, 64-65
Bangladesh: Islam, 4, 22; independence, 8, 27-28; 1972 Constitution,
28-33; Prime Minister, 28, 31, 32;
English Bill of Rights, 30; and highest population density, 35
Basic Law on Judicial Organization
(Indonesia), 100, 108
Basic Press Law (Indonesia), 109
Bengal: in history of Bangladesh, 21
Bentham, Jeremy: and theory of
rights, 2

(201)

202

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Bhargava, Pt. Thakur Das: on due
process, 86-87, 90
Bickel, Alexander M.: quoted, on
judicial power, 96
Bill of Rights (English): and Bangladesh Constitution, 30
Bill of Rights (U.S.A.): provisions
quoted, 162-163; influence in the
Philippines, 166
Borneo: as part of Malaysia, 128;
receives favored legal treatment, 135
British East India Company, 21
British influence in Asia. See Great
Britain; Colonialism
Brunei, 128
Buddhism: influence in Asia, 4; and
rule of law, 13
Burma: British legal influence, 4; in6ependence, 8; Constitution, on socioeconomic rights, 173; on due
process, I 75; and procedural rights
in Singapore law, 190-191
Buss, Claude A.: quoted, on Asian
nationalism, I 46
Cabinet systems: in Bangladesh, 28. 32;
in Japan, 116; in Malaysia, 130, 137;
in Singapore, 191-192. See also
Executive Yuan
Cahn, Edmond: quoted, on James
Madison's impact, I 63- I 64
Calcutta, 20, 2 I, 13 I
Cambodia: communist victory, 2; independence, 7
Canada: independence, 62; and Government of India Act, 62-63; constitutional rights, 76
Carter, Jimmy (President): human
rights' policy, 3
Casannovas v. Hord(Philippines), !53
Catholicism: in Indonesia, I09n; in the
Philippines, 140,147. See also Christianity
Ceylon. See Sri Lanka
Chiang K'ai-shek (President): as successor to Sun Yat-sen, 36, 42
China: Muslim minofity, 4; People's
Republic of China, 6; traditional
law, 6, 37-38; Ch'ing dynasty, 36, 38,
39-40; traditional governmental system, 37; French legal influence, 41-

42, 50; Japanese legal influence, 50;
and Malaysia, 138
Chowdhury, Abu Sayeed (Justice): on
suspension or rights, 16; as President of Bangladesh, 22, 28n, 32n
Christianity: and rule of law, 13. See
also Catholicism; Protestantism
Citizenship: under Malaysian law, 136
Civil law: in China, 38, 55; in the
Netherlands, 100; in Indonesia, 108109. See also Japan
Civil Rights Act (U.S.A.), 126
Civil War (U.S.A.), 2
Code law. See Civil law
Colonialism: British, 4, 7; in Asia, 4-8;
Japanese, in Korea, 5; Japanese, in
Indonesia, 100; Dutch, in Indonesia,
102, 148; Spanish, in the Philippines,
141, 142, 144, 147; American, in the
Philippines, 141, 147-148; in Singapore, 182
Committee on Asian Law, viil-x, 10
Common law: compared to Indonesian
system, 108; in Malaysia, 129
Communism: in Laos, Vietnam and
Cambodia, 2; in China, 36; Malaysia, 138. See also North Korea
Compensation: Law Governing Compensation for Wrongful Conviction
(Republic of China), 54
Conference of Rulers (Malaysia), 137
Confucianism: in Asia, 4; and rule of
law, 13
Congress Party (India): and Indira
Gandhi, 57; and the Awami League,
63
Conseil Constitutionelle (France): contrasted with Indonesian judicial review system, 108
Constitution: •
-of Bangladesh: suspension of rights,
22, 28; President, 22-23, 31, 32,
provisions and changes, 28-33;
Prime Minister, 28, 31, 32; judicial
review, 30, 33
-of Burma: quoted, on judicial review, 161; on socioeconomic rights,
I 73; on procedural rights, I 75. See
also Burma
-of China, People's Republic of, 6,
6n. See also China; Mao Tse-tung

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA

-of China, Republic of, 6, 6n; tradition, 37-38; President, 45, 46, 47;
Legislative Yuan, 46-47; rights, 46,
49n, 51, 54; judicial review, 47-49;
habeas corpus, 51-53. See also
China; Sun Yat-sen; Chiang K'aishek
-of India: due process wording
from Japan, 12, 85; on judicial
review, 17, 60-62, 160-161; on
socioeconomic rights, 173; on
equality, 175. See also India
-of Indonesia (Proclamation Constitution): judicial review and Supreme
Court, 100, 101, 108-109; origins,
102-103; President, 103, 104-105;
basic principles, 103-104, 106, 107,
108; People's Consultative Assembly, 104-105, 106; rights, 109-110;
quoted, on social welfare, 173-174.
See also Indonesia
-of Japan: writing of, 12; on procedural rights, 85, 175; Constitution
of the Empire of Japan (Meiji Constitution of 1889), 112, 115, 116, 127;
1947 Constitution of Japan, 112,
115, 126-127; on socioeconomic
rights, 174; quoted, on equality
under the law, 176. See also Japan
-of Malaysia (Malaysian Constitution): British influence, 131; critique
of, 138-139; quoted, on judicial review, 160; on equality, 176; and the
Singapore Constitution, 182-183,
187. See also Malaysia; Singapore
-of North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), 5, 5n
-of Pakistan: quoted, on procedural
rights, 175; on equality under the
law, 177. See also Pakistan; Bangladesh
-of the Philippines: 1935 Constitution, 142; 1973 Constitution, 142143, 165-166, 169; President, 142143, 155-157; judicial review, 143,
152-157; rights provisions, 166-169;
rights, 166-172. See also Phili ines

203

ment of, 188-189; rights, 189-191;
Prime Minister, 191-192n. See also
Singapore; Judicial review
-of South Korea (Republic of Korea):
changed, 5-6, 6n; Constitution Committee, !58; quoted, on socioeconomic rights; 174; on equality under
thelaw,l76
-of Sri Lanka: quoted, on judicial
review, 161. See also Sri Lanka
-of the United States of Am.erica: its
antiquity, 10, 90-91, 177; influence
in Asia summarized, 19, 177
Constitution Commission(Singapore):
on rights, 184
Constitution Committee (South Korea): judicial review powers, 158
Constitutional Convention of 1971
(Philippines): candidates and their
freedom, 156
Constitutional Court: of West Germany, 108; of Sri Lanka, 161. See
also Constitution Committee
Constitutionalism: in Asia, 3, 4-9, 177178; comparative study of, 9-10
Control Yuan (Republic of China),
46,48
Council of Grand Justices (Republic
of China), 48-49
Counsel, right to legal: in India, 90;
in Malaysia, 135; in Singapore, 186,
187, 191. See also Procedural rights
Court systems. See Judicial review·
Constitution; Supreme Court
'
Cripps, Sir Stafford: 1942 mission to
India, 27
Customary courts (Indonesia): elimination of, 100
Customs Law: Japan's held invalid in
part, 118

Das, S. R.(Justice): on due process, 9ln
Dec~aration ?flndependence(U.S.A.):
Blcentenmal of, 1-3; its antiquity,
10; quoted, in part, 13, 104; and
constitutional interpretation, 14
Dec_laration of Pr~nciples ~Philip.
. PP
pmes); as a const1tutwnal mnova-of Smgapore: and Malaysian Con- tion 171
stitution, 182-183, 186, 187, 189; in- Decla;ation of the Rights of Man
fluence of India, 186, 187; amend- (France), 2

204

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Defamation: in Indian law, 73
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. See North Korea
de Smith, S.A.,; quoted, on American
and British judicial review doctrine,
159
de Tocqueville, Alexis, 144
Dicey, A.V., 107
Diet (Japan), 116. See also Parliament
Directive Principles of State Policy
(India): quoted, on State's responsibilities to the people, 173
Discrimination: its prohibition in
Bangladesh, 30-31; in Singapore,
192. See also Equality under the law
"Dual standard" principle: useful for
Japanese law, 120-122
Due process. See Procedural rights
Dutch influence: in Indonesia, 7, I 02,
148; in Malaysia, 130
East Asia: Buddhism, 4; colonial history, 5-7. See also China; Japan;
North Korea; South Korea
East Pakistan: becomes Bangladesh,
26, 27
Elections: in Bangladesh, 21-22, 28; in
the Republic of China, 46n; in India,
57, 58; in Indonesia, 106; malapportionment problem in Japan, 117;
in Malaysia, 130, 137; in the Philippines, 155-156; in Singapore, 180.
Emergency powers: in Malaysia, 15-16,
188; and the Bangladesh Emergency,
33; in India, 57-58; in the Philippines, 156-157; in Singapore, 188
Employee rights. See National Public
Employees Law; Rights
Equality under the law: stressed more
than freedom in Asia, 13; in Bangladesh, 30; in Japan, 117, 119; in
Malaysia, 134, 135, 138; legal exceptions to, 135; in the Philippines,
172; in laws of Asian nations compared, 173, 175-177
Equity, the law of: in Indonesia,
108-109
Examination Yuan (Re~ublic of China), 46, 48
Executive systems: in Asia, 18; in the
Republic of China, 46-47; in Indonesia, 107; in Japan, 116. See also

Cabinet systems; President; Prime
Minister
Executive Yuan (Republic of China),
46-47
Expression, freedom of. See Freedom;
Press freedom; Rights
Federal Court (Malaysia), 133, 134.
See also Supreme Court; Judicial
review
Federalism: in Asia and the U.S.A.,
17; Pakistan and India, 26; in India,
57, 62-63, 67, 71; Malaysia and the
U.S.A. compared, 136
Federation of Malaya, 130
Fernando, Enrique (Justice): on U.S.
influence in Asia, 12; on denial of
habeas corpus, 16
Filipino-American War, 147
First Amendment (U.S. Constitution):
interpretations criticized, 13, 15,
109-110, 138. See also Rights; Freedom; Religion
Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. Constitution): and equality under the Bangladesh Constitution, 30
France: in French Indo-China, 7, 145;
on China, 41, 42, 50; legal influence
on Japan, 112
Frankfurter, Felix (Justice): and the
Indian Constitution, 67-68, 85, 94;
paraphrased, I ~7
Freedom: stressed less than equality,
13; of speech and press, 14-15. See
also Press freedom; Rights
Gandhi, Indira (Prime Minister), 57,
97
Gandhi, Mohandas K.: linked with
Thoreau, II
.
Garcia, C. P. (President), 156
Germany: colonialism in Asia, 7; legal
influence on Japan, 112, 126
Gettysburg Address: quoted, 43
Golak Nath case (India), 95-96, 97
Government of India Act (British
Parliament, 1919), 26
Government of India Act (British
Parliament, 1935): in Bangladesh
history, 21; and models for the
Indian Constitution, 62-63; and

CoNSTITUTIONALISM IN AsiA

205

in Malaysia, 131, 132, 134, 136; in
strong central government, 66; and
Singapore, 186, 190-191. See also
rights, 75
Constitution
Great Britain: colonialism in Asia, 4,
7; legal influence in Asia, 4, 148, Indian Independence Act (1947), 27
157; in Burma, 4; in Japan, 115-116; Indonesia: Islam, 4; Dutch colonialism, 7; independence, 8; judicial reParliament compared to Japan's
view, 100, 101, 108-109; President,
Diet, 116; in Malaysia, 129, 131, 137;
103; role of Pancasila, 103, 106,
in Singapore, 182, 186
107; adat law, 108, 129. See also
Guyana: and the Singapore ConstituConstitution; Colonialism
tional Commission, 184
International Commission of Jurists:
focuses on dignity and diversity of
Habeas corpus: in the Republic of
peoples, I07
China, 16, 51-53; in the Philippines,
16, 156; in Bangladesh, 33; in Singa- Ireland: and Malaysian law on emergencies, 15-16
pore, 186-187. See also Procedural
Irish Constitution: and India's Constirights
tution, 68, 76
Hamilton, Alexander: on good governIshida, Kazuto (Chief Justice): on
ment, 149
patricide penalities, 119
Hand, Learned (Judge): and the Indian
Islam: legal tradition in Asia, 4; in
Constitution, 68-69, 85
China, 4; in Indonesia, 4, 109n;
Hinduism: kingship systems, 4; and
and rule of law, 13; in Bangladesh,
rule of law, 13; in India, 56; in
20; in India, 56, 64; Islamic courts
Indonesia, 109n
in Indonesia, 108; in Malaysia, 129,
Hokkaido, Ill, 124
Holland, William L.: quoted, on Asian
132, 138
nationalism, 146
Ito, Prince Hirobumi: as constitutionHolmes, Oliver Wendell (Justice):
maker, 115
quoted, on purpose of constitutions, Ito, Masami: on judicial review in
149; mentioned, 168
Japan, 158
Homogeneity: of Bangladesh, 29; of
Japan, Ill
Hong Kong: British law, 4
Japan: Confucian influence, 4; occupaHonshu, Ill
tion of Indonesia, 100; U.S. CulHouse of the People (Lok Sabha,
tural Mission ( 1949) and freedoms,
India), 57
117-118; occupation of the PhilipHouse of the States (Rajya Sabha,
pines, 141, 147, !55; impact of U.S.
India), 57; and distribution of powConstitution, 177. See also Constiers, 67
tution; Diet; Rights
Hutchins, Robert M.: and press free- Java, 99
dom, 109
Jefferson, Thomas: rights theory cited,
2; on judicial review, 94; quoted, on
Independence movements: in Asia, 4,
liberty, 149
7, 11, 141, 146-147
Jennings, Ivor: and the Malaysian
Independence of Singapore Agreement
Constitution, 132
(1965), 181
Judicial Organization, Basic Law on
India: restraints on liberties in 1970s,
(Indonesia), 100, 108
3n; Muslim minority, 4; indepen- Judicial review: in Asian legal sysdence, 8; society and government,
tems, 16-17, 157-158; in Bangladesh,
57; Parliament and the courts, 61-62;
30, 33; in the Republic of China,
untouchables, 66n, 81; and U.S.
47-49; in India, 60-62, 160-161; in
jurisprudence, 91-93; legal influence
Indonesia, 108; in Japan, 113, 116-

206

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

118; in Malaysia, 133-134, 160-161;
in the Philippines, 143, 152-157; in
South Korea, 158; in the U.S. and
Great Britain compared, 159; as
respected in Asia, 177-178; in Singapore, 188-189
Judicial Yuan (Republic of China),
38, 46
Kania (Chief Justice): on due process,
91n

Kesavananda Bharati case (India),
95-96
Kim 11-sung (Premier), 5
King of Malaysia. See Yang Dipertuan
Agung
Korea: Confucian influence, 2, 4; history, 5; after World War II, 146.
See also North Korea; South Korea;
Constitution
Kuang-shu (Emperor): 1908 declaration of a constitution, 39
Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, China): and court system, 38
Kyilshti, Ill
Lansang v. Garcia (Philippines), 156
Laos: communism, 2; French colonialism, 7; independence, 8; kingship
system, 18
Laski, Harold: quoted, on American
impact, 144; on rights, 162
Laurel, Jose P. (Justice): on judicial
independence, 154; and drafting of
Philippine constitution, 169
"Least restrictive alternative" principle: useful in Japanese law, 124
Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister): as
leader of Singapore, 179; quoted, on
multi-racial and multi-ethnic societies, 185
Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home
Affairs, Singapore & Anon (Singapore), 186-187, 191
Legislative Yuan (Republic of China),
46-47. See also Parliament
Locke, John, 2
Lok Sabha (India), 57
Ma, Herbert H.P.: on habeas corpus,
16, 51-53

Macapagal, Diosdado (President), 156
MacArthur, Douglas: in Japan, 115
McCulloch v. Maryland: quoted, on
incidental powers, 65
Madison, James: quoted, on tyranny,
33; influence analyzed, 163-164
Magna Carta, 30, 158-159, 164
Makalintal (Chief Justice): on martial
law, 156-157
Malay p.!oples: in Malaysian law, 135;
in the Phillipines, 140
Malaya, 128, 129, 179
Malaysia: Islam, 4, 129, 138; independence, 8, 128, 130; King of, 15, 130,
132, 133, 137-138; emergencies, 1516; brief union with Singapore, 130;
Federal Court, 133, 134; Parliament,
133, Conference of Rulers, 137; influence in Singapore law, 187.
See also Constitution; Judicial review; Emergency powers
Malaysia Agreement (1963), 183
Malaysian Constitution. See Constitution
Malolos Constitution (Philippines,
1898), 168
Manchuria: under Japanese control, 7
Mao Tse-tung: establishes People's Republic of China, 6; and the Philippines, 156
Marbury v. Madison: and judicial
review in Japan, 116-117; quoted, on
judicial review, 150; doctrine explained, 151; and Singapore law,
184; quoted, on legislative constitutional amendment, 188-189
Marcos, Ferdinand (President), 142,
156
Marshall, John (Chief Justice): mentioned, 59, 165; on incidental powers, 65; quoted, on judicial review,
150; on legislative constitutional
amendment, 188-189
Martial law: in Asia, 15; in Bangladesh, 22, 32, 32n; and the Philippines, 143, 155, 156-157. See also
Emergency powers
Meiji period: influence in China, 40;
Emperor, 112, 115; Restoration, 114
Military Courts (Indonesia), 108
Mindanao, 140, 156

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA
Miranda v. Arizona: influence in the
Philippines, 170
Mitsubishi Plastic Company case (Japan), 125-126
Monarchy: in Asia, 8, 18. See also
King of Malaysia
Monotheism: in Islamic and Christian
Asia, 13. See also Islam; Catholicism; Protestantism
Mukherjee, B. K. (Justice): on due
process, 91 n
Muslim League (India), 64
Muslims: rebellion in the Philippines,
156. See also Islam

National Public Employees Law (Japan): restraints on workers' freedom, 124
Nationalism: in Asia, 145-148
Natural law: philosophy of, 2, 163,
164; and rights, 24, 25
Nehru, Jawaharlal: on India's Constitution, 65n; as India's leader, 97
Netherlands: colonialism in Asia, 7;
influence in Indonesia, 102, 148;
and Malaysia, 130
North Korea (Democratic People's
Republic of Korea): origins, 5; Constitution, 5, 5n
Obscenity law: in India, 73; in Japan,
122, 122n
Occupation of Japan: and origins of
the Constitution, 112, 115; and
Japan's surrender in 1945, 116
Opium War (China), 36
Pacifism: in Japan, Ill, 113
Paine, Thomas: and rights theory, 2
Pakistan: as British colonial territory,
4; independence, 8; history and division, 20-22; origins, 26-27; and
India, 65; and making of Malaysian
Constitution, 132; on due process,
175; Constitution quoted, on equal
protection, 177. See also Constitution; Islam; British influence
Pancasi/a (Five Principles, Indonesia):
as unchanging State ideology, 103,
103n, 106; and rule of law, 107
Papua-New Guinea: colonial period, 7;
independence, 8

207

Park Chung-hee (President): constitutional powers, 5-6
Parliament: of Bangladesh, 31, 32-33;
Legislative Yuan, 46-47; oflndia, 57,
67; and Indonesian system, 104, 106;
Japan's Diet, 116; in Malaysia, 133,
136; in Singapore, 191, 192
Patricide law: in Japan, 118-119
People's Consultative Assembly (Indonesia): supreme governmental organ, 104-105, 106
People's Republic of China: establishment, 6
Perry, Matthew: arrival in Japan,
114
Pethick-Lawrence, Lord: in India, 27
Petition of Rights: and the Bangladesh
Constitution, 30
Philippine Independence Act (U.S.
Congress, 1934), 141, 147
Philippines: rights restrictions, 3n;
Muslim minority, 4, 156; independence, 7; Catholicism, 140, 147;
Constitutional
Convention
of
1971, 142, 156; nationalism, 147;
Constitutional Convention of 19341935, 148. See also Constitution;
Judicial review
Police powers: law on police offences
challenged, 52; under the Indian
Constitution, 89, 90. See also Public welfare
Political liberties: separable frotn economic liberty, 14. See also Rights;
Press freedom
Portugal: colonialism in Asia, 7; in
Malaya, 130
Potsdam Declaration: and Japan's surrender, 116
Pound, Roscoe: in China as advisor,
50n; and the use of courts, 52n
President: limited influence of U.S.
Presidency, 18; of Bangladesh, 31,
32; of Republic of China, 45, 46,
47; of India, 57; of Indonesia, 103,
104-105; of India compared to King
of Malaysia, 137; of the Philippines,
142-143, 155-157; of Singapore, 192.
See also Executive systems; Prime
Minister
Presidential Council for Minority
Rights (Singapore), 192

208

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Press freedom: in Indonesia, 109;· in
Japan, 116. See also Rights
Prime Minister: of Bangladesh, 28, 31,
32; of the Republic of China, 47; of
India, 57; of Malaysia, 137; of
Singapore, 191, 192n. See also President; Cabinet systems
Privy Council (Great Britain): appeal
to from Malaysian courts, 129
Procedural rights: in India's Constitution, 83; Indian use of Japan's constitutional wording, 85; in Malaysia,
134, 135; in Asian constitutions,
167, 175; in Singapore, 190-191. See
also Counsel; Habeas corpus; Equality under the law
Proclamation Constitution. See Constitution of Indonesia
Property rights: stressed less than
equality in Asia, 14; in Japan, 121122; limits of in Singapore, 190.
See also Rights
Protestantism: in Indonesia, 109n; in
the Philippines, 147. See also Christianity
Provisional Constitution (China), 41
Public Enterprise Labor Relations
Law (Japan): denial of right to
strike, 124
Public welfare: as constitutional standard, 120-121
Quirino, Elpidio (President), 155, 156n

Religion: and the .rule of law, 13;
freedom of, in Republic of China,
46; in India, 80-81; in Indonesia,
109-110; in Japan, 116; in Malaysia,
138. See also Rights
Religion, Ministry of (Indonesia), 100,
109n

Religious Courts (Indonesia), 108
Republic of China, 6. See also China;
Constitution
Republic of Korea. See South Korea
Republic of Singapore Independence
Act, 187-188, 189
Resolution of the People's Consultative Assembly (Indonesia): of higher
legal order than statute, 106, 107 .
Respondeat superior: in Republic of
China law, 53-54
Revolution: in Asia, 4
Rights: suspension in Bangladesh, 22,
28; in Bangladesh, 30-31; in the
Republic of China, 46, 49n, 51, 54;
in India, 72-74, 82, 85; in Indonesia,
109-JIO; in Japan, 113, 116, 120121, 123-125; in Malaysia, 134-135;
in the Philippines, 166-172; in Singapore, 189-191. See also Equality;
Press freedom; Property rights; Procedural rights; Religion
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (President):
confrontation with Supreme Court,
59
Rosinger, Lawrence K.: quoted, on
Asian nationalism, 146
Rostow, Eugene V.: quoted, onjudicial
review, 94
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 2, 105
Roxas, Manuel (President): mentioned, 155; quoted, on need for
statement of principles in a constitution, 171
Rule of law: and religion in Asia, 13.
See also Supremacy of the Constitution
Russia: in Korea, 5; colonialism in
Asia, 7; defeat by Japan, 39

Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur: and Bangladesh autonomy, 22; assassination of,
32n
Rahman, Zaiur (General): becomes
leader of Bangladesh, 22-23
Rajya Sabha (India), 57, 67
Rao, B. Shiva: and making of India's
Constitution, 63n, 70
Rau, Sir B. N.: as Constitutional
Advisor, India, 64; and the Constitution, 66; visit to the United States,
67
Recto, Claro M.: as President, Philippine Constitutional Convention
( 1934), 154, 167-168
Reid, Lord: as head of commission on Sabah, 128, 130, 179
Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore Order
Malaysian Constitution, 132
in Council (Great Britain), 183,
Reischauer, Edwin 0.: as member of
!83n
1949 mission to Japan, 117

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA

Sarawak, 128, 130, 179
Sarufutsu case (Japan): and public
employee rights, 124-125.
Scandinavia: and Singapore Constitutional Commission, 184
Search and seizure: in the Philippines,
169. See also Procedural rights;
Rights
Seno Adji, Oemar (Chief Justice): on
documentary constitutionalism, 10;
on the American presidency, 18
Separation of powers: in Bangladesh,
33, 34; in Republic of China, 43-45;
in Malaysia, 131. See also Constitution
Shikoku, Ill
Shimoda, Takezo (Justice): dissent in
patricide decision, 119
Shivkant Shukla case (India): and
political detention, 57; and habeas
corpus, 97-98
Shotoku, Prince, 112
Simon, Sir John: and constitutional
reform, Indian subcontinent, 26
Singapore: influences on, 4, 7; independence, 8, 179, 181; and Malaysia,
128, 129, 130, 179, 181, 182; rights
under Constitution, 189-191; Prime
Minister, 191, 192n. See also
Amendment of constitution; Constitution
Singh, Sardar Hukum: on due process,
86
Sino-Japanese War of 1894, 39
Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, 36
South Asia: colonial history, 7-9. See
also Bangladesh; India; Pakistan;
Sri Lanka
South Korea: restraints on rights, 3n;
President Park Chung-hee, 5-6; origins, 5. See also Constitution
Southeast Asia: colonial history, 7-9,
146. See also Burma; Cambodia;
Indonesia; Laos; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Vietnam
Spain: influence in the Philippines,
140, 141, 142, 144, 153
Sri Lanka (Ceylon): British legal influence, 4; independence, 8; Dutch
influence, 17; judicial review, 161

209

"State action" principle: in United
States law, 14; and Japan's law,
123,126
Stevenson, Adlai: quoted, on aspirations of the Third World, 146
Straits Settlements, 181
Strong, C. F.: on complexity of constitutional government, 108
Suffian bin Hashim, Tun Mohamed:
on emergencies and rights in Malaysia, 15-16; quoted, on judicial review, 160-161
Suharto, President: his election, 105,
105n; his political role since 1965,
105n
Sukarno, President: adjourned Constituent Assembly, 101; removed from
office, 105
Sultan of Yogyakarta: as Vice-President of Indonesia, I05n
Sultans (Malaysia): constitutional
roles, 17, 130, 137-138
Sulu Islands, 140
Sun Yat-sen: as leader of modern
China, 36, 40-55 passim
Supremacy of the constitution: in
Asia, 19; in Indonesia, 107, 159; in
Malaysia, 133; as a definition of
constitutionalism, 145; In the Philippines, 150-151; in Singapore, 188189. See also Rule of law
Supreme Court: of Bangladesh, 33; of
India, 60-62; of Indonesia, 108; of
Japan, 117, 118; of the Philippines,
142, 143; political cases and Philippine court, 155-157. See also Council
of Grand Justices; Federal Court;
Judicial review
Switzerland: legal influence in Republic of China, 54n, 55
Taiwan, 6. See also Republic of China
Tanaka, Jiro (Justice): on invalidity of
patricide provision, 119
Taylor, George E.: quoted, on nationalist sensibilities in Southeast
Asia, 146
Ter Haar, B.: on Indonesia law and
courts, 108-109
Thailand: maintenance of independence, 8; popularity of the monarchy, 18

210

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Thayer, James Bradley: on judicial
review, 59-60, 94, 96
Theory: Western ideas in Third World,
2; on constitutionalism, 9-10. See
also Declaration of Independence;
Declaration of Principles; Directive
Principles of State Policy; Pancasila;
Three Principles of the People
Third World: antiquity of traditions,
2; dictatorial regimes, II; as "middle zone" political systems, 16
Three Principles of the People (San
Min Chu /, Republic of China): as
basis for Constitution, 42-45, 54
Tokugawa period: and premodern
Japanese law, 112, 119
Tokyo Central Post Office case (Japan): and workers' rights, 123-124
Treaty of Paris (1898): and the Philippines, 147
Truman, Harry S. (President): and the
Indian Constitution, 69

Vietnam: war in, 2, 3; Confucianism,
4; independence, 7
Warren, Earl (Chief Justice): and the
Philippine Constitution, 165
Watergate affair (U.S.A.), 2
Wee, Ching Jin (Chief Justice): on
habeas corpus, 186-187
Weeramantry, C.G.: quoted, on natural law basis of rights, 2; on the
U.S. and the Third World, II
Wheare, K.C.: quoted, on brevity in
constitutions, 106-107
Wilson, Woodrow(President): quoted,
on self-determination, 25, 145
Workers' rights: in Japan, 123-125.
See also Rights
World War II: in Indonesia, 100; in
the Philippines, 141, 147; in Singapore, 181

Yamin, Mohd.: quoted, on U.S. constitutional documents, 104
Ukai, Nobushige: on religion and Yang Dipertuan Agung (King of
Malaysia): constitutional roles, 130,
Japanese democracy, 13; on freedom, 15
132, 133, 137-138
Unconstitutionality: legal effect de- Yuan Shih-k'ai: as President of China,
41
bated in Japan, 119-120
Unequal treaty system: in Asia, 5;
Zurcher, Arnold J.: quoted, on purin China, 6, 36
poses of a constitution, 149
United Nations: human rights covenants, 2n
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 2
Untouchability (India): 66n, 81

